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FOREWORD BY THE CHAIR
Our Committee is delivering this Report to Parliament in the middle of an 
unprecedented health and consequential economic crisis. But our Report focuses 
on a different form of crisis, one with roots that extend far deeper, and are likely 
to last far longer than COVID-19. This is a virus that affects all of us in the 
UK - a pandemic of ‘misinformation’ and ‘disinformation’. If allowed to flourish 
these counterfeit truths will result in the collapse of public trust, and without trust 
democracy as we know it will simply decline into irrelevance. 
The situation is that serious.
In the digital world, our belief in what we see, hear and read is being distorted 
to the point at which we no longer know who or what to trust. The prospects for 
building a harmonious and sustainable society on that basis are, to all intents and 
purposes, non-existent.
Our Report addresses a number of concerns, including the urgent case for reform 
of electoral law and our overwhelming need to become a digitally literate society. 
We must all become better equipped to understand the means by which we can be 
exploited, and the motives of those doing so. Misinformation can pervert common 
sense to the point at which it is easy to forget the fragile foundations upon which so 
many of our freedoms are built - until they become threatened. With so many of 
those freedoms curtailed in lockdown it seems possible that as we regain them, we 
may wish to contribute more fully towards reimagining and reshaping our future.
In our Report we make forty-five recommendations which, taken together, we 
believe could serve as a useful response to a whole series of concerns. 
We urge the Government to implement them.
Our Committee met against a backdrop of troubling realities; the first being 
the power that has been ceded to a few unelected and unaccountable digital 
corporations; companies which between them control the flow of information that 
has such a profound influence on our daily lives. The second is an increasing 
abandonment of the seven Principles of Public Life adopted by a Parliament in crisis 
just twenty-five years ago. As a Committee we have tested our recommendations 
against these principles in the hope that those holding positions of power and 
influence in the public and private sectors might similarly respond.
Trust, be it in Government, the media, the giant digital platforms, or civil society 
generally, must be resurrected, and then reinforced every day.
I will forever be grateful to the Committee who, along with our extraordinarily 
committed officials, remained undistracted by a seemingly endless stream of 
breaking stories, each of which threatened at times to derail our considerations - 
from the proroguing of Parliament to the public arguments between the President 
of the United States and social media platforms.
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The unanimous views of our Committee were recently summed up by Shoshana 
Zuboff, author of the 2018 book ‘The Age of Surveillance Capitalism’:
“It’s down to lawmakers to protect democracy in an age of surveillance, 
whether it’s market driven or authoritarian driven. The sleeping giant of 
democracy is finally stirring, lawmakers are waking up, but they need to 
feel the public at their backs. We need a web that will offer the vision of 
a digital future that is compatible with democracy. That is the work of 
the next decade.”1
We sincerely hope our Report will be a useful contribution to what is clearly an 
urgent epoch-shaping debate.
Lord Puttnam 
Chair of the Select Committee on Democracy and Digital Technologies
1 ‘Inside China’s controversial mission to reinvent the internet’ Financial Times (27 March 2020): https://
www.ft.com/content/ba94c2bc-6e27-11ea-9bca-bf503995cd6f [accessed 8 June 2020]
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SUMMARY
Democracy faces a daunting new challenge. The age where electoral activity 
was conducted through traditional print media, canvassing and door knocking, 
is rapidly vanishing. Instead it is dominated by digital and social media. They 
are now the source from which voters get most of their information and political 
messaging.
The digital and social media landscape is dominated by two behemoths–
Facebook and Google. They largely pass under the radar, operating outside 
the rules that govern electoral politics. This has become acutely obvious in the 
current COVID-19 pandemic where online misinformation poses not only a 
real and present danger to our democracy but also to our lives. Governments 
have been dilatory in adjusting regulatory regimes to capture these new realities. 
The result is a crisis of trust.
Yet our profound belief is that this can change. Technology is not a force of 
nature. Online platforms are not inherently ungovernable. They can and should 
be bound by the same restraints that we apply to the rest of society. If this is 
done well, in the ways we spell out in this Report, technology can become a 
servant of democracy rather than its enemy. There is a need for Government 
leadership and regulatory capacity to match the scale and pace of challenges 
and opportunities that the online world presents.
The Government’s Online Harms programme presents a significant first step 
towards this goal. It needs to happen; it needs to happen fast; and the necessary 
draft legislation must be laid before Parliament for scrutiny without delay. The 
Government must not flinch in the face of the inevitable and powerful lobbying 
of Big Tech and others that benefit from the current situation.
Well drafted Online Harms legislation can do much to protect our democracy. 
Issues such as misinformation and disinformation must be included in the 
Bill. The Government must make sure that online platforms bear ultimate 
responsibility for the content that their algorithms promote. Where harmful 
content spreads virally on their service or where it is posted by users with a large 
audience, they should face sanctions over their output as other broadcasters do.
Individual users need greater protection. They must have redress against large 
platforms through an ombudsman tasked with safeguarding the rights of 
citizens.
Transparency of online platforms is essential if democracy is to flourish. 
Platforms like Facebook and Google seek to hide behind ‘black box’ algorithms 
which choose what content users are shown. They take the position that their 
decisions are not responsible for harms that may result from online activity. 
This is plain wrong. The decisions platforms make in designing and training 
these algorithmic systems shape the conversations that happen online. For this 
reason, we recommend that platforms be mandated to conduct audits to show 
how in creating these algorithms they have ensured, for example, that they are 
not discriminating against certain groups. Regulators must have the powers to 
oversee these decisions, with the right to acquire the information from platforms 
they need to exercise those powers.
Platforms’ decisions about what content they remove or stop promoting through 
their algorithms set the de facto limits of free expression online. As it currently 
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stands the rules behind these decisions are poorly defined. Their practical 
operation should reflect what the public needs. In order to protect free and open 
debate online, platforms should be obliged to publish their content decisions 
making clear what the actual rules of online debate are.
Alongside establishing rules in the online world, we must also empower citizens, 
young and old, to take part as critical users of information. We need to create a 
programme of lifelong education that will equip people with the skills they need 
to be active citizens. People need to be taught from a very young age about the 
ways in which platforms shape their online experience.
The public needs to have access to high quality public interest journalism to 
help inform them about current events. This requires fair funding to support 
such journalism.
Platforms must also be forced to ensure that their services empower users to 
exercise their rights online. The public need to understand how their data is 
being used. We propose that this obligation of fairness by design should be a 
core element in ensuring platforms meet their duty of care to their users.
Parliament and government at all levels need to invest in technology to engage 
better with the public.
Electoral law must be completely updated for an online age. There have been no 
major changes to electoral law since the invention of social media and the rise 
of online political advertising. As the Law Commission recently pointed out, a 
wholesale revision of the relevant law is now needed. This should include rules 
that set standards for online imprints on political advertisements so that people 
can see who they come from and advert libraries that enable researchers and the 
public to see what campaigns are saying. The Electoral Commission needs the 
powers to obtain the information necessary to understand when individuals are 
breaking the rules and to be able to set fines that act as a real deterrent against 
flagrant breaches. We also need to ensure that there is greater clarity around the 
use of personal data in political campaigns; the Information Commissioner’s 
guidance should be put on statutory footing.
We take the nolan Principles of Public Life as our guide in this Report, and as 
the standard to which individuals in public life should be held. In turn, platforms 
and political parties should aspire to the same high standards.
We believe this Report sets out a way whereby digital technology is no longer in 
danger of undermining democracy but rather where the wonders of technology 
can support democracy and restore public trust.

Digital Technology and the 
Resurrection of Trust
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1. This Committee was asked by the House of Lords Liaison Committee to 
consider Democracy and Digital Technologies. To do so, we have taken a 
broad view of democracy. We do not believe that democracy is a single event 
that happens every few years.2 Whilst elections are a vital part of a modern, 
representative democracy, they are insufficient in themselves; a democracy 
is defined by its shared institutions and shared values.3 The shape of these 
institutions and values change over time and as the context in which we 
operate shifts. This is perhaps never more the case than at moments like the 
current COVID-19 pandemic. Of course, technology too changes over time, 
often rapidly, and this has an impact on our democracy.
2. Democracy is an enduring feature of British society, but it can be eroded 
unless it is upheld and protected by citizens, civil society, companies and 
elected representatives. It is vital for us to continually invest time and focus 
in defining and protecting democratic ideals. We must resist the emergence 
of undemocratic practices and institutions and strengthen public trust and 
confidence in democratic processes.
3. In effect these technologies are reshaping not only our private lives but 
also our public life and our democracy. People now have a printing press, 
a broadcast station and a place of assembly in their pockets.4 This gives 
them the opportunity to express themselves and challenge ideas in a way 
that was not possible even a decade ago. This has encroached on existing 
power structures in increasingly evident ways. Social media allows people to 
take part through tiny acts of participation that were never before possible.5 
Previously, taking part in politics was the preserve of an active few who had 
the resources of time or money to lobby, join a political party or knock on 
doors during an election. now more of the public can take part simply by 
liking a post, following a campaigner or sharing a video of a news item. More 
people now encounter political debate through social media than would 
have done so in the past.6 People who would not have previously engaged in 
the everyday discussion of democracy are now taking an active part. This 
increased participation, although it has empowered many, has, paradoxically, 
shifted power toward a very small group of new gatekeepers; the individuals 
who determine the ways in which the technology platforms operate. These 
individuals can, purposefully or not, change whose voice is heard. It has also 
introduced new opportunities for individuals and organisations with malign 
intentions to manipulate the flow of political debate.
2 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (Penguin, translation published 1968) p 141
3 Bernard Crick, Democracy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)
4 Q 32 (Caroline Elsom)
5 Q 46 (Professor Helen Margetts)
6 Q 46 (Professor Cristian Vaccari)
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Box 1: Definition of platforms
The defining feature of platforms, as used in this Report, in the context of 
democracy and digital technology is that they intermediate between their 
customers and content that they do not create (and that they do not usually pay 
for either). This is achieved through indexing content that exists elsewhere on the 
internet, such as Google, or through user submitted content, such as Facebook, 
Twitter or YouTube. As a result, they often offer harmful content that can have 
a detrimental effect on individuals and society. This can be compounded by 
the business models of these platforms. The largest platforms in this space are 
all funded by advertising and are incentivised to increase user attention. Many 
of these platforms harvest users’ personal data to effectively algorithmically 
rank and recommend content to maintain user attention. This can incentivise 
an increased spread of harmful content as we discuss throughout this Report. 
Algorithmic ranking and recommending of content mean these platforms are 
making de facto editorial decisions and we consider them as such in this Report.
neither advertising, nor algorithmic recommendation is a necessary condition 
for spreading harmful content. For example, WhatsApp features neither but still 
has been used to spread concerning content. Throughout this Report we refer 
to platforms, online platforms or technology platforms as ways to describe these 
intermediary services. These intermediaries are not necessarily bad. If platforms 
were to effectively abide by the norms of a democratic society through tackling 
harmful content rather than spreading it then they could play a powerful, 
constructive role in supporting democracy.
4. The rise of these platforms has not occurred in a vacuum. Even before the 
rise of social media our society was reshaping itself and what democracy 
means in our daily lives. There has been a long-term decline of social, 
cultural and political institutions which would have at one point been core 
arenas for democratic activity. The fall in membership in churches, trade 
unions, sporting associations, and local community organisations means that 
our democracy would look very different to how it looked 50 years ago with 
or without the internet. Power has dramatically shifted from civil society 
organisations to privately owned companies.
5. Focusing on democracy is particularly important given rapid changes in 
society brought about by technology. Developments in the communications 
environment have had a significant impact on the democratic landscape, 
including public debate, political learning and participation. Public 
debate has changed from being the reserve of a relatively small number of 
newspapers, television channels and radio stations, to a situation whereby 
millions of people across the UK are able to broadcast their thoughts to their 
fellow citizens. Within this landscape, private companies such as Facebook 
and Twitter have become major sites of public debate where we share news 
and opinions. In addition, Google has become a basic tool to find answers 
to all manner of questions and acquire new information. There are also new 
platforms for democratic engagement and activism online, and specialist tools 
have been crafted to help people shape the environments in which they live. 
The role these technologies play in our lives has been dramatically accelerated 
over the past decade and even more so by the COVID-19 crisis. As many of 
us have been forced to withdraw into our homes we have increasingly come 
to rely on these technology platforms to connect us with the rest of society.
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Source: (1) Facebook, Facebook Reports First Quarter 2020 Results (April 2020): https://investor.fb.com/investor-
news/press-release-details/2020/Facebook-Reports-First-Quarter-2020-Results/default.aspx , (2) Alexa, Site info 
for youtube.com (June 2020): https://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/youtube.com, (3) inernetlivestats, Google Search 
Statistics (June 2020): https://www.internetlivestats.com/google-search-statistics/, (4) Mention, 2018 Twitter 
Report, https://info.mention.com/hubfs/Twitter%20Engagement%20Report%202018%20%7C%20Mention.pdf, 
[accessed 2 June 2020]
6. During the COVID-19 crisis, technology has become our means of accessing 
health advice, the way we conduct business and the medium through which 
we organise politically. In this environment the spread of misinformation has 
become an even more critical issue as the wrong information could topple a 
government, bankrupt a business and is literally a matter of life and death. 
The effects of COVID-19 have shown the sharp end of this underlying 
societal shift.
7. This change in the way that politics happens and where power lies requires us 
to think deeply about how our parliamentary form of democracy works and 
how it can be improved. There is an urgent need to establish a vision of how 
technology platforms should function in our society. This is vital, because 
whilst it is easy to assume that we all share the same understanding of what 
democracy means and how technology should be used to promote these 
ideas, there are actually competing conceptions of what good practice looks 
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like. Indeed, there are already signs that Moscow, Beijing and Silicon Valley 
have very different ideas for what should be done which are not compatible 
with how we would view democracy.7 To ensure we have the democracy we 
desire, we need to create a vision of how technology can support rather than 
undermine representative parliamentary democracy. This should help us 
push back against efforts from those in Moscow and Beijing who see an 
opportunity to shape debate and undermine democracy and against an 
indifferent Silicon Valley where support for parliamentary democracy is not 
a feature of their business plan.
8. Before that can happen though, there must be public trust in the democratic 
process and those who make decisions. The problem, put starkly, is that the 
public do not trust politicians. This is not new; according to the Ipsos Mori 
Veracity Index, at no point since 1983 have even a quarter of the public 
trusted politicians to tell the truth.8 Instead, the most trusted professions 
are people who have worked to understand their field and have professional 
standards that require them to act in the public’s interests. nurses, doctors 
and teachers are the most trusted professions. They are more trusted now 
than when Ipsos Mori first began asking the question, with nine out of ten 
people trusting nurses to tell them the truth. This lack of trust in politicians 
leads to cynicism, with 56 per cent of the public saying that they tend to 
ignore what parties and politicians say because they know they cannot trust 
them.9 We are concerned that such distrust of politicians may extend to 
distrust of the democratic process itself.
9. This trust in authoritative sources is reflected in who people trust in a crisis. 
Research from the Reuters Institute found that the most trusted sources of 
news on the COVID-19 crisis were scientists, doctors and health experts, with 
87 per cent saying they trusted them.10 Far fewer people trusted technology 
platforms to bring them accurate news. Only 31 per cent trusted search 
engines, 14 per cent trusted social media, 12 per cent trusted messaging apps 
and 11 per cent trusted video sites. This compares to 60 per cent who trusted 
established news organisations to give them accurate information.
10. There have been many attempts over the years to improve public trust in 
those who work on their behalf. In this Report, we sought to learn from the 
nolan Principles of Public Life, which have, in the decades since they were 
established, set out non-partisan criteria for what we expect from individuals 
working in public life.11 We have looked at these principles and expanded 
them to help define what our democracy requires. For our democracy to 
flourish, we need informed citizens, accountability, transparency, inclusive 
public debate, free and fair elections, and an active citizenry. We have built 
our Report around these six principles and the role of technology in enabling 
7 Q 36 (Alex Krasodomski-Jones) 
8 Ipsos Mori, ‘Ipsos Mori Veracity Index 2019’ (november 2019): https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/
files/ct/news/documents/2019–11/trust-in-professions-veracity-index-2019-slides.pdf [accessed 13 
May 2020]
9 Full Fact, Research into public views on truth and untruth in the 2019 General Election: Final Report (December 
2019): https://fullfact.org/media/uploads/ff_election_research_report_final_version_16.12.19.pdf 
[accessed 13 May 2020]
10 Reuters Institute, ‘navigating the ‘infodemic’: how people in six countries access and rate news and 
information about coronavirus’ (April 2020): https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/infodemic-how-
people-six-countries-access-and-rate-news-and-information-about-coronavirus [accessed 13 May 
2020]
11 Committee on Standards in Public Life, ‘The 7 principles of public life’ (May 1995): https://www.gov.
uk/government/publications/the-7-principles-of-public-life [accessed 13 May 2020]
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them. There are further questions about the relative size and power of 
technology companies that have strong implications for democracy but have 
been beyond the scope we could cover in a year-long inquiry. We commend 
the work of the Von der Leyen administration at the European Commission 
which has been leading on this question.
11. Public debate should be between informed citizens. In Chapter 2, we discuss 
how we can ensure citizens are well informed by tackling misinformation 
and boosting the reach of good information, including the question of how 
to regulate political advertising, the role of fact checkers, how our public 
institutions can better inform the public and the importance of supporting 
public interest journalism.
12. Democracy requires that those who hold power must be accountable for 
that power. Currently online platforms have built up an alarming amount of 
power with very few means by which they can be held to account for the way 
they influence public debate. Digital technology will not deserve a future in 
our democratic society unless it can win people’s trust and acceptance.12 As 
a result, in Chapter 3 we look at what technology platforms’ responsibilities 
should be and how they can be better held to account for what they do. 
This includes the role of the Government’s Online Harms work and how 
we believe it can help to protect our democracy. We also look at ways for 
individuals to seek redress when something goes wrong online.
13. For the public to trust individuals with power there must be transparency. 
People must understand how platforms function in order to have faith that 
they are fair arbiters of democratic discussion. In Chapter 4 we consider the 
information which platforms should share with researchers, what platforms 
should share about the algorithms that govern them, and how open companies 
should be about the decision-making process regarding what can stay on 
their platforms.
14. We can also further improve our democracy by using technology specially 
designed to foster an inclusive debate. In Chapter 5, we therefore discuss 
the importance of using technology to enhance democracy in a responsible 
manner and the ways the Government can support this innovative sector.
15. The ultimate accountability mechanisms in a democracy are free and 
fair elections. We need our electoral law to be able to cope with digital 
campaigning, which has become one of the most important elements of our 
elections. In Chapter 6, we discuss the need for updating electoral law, the 
powers of the Electoral Commission, the case for greater transparency in 
political advertising through imprints and archives, and the need for digital 
campaigning to respect people’s data rights.
16. Democracy is enhanced through active citizens seeking to improve the society 
in which they live. In Chapter 7, we look at how education can empower 
citizens to make a difference to their lives in a digital world. We discuss how 
to create world class digital media literacy in the UK, the ways in which 
we can improve digital understanding right across the curriculum, and how 
online platforms can be designed to empower citizens to make decisions for 
themselves.
12 Margrethe Vestager, Shaping a digital future for Europe (February 2020): https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/commissioners/2019–2024/vestager/announcements/shaping-digital-future-europe_en 
[accessed 26 May 2020] 
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The Committee’s work and acknowledgements
17. We were appointed on 13 June 2019 with the broad remit “to consider 
democracy and digital technologies”. We experienced numerous disruptions 
to our inquiry throughout its lifetime. On 28 August 2019, the Prime 
Minister announced that Parliament would be prorogued in September. 
Parliament was suspended on 10 September and was due to return on 14 
October 2019. On 24 September, the prorogation was deemed null and of 
no legal effect by the Supreme Court and Parliament resumed the next day. 
nevertheless, the impact was that we lost valuable weeks in which we could 
have continued our inquiry. Then, on 31 October, Royal Assent was given to 
the Early Parliamentary General Election Act 2019 and a General Election 
was held on 12 December. Parliament, and therefore this Committee, was 
dissolved on 6 november. Our Committee and its membership had to be 
re-established in the new Parliament. We are grateful to the Senior Deputy 
Speaker for extending our reporting deadline from 31 March to 23 June 
2020, but again we lost some momentum and weeks in which we could 
have taken evidence. Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic presented some 
disruption as Parliament went into recess early and we were instructed to 
work from home. Our evidence session with Ministers took place virtually, 
and this Report was similarly agreed virtually. Despite these interruptions, 
we are confident that the quality of our work has not been adversely affected. 
COVID-19 has in fact brought the importance of the issues raised in our 
Report to prominence in ways that we could not have possibly foreseen.
18. Another disruption that we feel it necessary to mention was that the 
two biggest political parties refused to give evidence to us in person. We 
approached the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties to give 
evidence to us on 25 February to discuss their use of digital technologies in 
campaigning, amongst other issues. The Conservative Party refused to give 
evidence in person but offered to give written evidence. The Labour Party 
initially offered to send a representative, but pulled out the day before the 
evidence session, meaning it had to be cancelled. Only the Liberal Democrats 
were willing to send a representative. We then asked the parties for written 
evidence in response to the questions we were due to ask them. This was 
duly provided. We were disappointed that we could not hear from the parties 
in person, as we heard numerous times that political parties must be more 
transparent to increase public trust in the democratic system. We hope that 
the parties share our goal of resurrecting public trust in democracy; their 
conduct would imply otherwise.
19. In reply to our call for written evidence, we received 83 submissions. We 
heard oral evidence from 66 witnesses, and from some of them we received 
supplementary written evidence. The witnesses are listed in Appendix 2. 
We are most grateful to all of those who sent us their ideas or spoke to us 
in person. Their evidence was invaluable and forms the basis of our work. 
We are likewise deeply grateful to the pupils from Oasis Media Academy 
in Salford and Queen Elizabeth’s School in Devon, and the six teachers 
who participated in our digital surgeries, who described their experience of 
both teaching and learning about digital media literacy. We are especially 
grateful to Harriet Andrews from The Politics Project for coordinating these 
sessions. We tender our thanks to Ravi naik, Legal Director at AWO and 
Visiting Fellow at the Oxford Internet Institute, who provided legal advice 
to the Committee and diligently reviewed drafts of this Report. Throughout 
the course of our inquiry, we have been extremely fortunate to have had 
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Dr Kate Dommett, Senior Lecturer in the Public Understanding of Politics 
and Director of the Crick Centre at the University of Sheffield, as our 
specialist adviser. We offer her our thanks for her invaluable expert advice 
and thoughtful input.
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CHAPTER 2: INFORMED CITIZENS
20. One of our key concerns in this inquiry is the effect of inaccurate or malicious 
information on our democracy. Will Moy, Chief Executive of Full Fact, 
explained the effects of misinformation:
“Bad information can ruin lives. It damages people’s health. It promotes 
hate and it hurts democracy. We now see people suffering from curable 
diseases because they have been misled by false information about 
vaccines. There is false information about public health issues related, 
for example, to the rollout of 5G mobile communications technology. 
We see terrorist attacks sometimes promoted by people who have been 
radicalised by false information online.”13
Box 2: Definition of misinformation and disinformation
Baroness O’neill of Bengarve neatly explained the difference between 
misinformation and disinformation:
“… if I make a mistake and tell you that the moon is made of blue 
cheese, but I honestly believe it, that is misinformation. If I know 
perfectly well that it is not made of blue cheese but tell you so, that is 
disinformation.”14
Whether or not information is purposefully false does not change whether it is 
harmful. In our Report we use ‘misinformation’ where it is unclear if there was 
purposeful intent to misinform and only label something ‘disinformation’ if that 
intent is clear.
 14
21. Research from Full Fact during the 2019 General Election showed that 
misinformation reduces faith in democracy, trust in politicians and people’s 
drive to participate.15 It found that 17 per cent of the public said that they 
were less likely to vote because of the level of false and misleading claims 
in that election campaign. Focus group participants reported that political 
misinformation made them lose trust in the political process and even made 
them angry.
22. We have heard suggestions that the rise in misinformation and disinformation 
is a consequence of digital change. Alex Krasodomski-Jones Director of the 
Centre for the Analysis of Social Media at Demos told us that a breakdown in 
a common reality and the sense of an agreed set of facts on which democracy 
rests is a key symptom of digital change.16 However, this may be taking 
too rosy a view of the pre-digital world. The Kofi Annan Commission on 
Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age explained:
“… just as fake news and hate speech have been around for centuries, 
there has never been a time when citizens in democracies all shared the 
same facts or agreed on what constitutes a fact. Democratic citizens 
often disagree on fundamental facts and certainly do not vote on the 
13 Q 85 (Will Moy)
14  Q 9 (Baroness O’neill of Bengarve)
15 Full Fact, Research into public views on truth and untruth in the 2019 General Election (December 2019) 
p 17: https://fullfact.org/media/uploads/ff_election_research_report_final_version_16.12.19.pdf 
[accessed 13 May 2020]
16 Q 32 (Alex Krasodomski-Jones)
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basis of shared truths. Democracy is needed precisely because citizens 
do not agree on fundamental facts.”17
Misinformation and the media
23. Offline media has also had an active role in circulating misinformation. In 
recent months there have been shocking examples of broadcast media actively 
promoting dangerous conspiracy theories in the context of the COVID-19 
pandemic.18 London Live, a local TV station, hosted known conspiracy 
theorist David Icke for an 80-minute interview in which he went largely 
unchallenged. During this interview Mr Icke spread false information about 
the pandemic. In its defence to Ofcom, the station argued that whilst Mr 
Icke’s views were absurd it was playing an important role in holding power to 
account and acting in a responsible manner. The station’s acknowledgment 
of the absurd nature of Mr Icke’s view shows that it was well aware that it was 
not acting in a responsible manner. Whilst Ofcom have enforced a correction 
to be shown on the station, at time of writing it has kept its broadcasting 
licence.
24. On ITV’s This Morning show, presenter Eamonn Holmes suggested that 
people were right to be concerned about links between 5G and COVID-19. 
He criticised individuals who correctly identified this as dangerous 
misinformation suggesting that they were simply fitting in with ‘the state 
narrative’. These irresponsible and dangerous comments were made at 
a time when Ofcom identified the most common piece of misinformation 
that individuals encountered online about COVID-19 was linking its origin 
or causes to 5G technology. There have also been a number of attacks on 
communications workers and infrastructure.19 Misinformation has appeared 
in many newspapers. The Daily Mail, The Daily Express, The Sun and 
The Metro all published misinformation about mass cremations occurring 
in China during the early days of COVID-19.20
25. It is not clear that online misinformation is particularly worse than offline 
misinformation or should be viewed as separate from it. A study from the 
Reuters Institute found that whilst 38 per cent of social media users reported 
seeing large amounts of false or misleading information about COVID-19, 
it found no link between using social media as a source of information and 
having a lack of knowledge about the virus.21 A further study looked at online 
misinformation about COVID-19 which had been fact checked. It found 
that although claims made by prominent public figures like celebrities and 
17 Kofi Annan Foundation, ‘Protecting Electoral Integrity in the Digital Age’ (January 2020) p 29: 
https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/app/uploads/2020/01/f035dd8e-kaf_kacedda_report_2019_
web.pdf [accessed 13 May 2020]
18 Ofcom, ‘Ofcom decisions in recent programmes featuring David Icke and Eamonn Holmes’ (20 April 
2020): https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/latest/features-and-news/david-icke-and-eamonn-
holmes-decision [accessed 13 May 2020]
19 Ofcom, ‘Covid-19 news and information: consumption and attitudes’ (April 2020) p 1: https://www.
ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0031/194377/covid-19-news-consumption-weeks-one-to-three-
findings.pdf [accessed 13 May 2020] and Wired, ‘The 5G coronavirus conspiracy theory just took a 
really dark turn’ (7 May 2020): https://www.wired.co.uk/article/5g-coronavirus-conspiracy-theory-
attacks [accessed 27 May 2020]
20 Full Fact, ‘These aren’t satellite images and they don’t show evidence of mass cremations in Wuhan’ 
(February 2020): https://fullfact.org/health/satellites-wuhan-sulphur-dioxide-coronavirus/ [accessed 
13 May 2020]
21  Reuters Institute, ‘navigating the ‘infodemic’: How people in six countries access and rate news and 
information about coronavirus’ (April 2020): https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/infodemic-how-
people-six-countries-access-and-rate-news-and-information-about-coronavirus [accessed 13 May 
2020]
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politicians were responsible for just 20 per cent of claims in their sample, 
these claims accounted for 69 per cent of the total social media engagement 
with misinformation.22 This suggests that online misinformation often comes 
through platforms broadcasting powerful individuals as well as through 
private individuals sharing within their own networks.
26. A particular example of online disinformation coming from powerful 
individuals and organisations is disinformation originating from foreign 
governments. Investigations from the US Senate have found that foreign states 
such as Russia use information warfare to sow societal chaos and discord.23 
In the context of COVID-19, Russian state-funded sources have promoted 
disinformation that washing hands does not help fight the spread of the virus 
and that 5G can kill you.24 Meanwhile, Chinese state representatives have 
tried to spread the false suggestion that the virus did not originate in China 
but was spread to China by the US army.25
27. The 2019 General Election provides a good case study of how traditional 
media can play a key role in promoting online misinformation and its effects 
on democracy. During the election campaign period the Conservative Party 
and the Labour Party both published analysis of the effects of their own and 
each other’s policies. These consisted of largely meaningless numbers that 
were not based upon credible assumptions.26 Despite this fact, both received 
largely uncritical coverage from sympathetic newspapers.27 The same analysis 
was publicised through social media accounts for both parties.28 Similarly 
online advertising by both parties repeated claims made in news coverage.29 
There has also been criticism of the Liberal Democrats for circulating bar 
charts that overstate their chances of winning an election both in paper 
22 Reuters Institute, ‘Types, sources, and claims of COVID-19 misinformation’ (April 2020): https://
reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/types-sources-and-claims-covid-19-misinformation [accessed 13 
May 2020]
23 Richard Burr, ‘Senate Intel Releases new Report on Intel Community Assessment of Russian 
Interference’ (April 2020): https://www.burr.senate.gov/press/releases/senate-intel-releases-new-
report-on-intel-community-assessment-of-russian-interference [accessed 13 May 2020]
24 EU vs Dinsinfo, ‘EEAS Special Report Update: Short assessment of narratives and disinformation 
around the Covid-19 pandemic’ (April 2020): https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-special-report-update-
short-assessment-of-narratives-and-disinformation-around-the-covid-19-pandemic/ and The Verge, 
‘Why the 5G coronavirus conspiracy theories don’t make sense’ (April 2020): https://www.theverge.
com/2020/4/9/21214750/5g-coronavirus-conspiracy-theories-radio-waves-virus-internet [accessed 13 
May 2020]
25 Stanford Cyber Policy Center, ‘Coronavirus Conspiracy Claims: What’s Behind a Chinese Diplomat’s 
Covid-19 Misdirection’ (March 2020): https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/news/china-covid19-origin-
narrative [accessed 13 May 2020]
26 Full Fact, ‘Another flawed “cost of Corbyn” figure from the Conservatives’ (november 2019): https://
fullfact.org/news/cost-of-corbyn-figure-flawed/ and Full Fact, ‘Labour claims about savings under 
their policies are not credible’ (December 2019): https://fullfact.org/election-2019/labour-claims-
about-savings-under-their-policies-are-not-credible/ [accessed 13 May 2020]
27 ‘The true ‘cost of Corbyn’: £2,400 a year for every British worker, claim Tories’, The Telegraph (12 
november 2019): https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2019/11/12/true-cost-corbyn-2400-year-
every-british-worker-claim-tories/ and ‘Labour will put £6,716 in your pocket with savings on bills 
and higher minimum wage’, Mirror UK (3 December 2019): https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/
labour-put-6716-your-pocket-21019899 [accessed 13 May 2020]
28 @Conservatives, tweet on 12 november 2019: https://twitter.com/Conservatives/status/11 
94268864269312000 and @UKLabour, tweet on 5 December 2019: https://twitter.com/UKLabour/
status/1202679030777962501
29 Full Fact, ‘The facts behind Labour and Conservative Facebook ads in this election’ (December 
2019): https://fullfact.org/election-2019/ads/ [accessed 13 May 2020]
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leaflets and over social media.30 In the context of this misinformation being 
spread across platforms it is not surprising that the public became deeply 
cynical about politicians; 76 per cent of the public agreed that voters were 
being misled by false and dishonest claims and 56 per cent stated that they 
tend to ignore what parties and politicians say because they know they cannot 
trust them.31
Political advertising
28. One of the important tools that political parties use to reach out to voters 
online is advertising. Political advertising is regulated differently to other 
advertising. Commercial advertising online is the responsibility of the 
Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) according to a self-regulated system. 
The advertising industry has a Committee of Advertising Practice (CAP) 
which writes Advertising Codes that advertisers are expected to adhere to.32 
The non-broadcast code explicitly rules out political advertisements from 
being covered by the code.33 The ASA acts as the regulator for the code, 
ensuring that advertising adheres to its standards. If advertisers persistently 
break the code and do not work with the ASA, then they can be referred 
to Trading Standards who take enforcement activity using their legal 
powers.34 Until 1999 political advertising was subject to some clauses of the 
code such as rules on offensiveness.35 However, the decision was made to 
exclude political advertising due to concerns over the ability of the ASA to 
act quickly enough, concerns around the 1998 Human Rights Act and a lack 
of consensus among the main political parties.36 These decisions were made 
in an era before online political advertising was a pressing concern but apply 
both to online and offline adverts.
29. We heard concerns about the regulation of political advertising. Matthew 
d’Ancona of Tortoise Media warned against creating a Ministry of Truth that 
attempted to regulate falsity.37 The Conservative Party told us that rather 
than regulate advertising it should be the role of the Government to ensure 
that there is an independent free press to facilitate robust political debate 
and scrutinise claims.38 The Labour Party argued that political adverts were 
more restricted by the disclosure requirements of platforms and the Electoral 
Commission than any commercial advertising is.39
30 First Draft, ‘The main parties embrace a local digital strategy to win over voters’, (november 
2019): https://firstdraftnews.org/latest/uk-election-the-main-parties-embrace-a-local-digital-strate 
gy-to-win-over-voters/ and Full Fact, ‘Lowering the Bar’ (november 2019) https://fullfact.org/
electionlive/2019/nov/28/lowering-the-bar/ [accessed 13 May 2020]
31 Full Fact, Research into public views on truth and untruth in the 2019 General Election (December 2019): 
https://fullfact.org/media/uploads/ff_election_research_report_final_version_16.12.19.pdf [accessed 
13 May 2020]
32 ASA, ‘About the ASA and CAP’: https://www.asa.org.uk/about-asa-and-cap/about-regulation/about-
the-asa-and-cap.html [accessed 13 May 2020]
33 ASA, ‘Scope of the CAP Code’: https://www.asa.org.uk/type/non_broadcast/code_folder/scope-of-
the-code.html [accessed 13 May 2020]
34 ASA, ‘Self-regulation and co-regulation’: https://www.asa.org.uk/about-asa-and-cap/about-regulation 
/self-regulation-and-co-regulation.html [accessed 13 May 2020]
35 Ravi naik, Political Campaigning: The law, the gaps and the way forward (October 2019) p 37: https://
oxtec.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/115/2019/10/OxTEC-The-Law-The-Gaps-and-The-
Way-Forward.pdf [accessed 13 May 2020]
36 Written evidence from the ASA (DAD0029)
37 Q 102 (Matthew D’Ancona)
38 Written evidence from the Conservative Party (DAD0095) 
39 Written evidence from the Labour Party (DAD0096) 
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30. Whilst these are legitimate concerns, the exemption of political advertising 
undermines confidence in the quality of public debate. Keith Weed, President 
of the Advertising Association, told us that in order for the public to have 
confidence in the quality of debate, political advertising needs to be held to 
the same standards of being legal, decent, honest and truthful as commercial 
advertising.40 The LSE Truth, Trust and Technology (T3) Commission told 
us that the current arrangement was not sustainable as paid advertising on 
social media becomes a more important element of political communication 
in the UK.41 It called for a mandatory code for political advertising. The 
Coalition for Reform of Political Advertising stated that 84 per cent of the 
public support a legal requirement that factual claims in political adverts must 
be accurate. 42 It recommends regulation covering political advertising in all 
formats including all types of media directly under the advertiser’s control 
like social media accounts and websites and all types of publicity that is 
earned by the campaign, for example coverage earned by editorial influence. 
This is the same scope that the ASA has for commercial advertising.
31. The Coalition for Reform of Political Advertising argued that if campaigns 
made what seem to be objective and quantifiable claims then those claims 
should be accurate and stand up to independent scrutiny.43 However, Guy 
Parker, CEO of the ASA, cautioned that this approach would be difficult.44 
He told us that the vast majority of claims that would be contested in political 
advertising would not fall into the category of outright lies but would instead 
be statements where there could be arguments for and arguments against. 
Mr Parker highlighted that this was of particular concern because any 
regulatory judgement on this area is highly likely to be challenged by way of 
judicial review. If that were to happen, he suggested that courts would give a 
large amount of discretion to those speaking.
32. Given the lack of support from the two largest political parties, it is clear 
that a self-regulatory model could struggle. Lord Currie, Chair of the ASA, 
told us that being a collective self-regulatory system was crucial to the ASA’s 
success.45 He told us that as there was no buy-in from political parties it was 
not clear that their system could work in this area. However, Guy Parker 
pointed out that if regulation was introduced to create such a system it would 
de-facto have received political support in order to pass through Parliament, 
as Parliament is made up of political parties.46 Lord Currie expressed a 
concern that the contentious nature of regulating this area could undermine 
trust in the ASA more broadly.47 He also stressed that a regulator would need 
substantial resources in order to adjudicate on claims at the speed required 
by political campaigns. Guy Parker proffered the suggestion that regulation 
could work if it focused on outright lies rather than misleading statements. 
Both Guy Parker and Lord Currie told us that their personal opinion was 
that political advertising should be regulated. Since giving evidence to us the 
ASA has publicly stated that political advertising should be regulated.48
40 Q 77 (Keith Weed)
41 Written evidence from the LSE T3 Commission (DAD0078)
42 Written evidence from the Coalition for Reform in Political Advertising (DAD0071) 
43 Written evidence from the Coalition for Reform in Political Advertising (DAD0071) 
44 Q 61 (Guy Parker)
45 Q 61 (Lord Currie of Marylebone)
46 Q 61 (Guy Parker)
47 Q 61 (Lord Currie of Marylebone)
48 ‘British political advertising must be regulated. How to do it is a harder question’, The Guardian 
(3 June 2020): https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jun/03/british-political-advertisin 
g-regulated-parties-support [accessed 3 June 2020]
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33. The ASA’s reluctance to be the sole regulator of this area is part of a general 
reluctance from regulators to be given this role. Professor Helen Margetts, 
Professor of the Internet and Society at the University of Oxford and 
Director of the Public Policy Programme at The Alan Turing Institute, told 
us that the ASA, the Electoral Commission, Ofcom, and the Information 
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) all expressed a preference that a different 
regulator be responsible.49 Keith Weed, the LSE T3 Commission and the 
Coalition for the Reform of Political Advertising all suggested that the 
ASA and the Electoral Commission should work together on this area.50 
Guy Parker suggested that one way to mitigate the reputational risk to any 
one regulator would be to create a temporary body during a campaign period 
which drew on expertise from a range of different regulators.51
34. The suggestion put forward by Guy Parker of a joint approach with expertise 
from different regulators that focused on removing outright lies from the 
political conversation is a sensible way forward. However, his suggestion that 
it would be temporary is untenable as important political activity takes place 
outside of campaign periods and time would be needed for relevant bodies 
to develop productive ways of working together. The ASA’s experience 
regulating advertising could be useful in developing this scheme, as could the 
experience of the Office for Statistics Regulation from their efforts to correct 
public figures who misuse national statistics, as well as the experience of 
the Electoral Commission of the processes of political parties. Investigations 
should be expedited to ensure they reach a conclusion in time to have an 
effect before the relevant election. This may involve creating fast-track 
procedures that differ from existing ASA practice.
35. This process would unquestionably be more effective if it had the support of 
political parties from across the political spectrum and across the UK. It is 
incumbent on them to engage with this process to help restore public trust 
in political debate. As individuals in public life, politicians from all parties 
should abide by the nolan Principles, which include being accountable, 
open and honest. In order to achieve this there must be regulation of political 
advertising.
36. The relevant experts in the ASA, the Electoral Commission, 
Ofcom and the UK Statistics Authority should co-operate through 
a regulatory committee on political advertising. Political parties 
should work with these regulators to develop a code of practice for 
political advertising, along with appropriate sanctions, that restricts 
fundamentally inaccurate advertising during a parliamentary or 
mayoral election, or referendum. This regulatory committee should 
adjudicate breaches of this code.
Tackling misinformation and disinformation online
37. The regulated approach suggested above would help tackle inaccurate 
formal activity during political campaigns. However, this will not solve the 
broader problem of the prevalence of misinformation and disinformation 
online. The Online Harms White Paper recognises that hostile actors 
could use disinformation to undermine our democratic values and includes 
49 Q 54 (Professor Helen Margetts)
50 Q 78 (Keith Weed), written evidence from the LSE T3 Commission (DAD0078), written evidence 
from the Coalition for Reform in Political Advertising (DAD0071)
51 Q 63 (Guy Parker)
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disinformation as a harm within its scope. However, there has been concern 
that it may not be included in the final Bill. The Government’s response to 
its consultation on the White Paper only mentioned disinformation in noting 
that some civil society groups had concerns about its inclusion and the effect 
this would have on freedom of expression.52 Kevin Bakhurst, Group Director 
of Content and Media Policy at Ofcom, suggested that it was not yet decided 
if disinformation should be in their remit.53
38. As outlined at the beginning of this Chapter, misinformation is harmful, 
which the Government knows. Caroline Dinenage MP, the Minister for 
Digital and Culture, told us that misinformation online about coronavirus is 
a mixture of already illegal content such as calls to attack 5G infrastructure 
and harmful content such as fake nurses suggesting false cures.54 We know 
that misinformation online is reducing trust in vaccines which may play a 
crucial role in combatting the novel coronavirus.55 Government must act to 
reduce its spread. We believe that, on balance, this would not be too much 
of a restriction on free expression if it focuses on preventing misinformation 
from being recommended rather than whether it is hosted on the platform. 
We discuss this in greater detail and present our recommendations for the 
Online Harms White Paper in Chapter 3 on accountability. Intent is irrelevant 
to whether bad information is harmful and therefore both misinformation 
and disinformation should be covered.
39. Chloe Smith MP, Minister for the Constitution and Devolution, told us that 
she believed that our elections were not less secure and robust due to the 
fact that the Government had yet to implement its Online Harms work.56 
She added that “there should be no need to think that we are in some way 
vulnerable to interference right now.” That is a worryingly complacent 
attitude given the evidence of our systemic vulnerability to misinformation. 
As the evidence stated above shows, individuals are being put off taking part 
in democracy due to the prevalence of misinformation. There is also reason to 
believe that foreign states are actively pushing disinformation to undermine 
faith in the democratic process. The next generation of voters spend ever 
greater amounts of their time online and have their political views shaped 
by this. In the context of the COVID-19 crisis it is not difficult to imagine 
future misinformation campaigns either deterring people from voting in an 
election or undermining the legitimacy of an election outcome. This makes 
misinformation and disinformation existential issues for the future of our 
democracy. The Government should wake up and understand this.
40. The Online Harms Bill should make clear that misinformation and 
disinformation are within its scope.
52 Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS) , Home Office, ‘Online Harms White Paper 
– Initial consultation response’ (February 2020): https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/
online-harms-white-paper/public-feedback/online-harms-white-paper-initial-consultation-response 
[accessed 13 May 2020]
53 Q 282 (Kevin Bakhurst)
54 Q 331 (Caroline Dinenage MP)
55 Centre for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, ‘Facebook studies reveal mistrust winning on 
vaccine messaging’, 14 May 2020: https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2020/05/facebook-
studies-reveal-science-mistrust-winning-vaccine-messaging [accessed 3 June 2020]
56 Q 344 (Chloe Smith MP)
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The role of fact checkers
41. One of the more recent tools to fight misinformation are dedicated fact 
checking teams. These take the form of teams within news organisations, such 
as the BBC’s Reality Check Team57 and Channel 4’s FactCheck team,58 or 
dedicated organisations like Full Fact and FactChecknI. Matthew d’Ancona 
of Tortoise Media told us that the development of fact checkers was an 
exciting development but also an indictment of modern journalism as this 
used to be a part of journalists’ role.59
42. Avaaz has suggested that the role of fact checkers should be built into the 
processes of technology platforms.60 It argues that platforms should feed 
potential misinformation to fact checkers, reduce the spread of misinformation 
once it has been identified as such by fact checkers and show those who have 
seen the misinformation the fact checkers’ verdict. Some elements of this 
exist in Facebook’s third-party fact checking initiative. Under this initiative, 
Facebook presents to its fact checking partners a queue of content that could 
potentially be misinformation.61 Fact checkers choose what content to check 
(including content outside of this queue) and are paid by Facebook for each 
article they write. Content that has been marked as misleading or false is 
then down weighted in Facebook’s recommendation algorithm. Facebook 
told the House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) 
Select Committee that during the month of April 2020 it displayed warning 
labels on approximately 50 million pieces of content related to COVID-19 
based on around 7,500 articles, although it is unclear what proportion of 
total number of misleading articles this represents.62 Karim Palant, UK 
Public Policy Manager at Facebook told us that this reduces the content’s 
spread by 80 per cent of what it otherwise would have been.63 This shows the 
power of Facebook’s algorithms in recommending content to users and the 
impact of choosing to no longer recommend harmful content. Full Fact have 
described this as the high watermark of internet companies supporting fact 
checkers.64
43. Other platforms have partnerships with fact checkers, but these are much 
less transparent, and it is difficult to determine their efficacy. Google’s 
programme inserts articles written by fact checkers that Google’s algorithm 
determines to be a reliable source into a privileged position in search results.65 
This happens where fact checking organisations identify individual pages 
as containing fact checks to Google using the meta-data of a page (parts of 
a webpage read by machines but not by visitors).66 Google’s algorithm then 
57 Written evidence from the BBC (DAD0062)
58 Written evidence from Channel 4 (DAD0055) 
59 Q 105 (Matthew D’Ancona)
60 Written evidence from Avaaz (DAD0073) 
61 Full Fact, Report on the Facebook Third-Party Fact Checking programme Jan-June 2019 (July 2019): 
https://fullfact.org/media/uploads/tpfc-q1q2-2019.pdf [accessed 13 May 2020]
62 Correspondence between Facebook and the Digital, Culture, Media and Support Select Committee, 
14 May 2020 (Session 19–21): https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/1173/documents/10106/
default/ [accessed 27 May 2020]
63 Q 306 (Karim Palant)
64 Full Fact, The Full Fact Report 2020: Fighting the causes and consequences of bad information (April 2020) 
p 97: https://fullfact.org/media/uploads/fullfactreport2020.pdf [accessed 13 May 2020]
65 Google The Keyword blog, ‘Fact Check now available in Google Search and news around the world’ 
(7 April 2017): https://blog.google/products/search/fact-check-now-available-google-search-and-new 
s-around-world/ [accessed 13 May 2020]
66 Google Search Help, ‘See fact checks in search results’: https://support.google.com/websearch/answer 
/7315336 [accessed 13 May 2020]
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decides which search results to put these fact checks in and where to put 
them.
44. As with many of the topics identified in Chapter 4 on transparency, Google 
does not explain these processes to the outside world. However, we do note 
that on occasion this approach has gone badly wrong. In late 2019 if an 
individual asked Google the question “Do Muslims pay Council Tax?”, 
Google would return an answer drawn from Full Fact’s fact check on this 
question.67 This incorrectly repeated the claim that Full Fact was checking 
and attributing that to Full Fact rather than Full Fact’s verdict. As a result, 
Google’s top search result stated that Full Fact said that Muslims did not 
pay council tax. This was also the case if someone asked the question of 
Google’s voice assistant.68 In turn, video clips of Google assistant stating 
that Full Fact said that Muslims do not pay council tax spread online. This 
is despite the fact that the relevant page of Full Fact’s website’s meta-data 
was correctly formatted to be registered as a fact check by Google.69 It is not 
clear how often Google has been spreading dangerous misinformation in this 
manner. When we raised this specific issue with Google, Vint Cerf told us 
that machine learning systems can be brittle and break easily for unknown 
reasons.70 This type of intellectually remote response is deeply concerning 
given the real effects this type of misinformation can have. Misinformation 
about Muslims contributes to other false narratives that are used against 
groups who suffer discrimination and hate based violence. It is unclear that 
platforms accept the gravity of the consequences of their decisions.
45. During the COVID-19 crisis, YouTube began adding fact checks to certain 
search results in the United States following a previous trial in Brazil and 
India.71 YouTube’s description suggests that this works in a similar way to 
Google’s fact checking initiative.72 As this work is in its early stages and 
YouTube is not transparent about its processes it is unclear to what extent 
the fact checks are being correctly matched with relevant search results and 
are not being presented in a misleading manner.
46. A significant difference between Avaaz’s correct the record proposal and 
the Facebook third-party fact checking initiative is that Facebook does not 
automatically show individuals who have seen misinformation a fact checker’s 
correction. One concern is that doing this may cause a backfire effect, where 
it further embeds the misinformation rather than reducing the individual’s 
belief. Avaaz studied this effect by creating a fake version of Facebook (called 
Fakebook) that mimicked the way that Facebook functioned. It found in 
this test that corrections reduced belief in misinformation by 50 per cent.73 
Avaaz’s review of the literature supports its suggestion that the primary effect 
67 Full Fact, The Full Fact Report 2020: Fighting the causes and consequences of bad information (April 2020) 
p 95: https://fullfact.org/media/uploads/fullfactreport2020.pdf [accessed 13 May 2020]
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is to reduce rather than increase belief in misinformation. To date, Facebook 
has not tested this at scale on their own website. Karim Palant told us that 
they had tested it during the 2019 election on certain misinformation but 
were unsure of its effect.74 In response to the COVID-19 crisis Facebook 
began the process of testing showing correct information to people who had 
previously posted misinformation.75 This included testing different language 
on what this might look like including in some cases an explicit correction 
of the misinformation.76 Facebook have not committed to publishing the 
results of these tests.
47. Will Moy of Full Fact told us that whilst he viewed Facebook’s scheme as 
positive and recommended it be spread to other platforms, he believed there 
was need for greater transparency.77 Mr Moy called for an independent 
assessment of the programme. Karim Palant of Facebook argued that this 
independent assessment was already possible on the basis of the data that 
Facebook had recently released for academic research.78 However, this is 
not the case. Independent researchers have not been granted access to the 
queue of potential disinformation that Facebook sent to fact checkers and 
so cannot audit this mechanism. Facebook have stated that this queue is 
populated with content flagged by both human reviewers and algorithmic 
selection.79 However, not even the fact checkers know whether a specific 
piece of content was referred by a human reviewer or an algorithm.80 Without 
Facebook sharing this information with an external reviewer it is impossible 
to independently determine whether this process works properly or how it 
could be improved. This would be a good area for public interest research 
commissioned through Ofcom in line with the recommendations in Chapter 
4 on transparency.
48. Facebook have purposefully hobbled their third-party fact checking initiative 
by exempting all elected politicians and candidates for office from being 
fact checked. Allan Leonard of FactChecknI told us that this harmed his 
organisation’s reputation as it made the public believe that fact checkers 
did not check politicians when in reality this is the majority of their work.81 
Karim Palant of Facebook indicated to us that Facebook did not want to 
be seen as the referee of all political disputes whose role is to mark which 
contributions are true or false.82 He told us that attaching a fact check to 
politicians’ statements on the platform would mark a sharp departure for 
political debate. Mr Palant argued that it would be quite extreme for an 
elected politician’s communication to the public to be overlaid with whether 
it was true or not. He stated that this policy only applied to posts originating 
from politicians and that if a politician posted content from elsewhere that 
contained misinformation it would be fact checked. Facebook’s definition of 
a politician is essentially arbitrary, not fact checking candidates for elected 
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75 Facebook, ‘An Update on Our Work to Keep People Informed and Limit Misinformation About 
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office but allowing proxies who play a similar role in public debate to be fact 
checked.
49. Facebook has been inconsistent in its preference for staying out of political 
debate or allowing fact checkers to operate on politically sensitive content 
not posted by politicians. For example, Facebook removed a fact check 
from a video containing misinformation about abortion after US lawmakers 
complained about the existence of the fact check.83 There were no material 
concerns with the accuracy of the fact check and it was supported by an 
independent secondary review.84 This suggests that Facebook’s position is 
more about avoiding political pressure than any particular concern about 
preserving democratic debate.
50. There are legitimate questions about the way in which platforms have 
responded to misinformation about the COVID-19 crisis. Platforms have 
removed content posted by the heads of state of Brazil and Venezuela 
advocating for hydroxychloroquine as a cure for COVID-19.85 On the other 
hand, they have allowed the US President to advocate for the same drug.86 
Facebook removed groups that were created to organise protests against social 
distancing measures.87 Mark Zuckerberg stated that this was due to these 
groups posting misinformation suggesting that social distancing was not 
effective.88 Another Facebook spokesperson clarified that this was consistent 
with Facebook’s policy of not allowing groups to organise events that break 
the law as these protests were.89 However, civil liberties groups including the 
Un special rapporteur on freedom of expression criticised this decision. It 
is not clear how much misinformation an item of content can contain before 
it is viewed as misinformation and is removed from the platform. Platforms 
have not clearly explained their thinking or released fact checks of each 
individual case explaining why each piece of content is inaccurate.
51. Tackling misinformation online requires transparency in order to be effective 
as well as to ensure a thriving democratic debate. The International Fact 
Checking network (IFCn) is a global alliance of fact checkers which seeks 
to promote best practice in the field.90 The IFCn has a code of principles 
requiring that all fact checkers who sign up publish the sources for all of the 
information in their fact checks and have an open and honest corrections 
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policy.91 This ensures that fact checks can be disputed and corrected as part of 
a democratic debate within civil society based on facts. Paddy McGuinness, 
former Deputy national Security Adviser, told us that to ensure a healthy 
democratic debate we must rely on civil society to establish whether something 
is true or not rather than relying on the state or private companies.92
52. It is not clear that the fact checking eco-system that currently exists in the UK 
is able to handle the suggested role in improving online debate. Facebook’s 
third-party fact checking initiative only partners with signatories to the IFCn’s 
code of principles.93 During our evidence taking process only Full Fact and 
FactChecknI were UK based signatories.94 Reuters were added as a third UK 
partner in late March 2020.95 Will Moy of Full Fact told us he was concerned 
about how to scale up Facebook’s initiative to the scale required by the 
internet.96 FactChecknI is focused solely on northern Ireland, leaving only 
Full Fact and Reuters to monitor misleading information for the rest of the 
UK. The programme would cease to function in most of the UK if anything 
happened to Full Fact and Reuters or their relationship with Facebook. In 
the netherlands Facebook’s only fact checking partner dropped out from 
the programme because it disagreed with Facebook’s policy not to fact check 
politicians, effectively discontinuing the programme there.97 Jenni Sargent, 
Managing Director at First Draft, warned that the financial incentives in the 
programme could draw new entrants into the fact checking market in order 
to receive this compensation and that this could cause an erosion of trust.98 
Sir Julian King, former EU Security Commissioner, told us that support for 
independent fact checkers is one thing that the UK could do to increase 
societal resilience against external disinformation threats.99 Given the public 
concern in this area there is a case for regulatory involvement to promote a 
diverse range of fact checking organisations which have incentives that are 
clearly aligned with the public interest.
53. There are also legitimate concerns about the scale of the fact checking 
response compared to the vast amount of misinformation that is propagated 
on online platforms. Whilst fact checking has a role to play in reducing the 
spread of misinformation it is not currently sufficient to tackle the scale of 
the problem as it exists on these platforms.
54. Ofcom should produce a code of practice on misinformation. This 
code should include a requirement that if a piece or pattern of content 
is identified as misinformation by an accredited fact checker then it 
91 Poynter, ‘International Fact Checking network: The commitments of the code of principles’: https://
ifcncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/know-more/the-commitments-of-the-code-of-principles [accessed 
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should be flagged as misinformation on all platforms. The content 
should then no longer be recommended to new audiences. Ofcom 
should work with platforms to experiment and determine how 
this should be presented to users and whether audiences that had 
previously engaged with the content should be shown the fact check.
55. Ofcom should work with online platforms to agree a common means 
of accreditation (initially based on the International Fact Checking 
Network), a system of funding that keeps fact checkers independent 
both from Government and from platforms, and the development 




56. Alongside tackling bad information, it is important to promote good 
information in order to encourage and support citizens in an informed 
democratic debate. Jenni Sargent of First Draft told us that there was a 
risk of damaging public debate if too much focus is put on fact checkers 
publishing what is not true rather than also focusing on publishing and 
promoting accurate reporting.100 Caroline Dinenage MP, Minister for 
Digital and Culture, told us that one of the things she would like to see 
continue after the COVID-19 crisis would be platforms’ efforts to promote 
good information.101 Ed Humpherson, Director General for Regulation 
at the Office for Statistics Regulation (OSR), told us that he worries more 
about the failure of good information to be properly communicated in a way 
that is useful to the public than he does about misinformation.102 He argued 
that we should spend as much time thinking about what it means to inform 
as to misinform.103 A United nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UnESCO) report on misinformation and COVID-19 stated 
that it was vital for governments to release public data about the spread of 
the disease and the Government’s response to COVID-19 was crucial to 
informing public debate.104 Oliver Dowden MP, the Secretary of State for 
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport told the DCMS Select Committee that 
he viewed his primary focus as promoting good news sources in response to 
COVID-19 and that dealing with misinformation was a secondary focus.105
57. Ed Humpherson told us that too many statistics were presented and 
communicated in a dry and mechanical way which meant that good 
information is not getting to the public where it was needed.106 Allan Leonard 
of FactChecknI gave an example from northern Ireland where data was 
being misused as it had not been communicated in the right context and how 
in response the northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (nISRA) 
created a tool called nI: In PROFILE which helps to combine different data 
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products in a way that are easy to understand and can be better communicated 
to the public.107 Ed Humpherson agreed that nI: In PROFILE was a 
positive development. He told us that to answer important policy questions 
many different statistics from different data sets are required and that better 
integrating and communicating existing data would be a useful service.108
58. Will Moy of Full Fact praised the Office for national Statistics (OnS) as an 
important institution that can help democracy but highlighted the difference 
between it and an organisation like the BBC.109 He noted that the BBC’s 
mission is to educate, entertain and inform and that entertainment is part of 
their role to get people’s attention. Mr Moy argued that good journalism gets 
people’s attention and does something useful with that attention. Statisticians 
are not journalists. They do not necessarily possess the skills needed to get 
the public’s attention and nor should we expect them to.
59. In response to the COVID-19 crisis there have been great efforts put into 
informing public debate. In a remarkably short time, government statisticians 
have ensured that there are high quality statistics available to help others 
scrutinise government policy.110 However, there are still concerns about how 
to communicate these statistics to the public.111
60. The issue of how best to communicate statistics has been explored many times 
before, from a report by the Statistics Commission in 2007 to an inquiry by 
the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee in 2013.112 
These inquiries noted some of the same issues we encountered including 
a difficulty in communicating statistics to the broader public. The lack of 
understanding of exactly who the users of statistics are was also noted in a 
2019 Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee inquiry 
into the UK Statistics Authority as a whole.113 That report recommended 
a user engagement strategy. However, these inquiries did not focus on the 
ways that official statistics can be used in an online world dominated by large 
social media platforms. We suggest a more specific approach than previous 
reviews, looking at the role of official statistics in informing online debate.
61. The House of Lords Communications and Digital Select Committee 
should consider conducting an inquiry to examine the communication 
of official statistics in an online world.
Making use of parliamentary expertise
62. Alongside the Office for national Statistics (OnS), the UK has other 
institutions that can help inform public debate. Several witnesses praised 
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the Libraries of both Houses of Parliament. Will Moy of Full Fact described 
them as building blocks that can help tackle the harms that come from bad 
information.114 However, he noted that they are focused on a specific audience 
and, like the OnS, are not journalists who are skilled at garnering public 
attention.115 Dr Alan Renwick from the UCL Constitution Unit told us 
that the Libraries produce great, impartial information but that more could 
be done for them to feed into wider democratic processes.116 Liz Moorse, 
Chief Executive of the Association for Citizenship Teaching, expressed her 
frustration that while the House of Commons Library normally produces 
high-quality information to inform the public debate, during an election it 
has to stop its work. She told us: “That seems crazy. We desperately need 
good-quality information for citizens during election periods.”117
63. Parliament is dissolved 25 days before a General Election.118 This means 
that Members of both Houses are not able to make requests of either 
Library. There are also no Select Committees. The substantial number of 
researchers and policy specialists working across committees and Libraries 
cease to inform public debate at a critical time. For scale, there are over 100 
policy professionals employed by both Houses whilst there are just seven fact 
checkers at Full Fact and three fact checkers at Channel 4.119 Currently the 
election period is used for ad hoc secondments for professional development 
but this could be an opportunity to use Parliament’s resources to improve 
public debate at what for many people is the most critical time.120
64. Parliament cannot speak for itself whilst it is dissolved so parliamentary 
resources should be used in partnership with another organisation that 
could communicate with the public. These partnerships would need to be 
with organisations that are impartial in order to maintain the neutrality of 
parliamentary staff. Broadcasters play a key role in informing the public 
during an election period and are regulated to ensure their impartiality. This 
could make them a key partner and a channel to use parliamentary expertise 
to better inform the public.
65. Parliament should establish formal partnerships with broadcasters 
during election periods to make optimal use of its research expertise 
to help better inform election coverage.
Public interest journalism
66. A further means of better informing the public is to provide greater 
support to public interest journalism. James Mitchinson, Editor of the 
Yorkshire Post, told us that the best way to inform the public was to use 
legislative and technological solutions to draw people’s attention to and 
increase the prominence of trusted sources of news from trained journalists.121 
He argued that, to date, technology platforms have had a dramatic negative 
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effect on local journalism. One analysis suggests that spending from small 
to medium sized businesses on advertising has risen between 2009 and 
2019 from £2.1 billion to £5.1 billion for Google and from £25 million to 
£1.3 billion for Facebook whilst falling from £1.5 billion to £5.9 million for 
the local press.122 Mr Mitchinson stated that due to changes in the business 
model necessitated by platforms over the last decade, the output generated 
by local newspapers and websites has fallen by half.123 He suggested that 
there was an urgent need for technology platforms to more fairly distribute 
their revenue with news providers. Mr Mitchinson stated that much of the 
wealth generated through platforms came from the work done by regional 
news companies.124 He argued that this would not be a handout but instead 
was a structural redistribution of the amount of revenue that comes from 
their content.
67. This is further exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis. news publishers 
are seeing declining advertising revenue and reduced subscriptions as a 
result of the economic downturn. They are also experiencing increasing 
difficulty in reporting stories due to restrictions on movement.125 Research 
from Enders Analysis suggests that without intervention, over £1 billion of 
revenue could fall out of the publishing industry in 2020.126 This includes 
an annual advertising decline of 50 per cent in print and 25 per cent for 
online publishers. UnESCO argues that there is a vital window for making 
an impact through timely stimulus or rescue packages for independent 
journalism and news outlets. It states that support for journalism is essential 
to ensure its sustainability as a public good whilst the pandemic takes a 
further toll on media institutions.127
68. The need for reform to protect the future of journalism is not a new issue 
and was the subject of a recent review by Dame Frances Cairncross. She 
told us that many of our concerns about democracy and digital technologies 
overlapped with the concerns addressed in her review.128 The Cairncross 
Review into sustainable high-quality journalism in the UK is a substantial 
piece of work and should form the basis of future work to ensure the future 
of public interest journalism.
69. While the Government has understandable concerns that it is not seen to 
be interfering with the work of the free press there are many areas where 
it agrees with the Cairncross Review. The Government has agreed to work 
on the Review’s recommendation of codes of conduct to formalise the 
relationship between publishers and online platforms and in working with 
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interested parties to develop this further is supported by the Competition 
and Market Authority’s (CMA) provisional recommendation that there is 
a strong case for a code of conduct.129 There is also agreement on the need 
for platforms to do more to prioritise reliable and trustworthy sources of 
information and this may form part of the Online Harms programme of 
work. The Government also agreed with the review that there is a need for 
additional funding of public interest news. It suggests that this be done by 
expanding the Local Democracy Reporting Service. The BBC has indicated 
its intention to set up a new body to take over the running of the scheme and 
is seeking additional funding to expand it further. Jessica Cecil, Director 
of the BBC Online Project at the BBC, told us that this scheme helps them 
reach 8 to 10 million people a week. She told us that the BBC was keen to 
expand the scheme and that technology platforms among others help fund 
the expansion in the programme.130
70. There is a need for a fundamental rebalancing of power away from technology 
platforms which have abused their position to siphon revenue away from 
public interest journalism. Other democratic countries across the globe 
are slowly concluding that this is necessary.131 Countries must ask difficult 
questions about the power of online platforms and their control over the 
advertising market. In the UK this should mean the CMA moving from 
their initial review into a full market investigation.
71. The House of Lords Communications and Digital Committee is also 
currently conducting an inquiry into the future of journalism and this should 
enable further informed discussion in this area.
72. A new settlement is needed to protect the role of local and public 
interest news. The Government should work urgently to implement 
those recommendations of the Cairncross review which it accepts, 
as well as providing support for news organisations in dealing with 
the impact of COVID-19.
73. The Competition and Markets Authority should conduct a full market 
investigation into online platforms’ control over digital advertising.
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Accountability and the technology platforms
74. One of the defining aspects of a developed democracy is the multitude of 
ways that power is held accountable for its actions. Citizens expect that, 
when they grant a person or organisation power to act on their behalf, there 
will be mechanisms to hold them to account for the manner in which that 
power is used.132 This is why accountability is one of the seven principles of 
public life that we expect all individuals elected or appointed to public office 
to uphold.133 In this Chapter we set out the case that platforms have become 
so dominant that they must be accountable for the power they hold and 
consider possible accountability mechanisms.
75. It may not always be understood how much power technology platforms hold 
over our democratic discussion. As those discussions move online it becomes 
increasingly important to look at how platforms mediate that debate. Much 
of this is determined by the way in which we are categorised and profiled 
for advertising purposes. The algorithms that companies use and regularly 
change for the purposes of advertising have a profound effect on the amount, 
quality and variety of the news each individual sees. Dr Ana Langer of the 
University of Glasgow and Dr Luke Temple of the University of Sheffield 
told us that as large platforms like Facebook and Google control a dominant 
share of the advertising market, minor changes in their algorithms can have 
a massive impact on how much news people consume, what news is seen, 
and whether a news organisation’s business model is commercially viable.134
76. According to eMarketer, in 2019, Facebook and Google made up 68.5 
per cent of the UK digital advertising market.135 This increase in platforms’ 
revenue has been accompanied by a loss of advertising revenue to traditional 
publishers, which has affected their ability to create original journalism. 
James Mitchinson, Editor of the Yorkshire Post, argued that social media 
has shifted the business model to one that is increasingly homogenised and 
centred around what generates the most ‘clicks’, rather than focused on that 
which is most in the public interest.136
77. Platforms have achieved a dominant market position. Dr Martin Moore, 
Director of the Centre for the Study of Media, Communication and Power 
at King’s College London, has drawn parallels between technology 
companies and the large monopolies that existed in the US in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries. He notes that some of the technology platforms 
that exist today are in many respects bigger and more dominant than the 
commercial monopolies of the late nineteenth centuries.137
132 Overseas Development Institute, ‘Accountability: the core concept and its subtypes’ (April 2009) 
p 1: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08b4740f0b652dd000bd6/APPP-WP1.pdf 
[accessed 13 May 2020]
133 Committee on Standards in Public Life, ‘The 7 principles of public life’, (May 1995) https://www.gov.
uk/government/publications/the-7-principles-of-public-life [accessed 13 May 2020]
134 Written Evidence from Dr Ana Langer and Dr Luke Temple (DAD0048) 
135 eMarketer, ‘Facebook and Google Maintain Grip in UK Digital Ad Market’ (October 2019) https://
www.emarketer.com/content/facebook-and-google-maintain-grip-in-uk-digital-ad-market [accessed 
3 June 2020]
136 Q 108 (James Mitchinson)
137 Dr Martin Moore, ‘Tech Giants and Civic Power’ (April 2016) p 3: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/policy-
institute/assets/cmcp/tech-giants-and-civic-power.pdf#page=7 [accessed 13 May 2020]
34 DIGITAL TECHnOLOGY AnD THE RESURRECTIOn OF TRUST
78. For organisations this powerful to be trusted there must be clear methods of 
accountability, as Microsoft explained:
“Just as today when consulting a doctor over a medical issue, or a 
lawyer over a legal challenge, we can seek a second opinion or redress 
when something goes wrong, in the world of algorithms knowing 
who is accountable when something goes wrong is equally important. 
Maintaining public trust will require clear line of sight over who is 
accountable … in the real world.”138
79. Vint Cerf, Vice-President and Chief Internet Evangelist at Google, told 
us that one force that holds platforms like his in check is competition. He 
argued that people can go to other search engines if they want to, and 
that Google did not force people to use their search engine.139 Whilst this 
argument is theoretically plausible in relation to Google Search, it fails to 
cover YouTube (which is owned by Google) or Facebook. YouTube has over 
two billion users with one billion hours of video watched daily.140 It is used 
by 92 per cent of the online population in the UK, and Facebook is used by 
89 per cent.141 People use Facebook partially because it is where their friends 
are. People upload videos to YouTube partially because that is where the 
viewers are; and viewers go to YouTube because it holds the content they 
are looking for. Whilst there are undoubtedly ways in which these platforms 
offer positive experiences to users, if a user did wish to use another platform, 
they are limited in their ability to do so. The Centre for Data Ethics and 
Innovation (CDEI) found that the public felt that there was not a real choice 
between online platforms or services, and that it was difficult to avoid the 
use of Google or Facebook without having a negative online experience.142 
Polling from Doteveryone showed that many of the public feel they have 
no choice but to sign up to services despite their concerns.143 The CMA, 
which is conducting an investigation into the Digital Advertising Market, 
has expressed its concern that Google and Facebook are both now so large, 
and have such extensive access to data, that potential rivals can no longer 
compete on equal terms.144 This dominance is an important reason why 
greater accountability is needed to preserve our democracy. It would be 
wholly insufficient to rely just on competition to keep platforms in check.
80. The public believe that there is a greater role for Government in ensuring 
accountability for these large companies. The CDEI found that 61 per cent 
of the public supported Government regulation of online targeting (another 
term used to describe the algorithmic recommendation of content) compared 
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with only 17 per cent who favoured self-regulation for these companies.145 
Christoph Schott, Campaign Director at Avaaz, told us that 81 per cent of 
the public think that platforms should be held accountable if they recommend 
fake news to millions of people.146 Doteveryone told us that two thirds of 
the public think the Government should be helping ensure technology 
companies treat their customers, staff and society fairly.147 Its polling found 
that 55 per cent of the public would like more places to seek help online and 
52 per cent want a more straightforward procedure for reporting technology 
companies.148
81. There are a number of smaller platforms which, although they do not 
currently have the same market dominance, could raise issues for democracy 
in the future. For example, TikTok is used by approximately one in seven 
older children and may well become a dominant platform.149 There should 
be regulation to ensure that, as smaller platforms grow, they come to embody 
the values the public requires of them.
The Online Harms agenda
82. The Government set out its proposals for making technology platforms more 
accountable in the Online Harms White Paper.150 The White Paper suggested 
a statutory duty of care to make companies more responsible for the safety 
of their users, and to tackle harm caused as a result of content or activity 
on their services. The proposed regulator for this area would set out how to 
fulfil this legal duty through mandatory codes of practice. Failure to comply 
with codes of practice or to provide evidence of how the platform is going 
beyond the requirements of the code of practice would lead to sanctions 
for failing in their legal duty of care. The Government has stated that it is 
minded to appoint Ofcom to regulate this area and in our Report we assume 
this will be the case.151 The duty of care is proposed to only apply to services 
that include user generated content and that is also the focus of this Report.152
83. Regulation has failed to keep up with technological innovation. MySociety, 
a civic technology social enterprise, told us that democratic institutions will 
struggle to move fast enough to hold social media platforms to account, and 
that constant innovation would be required just to maintain the status quo.153 
A practical example of this can be seen in the Government’s proposals to 
regulate user generated content. The Government published an Internet 
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Safety Strategy Green Paper in October 2017.154 This in itself would not 
be regarded as a rapid response to online threats, coming thirteen years 
after the founding of Facebook and five years after Facebook filed its Initial 
Public Offering valued at $104 billion with 845 million active users.155 It 
also came seven years after Dr Tarleton Gillespie first raised concerns 
about the politics of online platforms which shape the contours of online 
political discussion.156 There was an eighteen month wait between the 
green paper and the publishing of the Online Harms White Paper in April 
2019. In February 2020 the Government published its initial response to 
the consultation. Caroline Dinenage MP, Minister for Digital and Culture, 
told us that it would not publish its full response over the summer as they 
had previously planned but would publish it before the end of the year. She 
was unable to confirm that the Government would bring a draft bill to 
Parliament for scrutiny before the end of 2021.157 This is unacceptable and 
could mean that the bill may not come into effect until late 2023 or 2024. 
The Government and the wider policy making process have evidentially 
failed to get to grips with the pace of change, the urgent challenges and the 
opportunities of the digital age.
84. The Government should introduce Online Harms legislation within 
a year of this Report’s publication.
Figure 2: Timeline of progress on the Online Harms White Paper
Source: DCMS and Home Office, Online Harms White Paper, CP 57, (April 2019): https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/793360/Online_Harms_White_Paper.
pdf [accessed 13 May 2020]
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the concept of a duty of care because it allows for flexibility.158 The codes of 
practice produced by the regulator can be more easily changed than primary 
legislation.
86. We heard from Sarah Connolly that the Government was taking a three-
pronged, risk-based approach. The regulation would look at the size of 
the company, expecting more from larger companies; the kind of harm, 
anticipating more serious action to tackle the more serious harms; and the 
type of company, with companies that promise a restricted safe environment 
expected to do more than platforms that advertise themselves as a robust 
conversation.159 This is a sensible approach and our recommendations should 
be seen as fitting within this framework and the Online Harms work more 
broadly.
87. The Government has suggested that the Online Harms framework should be 
focused on harms to individuals. Sarah Connolly told us that Ministers were 
very keen that it should be narrow in scope and focused on individual harms. 
However, she stated that tackling individual harms will have a net benefit 
for the wider public.160 Tony Close, then Director of Content Standards, 
Licensing and Enforcement at Ofcom, told us that there is a difference 
between individual harms and societal harms but that it is a spectrum rather 
than a bright line.161 He cited the harms that come from misinformation 
about the coronavirus as an example of this. This misinformation might 
harm the individual but could also have a detrimental impact on society as 
a whole.
88. Societal harms reflect real damage to the rights of individuals and these are 
addressed within the White Paper. The White Paper includes cyberbullying 
and trolling, intimidation and disinformation, as harms within its scope. The 
regulator is also proposed to have a specific commitment to the protection of 
freedom of expression.162 A broader interpretation of individual harms that 
includes the real harm that individuals experience when they are deprived 
of their democratic rights such as free expression easily fits within this 
framework and would seem to cover the area we are concerned about.
89. The Online Harms work should make clear that platforms’ duty of 
care extends to actions which undermine democracy. This means 
that the duty of care extends to preventing generic harm to our 
democracy as well as against specific harm to an individual.
90. This Report works within the framework suggested by the Online Harms 
White Paper. Caroline Dinenage MP, Minister for Digital and Culture, told 
us that the Online Harms work is an urgent piece of work that should make 
radical changes to the online world.163 We agree. However, if for some reason 
the Online Harms work were to cease or if Ofcom were not appointed to 
oversee this work the recommendations in this Report should be seen as 
free standing and should be given to an appropriate regulator as soon as is 
practicable.
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Freedom of expression in the online world
91. However, there are concerns over whether the Online Harms framework can 
bolster rather than undermine democratic activity. Index on Censorship has 
warned that the Online Harms framework proposes restrictions on speech, 
between individuals, using criteria that is far broader than current law and 
so could risk capturing speech that is fundamental to effective democratic 
functions.164 The Government has suggested that the Online Harms bill will 
include an obligation on Ofcom to protect freedom of expression but it is 
important to consider what this actually entails.165
92. Baroness O’neill of Bengarve told us that protecting freedom of expression 
is not the only relevant standard that should be used and that we should 
also look at ethical and epistemic standards including whether it promotes 
accuracy and honesty.166 She noted that the generic call to protect freedom of 
expression has been inflated beyond the original argument advanced by John 
Stuart Mill and others to prioritise the rights of the speaker while ignoring 
the rights of the listener. Baroness O’neill of Bengarve explained that Mill’s 
argument was that that regulation of individuals should only be done when 
an action causes harm to others.167 Mill famously gave the example that the 
opinion that “corn dealers are starvers of the poor” should be allowed to 
circulate through the press but could be justly punished when told to an 
excited mob outside the house of a corn dealer.168 It is not clear that content on 
social media platforms should be seen as being more analogous to circulating 
through the press rather than a speech in front of a mob. It is increasingly 
apparent that whilst social media can be a site for open discussion it can also 
be used to incite groups of people to harass and cause harm to others.
93. Professor Cristian Vaccari, Professor of Political Communication at 
Loughborough University, told us that it was important to distinguish 
between free speech and free reach. He argued that whilst people should be 
allowed to circulate things that are distasteful and violate certain norms on 
social media, it is much more questionable whether that content should be 
allowed to spread as virally as content that does not violate these norms.169
94. Misinformation, abuse and bullying are the legal but harmful elements 
that are within the scope of the White Paper and were also identified in 
our evidence as posing a threat to representative democracy. Misinformation 
undermines the ability of citizens to have a meaningful conversation about 
the future shape of society and for this reason we recommend at the outset of 
this Report that misinformation and disinformation should be within scope.
95. Abuse and hate speech can deter people from taking part in public life. This 
affects both figures on the national stage and the everyday lives of ordinary 
members of the public. We heard from Dr Rosalynd Southern and her 
colleagues at the University of Liverpool that a majority of MPs received 
abuse online.170 This abuse was often misogynistic or racist in nature and 
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attempted to silence or dismiss the target. As the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights found in 2019, abuse of MPs is a serious problem and more action is 
needed to tackle abuse found on social media.171
96. Similar abuse can also deter young people from taking part in democratic 
discussion online. Professor Peter Hopkins and his colleagues told us about 
his research with young Muslims in the UK, which showed that young 
people engaged with democracy through social media also received racist 
and Islamophobic abuse.172 This had the effect of making them feel more 
marginalised and less inclined to participate. As discussed above the societal 
harm to democracy is closely linked to the harm these children experience 
as individuals.
97. The difficulty with acting on harmful but legal content without unduly 
affecting freedom of expression has been recognised by Ministers working 
on Online Harms legislation. They have stated that this work will not prevent 
adults from accessing or posting legal content, nor will it require companies 
to remove specific pieces of legal content.173
98. Dr Jennifer Cobbe from the University of Cambridge told us that the content 
by itself is not the problem.174 She argued that a conspiracy theory video that 
is only seen by 10 people is not a public policy issue and only becomes a 
problem when it is disseminated to a large audience and is presented alongside 
a lot of similar content. Dr Cobbe explained that the problem occurs because 
of the platforms’ recommendation systems. These are the algorithmically 
determined processes that platforms use to decide what content to show to 
users and in what order. She argued that although regulating this algorithmic 
recommendation would have some freedom of expression effects in deciding 
that certain communications should not be disseminated as widely as others, 
the content would remain on the website and could still be found by those 
who searched for it or if it were shared directly by other people.175 This 
would be less detrimental to free expression than removing the content. This 
view was summarised by Alaphia Zoyab, Senior Campaigner at Avaaz who 
argued that everyone should be free to share whatever they want on social 
media, but there is a need for intervention where it spreads virally through 
algorithmic recommendation.176
Platforms’ ultimate responsibility under a duty of care
99. Technology platforms have expressed a preference that regulation should 
focus on process rather than looking at the impact of their platforms. 
Facebook’s white paper on regulating online content suggests that regulation 
which targets specific metrics rather than focusing on getting platforms to 
improve their processes risks creating perverse incentives.177 Katy Minshall, 
Head of UK Government, Public Policy and Philanthropy at Twitter told us 
they thought that Facebook made a compelling point, and that regulators 
should consider a more holistic picture by looking at systems and processes.
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100. However, there is a strong case for platforms being required to take greater 
responsibility to protect their users from harm. It might not be the case that 
simply setting out good practice on dealing with certain harms is sufficient 
to reduce the harms platforms cause. We heard from several witnesses that 
it is the fundamental business models of technology platforms that directly 
lead to the harm. Alaphia Zoyab from Avaaz argued that as platforms want 
to retain your attention for as long as possible there is an incentive to promote 
triggering and the more outrageous forms of content.178 Dr Jennifer Cobbe 
told us that platforms prioritise engagement and that in practice means they 
promote content that is shocking, controversial or extreme.179
101. These concerns about platforms incentivising extreme content are evidenced 
by the fact that some of the most popular creators on social media have 
promoted hate speech and misinformation. Felix Kjellberg (known as 
PewDiePie) operates one of the largest channels on YouTube and has 
105 million subscribers, many of whom are children.180 His channel has 
previously featured him paying people to perform nazi salutes and hold a 
sign saying “Death to all Jews” in an attempt at humour.181 Logan Paul, 
another successful creator on YouTube, invited onto his video podcast Alex 
Jones, a far-right conspiracy theorist who suggested that a school shooting 
in the US was orchestrated by the US government, and who has also been 
banned from YouTube.182 Most recently, the professional boxer Amir Khan 
and actor Woody Harrelson both posted to their Instagram profiles, to 1.3 
and two million followers respectively, material about the fundamentally 
false conspiracy theory that COVID-19 was caused or amplified by the 
implementation of 5G.183 A similar effect can be seen with the ‘Plandemic’ 
COVID-19 conspiracy video; its reach was greatly expanded by being shared 
by individuals with large numbers of followers including a doctor who had 
appeared on The Oprah Winfrey show and a Mixed Martial Arts Fighter.184
102. Mark Zuckerberg, the CEO of Facebook, has stated that one of the biggest 
issues social networks face is that, when left unchecked, people will engage 
disproportionately with more sensationalist and provocative content.185 
However, he suggests that this is a feature of human nature seen just as much 
in cable news and tabloids as it is on social media. Mr Zuckerberg argues that 
Facebook is working to minimise sensationalist content and we have heard 
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from Google that it is also trying to do the same with YouTube.186 However, 
as we explain in Chapter 4 on transparency, platforms have not been clear 
about what exactly they are doing to minimise such content and the effect 
of these efforts. There are credible accounts of the internal decisions made 
inside of these platforms that suggest that despite being aware of the problems 
platforms have been reluctant to make all the changes necessary to reduce 
the spread of this type of content.187 Platforms have further undermined this 
work by exempting elected representatives from many of these policies, as 
discussed in more detail in the second Chapter on informed citizens.
103. As discussed in the previous chapter, when we asked Vint Cerf why Google 
was promoting misinformation on its platforms, he told us that algorithmic 
systems can be brittle.188 Mr Cerf told us that machine learning can make 
mistakes when small changes that would be imperceptible to humans cause 
the system to think it is looking at something entirely different. Whilst this 
is an understandable technical limitation that all platforms face, it is unclear 
why the responsibility should lie with a regulator to suggest improvements in 
the processes behind these systems, rather than on the platforms themselves.
104. Karim Palant, UK Public Policy Manager at Facebook, told us that he hoped 
there would be iterative conversations between platforms and regulators 
about their expectations and what is proportionate to prevent the spread of 
harms before fines were given out.189 This may well be the right way forward, 
but ultimately the responsibility should lie with the platforms to uphold 
their duty of care to prevent harms even in the absence of a relevant code of 
practice that advises them on how this must be done.
105. As discussed above, the issue is not that platforms must be responsible 
for all content on their platforms but rather that they are responsible for 
content that they spread at scale. This means that platforms should have 
a greater responsibility to ensure that content that is being widely shared 
is not harmful before it can do further damage. This is one of the lessons 
being learned from the COVID-19 pandemic. As well as shouldering greater 
responsibility for content that they spread peer to peer across a network, 
platforms must take particular responsibility for users with large audiences 
on their platforms.
106. Platforms that have content creators with audiences in the tens of millions 
clearly have a greater responsibility for this content than for content which is 
produced by creators with audiences in the single digits. These large creators 
are effectively in business relationships with the platforms they post. In some 
cases, creators are being paid millions of pounds per year in advertising 
revenue or tens of millions to create content exclusively for a specific platform.190 
However, it is not clear that platforms are taking additional action to ensure 
that those with larger audiences are not posting content that can be shown 
to be harmful.
186 Supplementary written evidence from Google (DAD0101)
187 ‘Facebook Executives Shut Down Efforts to Make the Site Less Divisive’, Wall Street Journal (May 
2020): https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-knows-it-encourages-division-top-executives-nixed-so 
lutions-11590507499?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=1 [accessed 3 June 2020]
188 Q 243 (Vint Cerf)
189 Q 300 (Karim Palant)
190 Socialblade, PewDiePie: https://socialblade.com/youtube/user/pewdiepie [accessed 13 May 2020] and 
Business Insider, ‘ninja reportedly got paid between $20 million and $30 million by Microsoft to leave 
Amazon’s Twitch streaming service’ (27 January 2020): https://www.businessinsider.com/how-much-
did-ninja-make-for-leaving-twitch-2020-1?r=US&IR=T [accessed 13 May 2020]
42 DIGITAL TECHnOLOGY AnD THE RESURRECTIOn OF TRUST
107. What ‘virality’ and large audience mean will differ according to the three-
prongs described by Sarah Connolly. Large platforms should be expected 
to be able to devote more resources to reviewing content and face larger 
fines for failing to do so. Platforms should have a greater responsibility 
for more impactful harms and should need to act at lower levels of virality 
than creators with smaller audiences. Platforms like YouTube that have 
partnership programmes to pay creators directly should accept a far greater 
responsibility for the output of those creators.
108. For harmful but legal content, Ofcom’s codes of practice should 
focus on the principle that platforms should be liable for the content 
they rank, recommend or target to users.
109. The Government should include as a provision in the Online Harms 
Bill that Ofcom will hold platforms accountable for content that they 
recommend to large audiences. Platforms should be held responsible 
for content that they recommend once it has reached a specific level 
of virality or is produced by users with large audiences.
110. The Government should empower Ofcom to sanction platforms 
that fail to comply with their duty of care in the Online Harms 
Bill. These sanctions should include fines of up to four per cent of 
global turnover and powers to enforce ISP blocking of serially non-
compliant platforms.
Content moderation oversight
111. Dr Tarleton Gillespie, a Senior Principal Researcher at Microsoft Research, 
explains in his book on the subject that content moderation is the process by 
which platforms decide what content is or is not allowed on their platform. 
He argues that although platforms like to suggest that this a peripheral part 
of their activities, it defines what the platform is and the conversation it 
allows to take place on it.191
112. Katie O’Donovan, Head of UK Government Affairs and Public Policy at 
Google, told us that most of their content review is done by machine learning. 
She stated that humans set the community guidelines and then machine 
learning is used to identify the content that breaches those guidelines.192 
Google told us that 90.7 per cent of the videos it removed from YouTube 
were first flagged by machines and, of those, 64.7 per cent were removed 
before the videos had any views.193 Karim Palant from Facebook told us that 
at Facebook human moderators look at user reports that have been flagged 
to them, although much of this flagging is done by automated processes. It 
is unclear to what extent this represents a difference in the way moderation 
is practiced by the two platforms or merely a difference in emphasis, with 
Facebook emphasising the human element and Google emphasising the 
quality of its machine learning.
113. These processes are what determines the de facto boundaries of free expression 
that users have on these platforms. There is very little transparency and 
accountability to the public over what they are or are not allowed to say on 
these platforms. This falls directly within the scope of the proposed Online 
191 Tarleton Gillespie, Custodians of the Internet: platforms, content moderation, and the hidden decisions that 
shape social media (new Haven: Yale University Press, 2018)
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Harms framework that suggests that platforms should prevent harm whilst 
protecting free expression online.
114. The evidence we have received suggests that ensuring free expression online 
is not the priority for content moderation processes. Professor Sarah Roberts, 
Co-Director of the Centre for Critical Internet Inquiry at UCLA, told us 
that the main concern behind platforms’ content moderation activities was 
brand management.194 A member of Facebook’s content policy team told 
Dr Tarleton Gillespie that Facebook’s moderation process was built around 
repeated operations at high scale. The employee explained the need for 
decisions to work at scale rather than focus on being thorough by stating that 
“it’s not a courtroom. It’s UPS195.”196
115. We heard that the focus of platforms was on moderating inexpensively rather 
than accurately and that this is reflected in the working conditions of some 
of the human moderators. Professor Sarah Roberts told us that platforms 
were constantly seeking sites that will provide labour at the lowest cost. 
Her research with moderators in the Philippines found that moderators 
were given approximately half a minute to decide whether certain types 
of content should be removed.197 Furthermore, Professor Roberts told us 
that moderators frequently deal with disturbing content including sexual 
exploitation or abuse of children. As a result, moderators either cease to 
be good at their job because they are traumatised by what they have seen, 
or through repetition they become desensitised to these types of extreme 
content.198
116. It is not clear that automated content moderation makes better decisions 
than human moderators. The Electronic Frontier Foundation , an American 
non-profit organisation that seeks to defend civil liberties in a digital world, 
argues that replacing human moderators with automation creates a more 
secretive process in which people’s content is removed inaccurately.199 Sarah 
Connolly from DCMS told us that for subjects like hate speech where there 
is not a clear line between a slur and the re-appropriation of language by 
an affected community, human eyes are needed to understand the wider 
context.200 This is particularly concerning in the context of COVID-19. 
During this public health crisis where moderators could not attend a physical 
workplace, platforms decided that rather than allow moderators to access 
private information from home, they would primarily rely on automation to 
remove misinformation about the virus.201
117. Even before the pandemic, platforms like Facebook did not empower their 
moderators to make the best decision possible. Karim Palant from Facebook 
told us that they reduce the contextual information that is available 
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to moderators in order to protect users’ privacy and to ensure against 
bias. This approach was criticised by the Reuters Institute which argued 
that moderators should have greater access to contextual information.202 
They gave the example of an image from the holocaust which has a very 
different significance when posted by a Holocaust survivor or by a neo-
nazi. A report from Yale Law School commissioned by Facebook to audit 
its transparency process suggests that Facebook does sometimes use this 
context for moderation decisions.203 It notes that Facebook routinely reviews 
moderation decisions using a reviewing panel and that this panel is given 
more information about the context of the post, including some additional 
details about the history of the user who posted the content and the user who 
reported the content.
Appealing platforms’ decisions
118. The Online Harms White Paper states that users should have the right to 
appeal moderation decisions.204 However, it is unclear what mechanism 
would be used to ensure the quality of this appeal process. The White Paper 
makes clear that the regulator’s role would not be to monitor individual 
decisions and instead only to regulate companies’ policy and processes.
119. Many individuals’ experience of something going wrong online has been 
mishandled. Polling from Doteveryone found that approximately a quarter 
of the public say they have reported something and nothing happened as a 
result.205
120. Facebook is in the process of creating an independent Oversight Board which 
would act as a final appeals body that could overrule moderation decisions 
made by Facebook. This could be an effective part of corporate governance. 
However, this should not be seen as anything beyond that. The Oversight 
Board provides Facebook advice on content moderation decisions. This 
helps create an externally visible avenue of appeal. However, the platform is 
under no legal obligation to take its advice and has only made a commitment 
to accept its decisions on individual pieces of content. The board is not, as 
the name might suggest, providing broader oversight of Facebook and does 
not provide an independent accountability mechanism. Facebook recently 
announced the international membership of the Oversight Board, but the 
process is global and seeks to make decisions across cultures,206 which may 
also prevent it from being effective.
121. A global body will not necessarily be well placed to determine what content 
should be removed in the UK. We heard from Professor Safiya noble, 
Co-Director of the Centre for Critical Internet Inquiry at UCLA, that 
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moderators can fail to understand the social context in which remarks are 
made. She highlighted the fact that something that might be blatantly racist 
in one culture could be imperceptible for a person from another culture.207 
Dr Ysabel Gerrard from the University of Sheffield told us that platforms 
should be aiming to moderate at a local, not global level.208
122. Will Moy, the Chief Executive of Full Fact, told us that the idea that technology 
platforms were best placed to say where the balance lies between harm and 
free expression in all the different countries in which they operate was 
laughable. He argued that there should be an open, democratic, transparent 
process defining where that balance lies in the UK.209 Doteveryone told us 
that that the UK should develop an ombudsman-style body to adjudicate on 
content takedown decisions if cases are of sufficient importance, for example 
if they relate to the abuse of a political figure or have been broadcast to 
a minimum threshold of users. They argued that content standards must 
ultimately be defined according to the public’s values founded on rigorous 
democratic debate.210 In their submission to the Online Harms White Paper 
consultation, the ICO suggested that in addition to a regulator to oversee 
policy there should be an ombudsman to deal with complaints that have not 
been satisfactorily dealt with between the user and the platform.211
123. One of the concerns with improving moderation is the volume of material 
that could have to be considered. Sarah Connolly from DCMS told us that 
the sheer number of uploads and amount of material that needs to be looked 
at makes moderation difficult.212 Karim Palant from Facebook stated that 
Facebook’s rules are designed and written to be enforced at scale based 
on millions of reports.213 Caroline Dinenage MP, Minister for Digital and 
Culture, told us that the size and scale of the online world would mean that 
the volume of traffic sent to an ombudsman would be massive and could 
overwhelm an organisation.214 The size of a problem does not remove the 
necessity of it being tackled. Whilst there would undoubtedly be a large 
number of potential cases for the ombudsman, this does not mean that there 
should not be one. Facebook’s Oversight Board will face an even greater 
challenge in dealing with complaints from Facebook’s users across the globe. 
Like the Oversight Board this ombudsman should prioritise cases on the 
basis of where its decisions can have the most impact. In addition, other 
parts of the Online Harms work should improve moderation processes and 
reduce the number of cases that would need an ombudsman. However, an 
ombudsman that only had the power to overturn a single issue would struggle 
to make a meaningful impact on users’ experience of a platform.
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124. Mackenzie Common, a researcher at LSE, has argued that content moderation 
procedures could be improved by establishing a system of precedent.215 This 
could be problematic if each case were unique and difficult to judge. However, 
that is not how it is described by platforms. A content policy manager at 
Facebook described this to Dr Tarleton Gillespie:
“The huge scale of the problem has robbed anyone who is at all 
acquainted with the torrent of reports coming in of the illusion that 
there was any such thing as a unique case. … On any sufficiently large 
social network everything you could possibly imagine happens every 
week, right? So there are no hypothetical situations, and there are no 
cases that are different or really edge. There’s no such thing as a true 
edge case. There’s just more and less frequent cases, all of which happen 
all the time.”216
125. There is a case for a greater transparency in content moderation and holding 
platforms to account for inconsistency in their practice which we discuss 
in Chapter 2. In this case, establishing clear standards would allow for the 
decisions of an independent ombudsman to help improve the quality of 
content moderation. Caroline Dinenage MP told us that Ofcom could use 
a super complaints system, where there are many complaints about a single 
issue, to feed into their horizon scanning approach in determining what 
‘good’ looks like.217 The ombudsman’s decisions could feed directly into this 
process. There are important decisions to be made about how widely the 
ombudsman’s rulings bind future content moderation. 218 The platform will 
need to work with Ofcom and the ombudsman to determine this and the 
best way for the platform to implement this.
126. This ombudsman should not have an absolute say over what must be 
included on a platform. It is not desirable that an ombudsman should be 
able to overrule the rights of a platform owner if they do not wish to host 
content that they find objectionable as set out in their terms and conditions 
or community standards.
127. The Government should establish an independent ombudsman for 
content moderation decisions to whom the public can appeal should 
they feel they have been let down by a platform’s decisions. This 
ombudsman’s decisions should be binding on the platform and in 
turn create clear standards to be expected for future decisions for 
UK users. These standards should be adjudicated by Ofcom, with 
platforms able to make representations on how they are applied 
within their moderation processes. The ombudsman should not 
prevent platforms removing content which they have due cause to 
remove.
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Parliamentary oversight
128. Appointing a regulator and an ombudsman to counteract online harms only 
achieves part of the goal of bringing democratic accountability to technology 
platforms. There must also be democratic oversight for these bodies. The 
decisions that Ofcom and the ombudsman will make may at times be deeply 
political and as such their decisions should flow from a parliamentary 
mandate. Will Moy of Full Fact suggested that social media companies were 
currently setting the rules because Parliament had failed to act.219
129. The Online Harms White Paper suggested there should be a role for 
Parliament in overseeing the regulator through the process of laying an 
annual report and accounts before Parliament, and responding to requests 
for information.220 The White Paper’s consultation asked about what 
Parliament’s role should be.221 Respondents strongly supported Parliament 
having a defined oversight role over the regulator. This included several 
bodies suggesting establishing a dedicated body to review codes of practice 
to ensure consistency with existing civil liberties.
130. We agree that Parliament should have a strong role in overseeing the 
regulator. Yet merely laying an annual report and accounts before Parliament 
would not be sufficient. The Electoral Commission and its oversight by the 
Speaker’s Committee provides a better model and one that would ensure 
greater parliamentary oversight and independence, and engagement with the 
regulator from Government.222 The Speaker’s Committee sets the budget 
of the Electoral Commission and thereby better protects it from political 
interference. Just as the Electoral Commission’s role in elections requires 
neutrality and independence so this work which judges free expression online 
requires that same level of independence.
131. This need for independence from Government can be seen from other 
countries’ attempts to tackle disinformation. In Singapore, the Government 
has the ability to remove all online information that it deems to be incorrect 
and not in the public interest.223 This power vested in the Government 
inevitably led to the first uses of the law being to take down posts critical of 
the Government.224 The way the UK acts in creating independent oversight 
for a regulator with powers so closely related to free expression will be closely 
watched by other countries. Caroline Dinenage MP, Minister for Digital 
and Culture, told us that many countries are watching how the UK delivers 
its Online Harms regulation.225 We should be careful not to provide an 
example that helps legitimise the actions of authoritarian regimes. To ensure 
this, any committee established to oversee this area of activity should be 
constituted in a way that ensured there was no inbuilt government majority. 
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The committee’s independence could be further underpinned by taking its 
membership from both Houses of Parliament.
132. The proposed committee’s role should be to ensure transparency and 
accountability in the work of the regulator and the ombudsman. This 
committee would represent the public and ensure that platforms are being 
held accountable for their decisions by the regulator and the ombudsman. 
This includes representing citizens who are not in a position to take action on 
their own behalf, including children who make up a third of internet users.226 
However, both the regulator and the ombudsman should be independent 
and empowered to make decisions on the policy and practice of technology 
platforms. The proposed committee should not be a court of appeal for cases 
that are overseen by the regulator and the ombudsman.
133. The proposed committee should play a key role in selecting the ombudsman’s 
chief executive in order to ensure independence from the Government. 
This would follow the example of the House of Commons Treasury Select 
Committee having the power to veto the Government’s choice of the Chair 
of the Office for Budget Responsibility. There should also be parliamentary 
oversight for Ofcom’s leadership. However, Ofcom’s work is broader than 
this Online Harms work. The DCMS Select Committee have requested a 
role in the appointment process and we would support that with the ability 
of this new joint committee to feed into that process.227
134. Parliament should set up a joint committee of both Houses to oversee 
Ofcom’s Online Harms work and that of the proposed ombudsman. 
This committee should be constituted so that there can be no 
Government majority amongst its Members. The committee should 
ensure an adequate budget for this portion of Ofcom’s work. Ofcom 
should be obliged to submit all codes of practice to the Committee 
for scrutiny.
135. The joint committee should set the budget for the content moderation 
ombudsman. The committee should hold an appointment hearing 
with the ombudsman’s proposed chief executive and hold the power 
of veto over their appointment.
Regulatory capacity
136. In order for these measures to provide effective accountability for the 
technology platforms, the relevant regulators must be able to keep pace with 
technological change. Alongside Ofcom, who have been the focus of much 
of this Chapter, there are several other regulators that have a role to play in 
ensuring that democracy can flourish in a digital society. This includes the 
ICO, the ASA, the CMA, and the Electoral Commission.
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Box 3: The Regulators
Advertising Standards Authority (ASA)
In the UK, general advertising and direct marketing across all media is regulated 
by the ASA, under the principle that adverts must be “legal, decent, honest and 
truthful.”
Advertisements made by companies and third sector bodies (such as voluntary 
and community organisations) must adhere to ASA rules. However, non-
broadcast political advertising which principally aims to influence voters in 
local, regional, national or international elections or referendums is exempt 
under Rule 7 of the CAP Code and is not regulated by the ASA.
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)
The CMA is an independent non-ministerial department which leads the 
Government’s Digital Markets Taskforce, and seeks to regulate the digital 
sphere by: enabling disruptors to challenge incumbents; empowering consumers 
through choice and control; supporting quality services and content online and 
providing industry, especially SMEs, with fair access to digital markets to be 
able grow their businesses.
Electoral Commission
The Electoral Commission is an independent body which regulates the 
funding of political parties, individual party members, and candidates, as well 
as organisations campaigning in referenda. It is distinct from other regulators 
for being answerable to Parliament. It also enforces inclusion of imprints of 
printed election material under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums 
Act 2000.
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)
The ICO is the independent regulatory office in charge of upholding information 
rights in the interest of the public. The organisation covers the Data Protection 
Act 2018 (DPA), Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy and Electronic 
Communications Regulations.
Under the DPA, all organisations that process personal information must register 
with the ICO, who publish the names and addresses of the data controllers. They 
also include a description of the type of processing each organisation performs.
Ofcom
Ofcom oversees telecommunications, post, broadcast TV and radio (including 
the BBC’s output), has duties in relation to broadcast advertising and regulates 
certain online video services. It has a statutory duty to promote media literacy, 
under which it carries out research into people’s use of online services such as 
social media and video sharing platforms. In February 2020 the Government 
announced it was “minded” to grant new powers to Ofcom as the regulator for 
online harms.
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137. In January, we hosted an informal workshop with representatives from 
relevant regulators, technology companies and external experts to discuss 
regulatory capacity and innovation in this area.228 This focused on the 
challenges that regulators face in adapting to the digital environment. Issues 
raised included a need for greater collaboration between regulators and the 
industry, the importance of regulators having a wide skill base and being 
able to attract talent from industry, and the growing resource constraint that 
regulators face.
138. In taking evidence, we heard particular concern voiced about the digital 
capacity of the Electoral Commission. Democracy Club, a civic technology 
company, told us that the Electoral Commission does not have an in-house 
digital team and has not been given the tools necessary to pursue its aims 
in a digital age.229 Full Fact argued that the Electoral Commission needs 
better funding and a strong technology team to develop the tools necessary 
to monitor spending as it happens, so that fraud or misuse is caught before 
it can have affected the outcome of elections or referendums.230 Doteveryone 
similarly stated that the Electoral Commission was hamstrung by limited 
resources and that it was vital that it build the digital capabilities needed 
to anticipate and respond to future developments in digital campaigning. 
It recommended that the Electoral Commission should work with the 
CDEI and the Better Regulation Executive to develop the horizon scanning 
capacities needed to identify emerging challenges. Louise Edwards, Director 
of Regulation at the Electoral Commission, told us that the Commission felt 
it had the resources to enforce the current framework and that the issue was 
that the existing legal framework prevented the Commission from regulating 
elections properly in a digital age.231 We will return to the regulation of 
elections in Chapter 6, however, it is not clear that the digital expertise and 
resources are currently available to the Commission to oversee its desired 
level of digital innovation.
139. We also heard other concerns about the under resourcing of other regulators. 
Alex Krasodomski-Jones, from Demos, suggested that the ICO was woefully 
under-resourced. Elizabeth Denham, the Information Commissioner, told us 
that although a regulator could always make a case for additional resources, 
she believed that the lack of resources at the Electoral Commission was of 
greater concern.232
140. Beyond the lack of resources, additional concerns were raised about 
the difficulty caused by the number of regulators with varying remits. 
Baroness O’neill of Bengarve felt that even with the variety of existing 
regulators, it was difficult to be confident that all concerns about democracy 
online were covered by any regulator or which regulator that might be.233 
Caroline Elsom, Senior Researcher at the Centre for Policy Studies, argued 
that there were at least five regulators working in this space which in turn 
brought a real risk of overregulating the technology industry in the UK.234
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141. A number of different models for encouraging better co-operation between 
regulators have been suggested. Many of these arrangements focus on the 
existence or creation of formal structures through which regulators meet. 
The House of Lords Communications Committee in its report on regulating 
in a digital world suggested the creation of a digital authority to oversee 
regulators operating in this space.235 This suggestion was made before the 
Online Harms White Paper was published and Ofcom was designated as 
its regulator. The report suggested that this digital authority should have a 
pool of staff resources that could support the activity of any of the relevant 
regulators. The Information Commissioner told us that her office had 
proposed a joint board of regulators to co-ordinate regulatory activity to 
ensure that all the relevant regulators were not pursuing the same technology 
company at the same time but from slightly different angles.236 She suggested 
that this should be done in a way that did not create a large and cumbersome 
layer of bureaucracy but which allowed for greater co-ordination and 
the sharing of expert resources. The ICO’s proposal is modelled on the 
Regulatory Reform (Collaboration etc. between Ombudsmen) Order 2007 
which allows the Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman, and the 
Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman to work together on a joint 
investigation if a complaint covers both jurisdictions.237 In addition to these 
formal structures, there are also examples of regulators developing more 
informal networks and means of collaboration. The Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) Regulator Group, for example, was created by the ICO in early 2019 
and brings together over 20 regulators including the ASA, the national 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence, the Civil Aviation Authority, 
Bank of England, Environment Agency, Ofsted and others to discuss best 
practice in the use of AI by regulators, and the possible focus of future AI 
regulation. This network adopts an agile approach to creating and dissolving 
working groups on specific issues of common interest, such as data sharing 
and facilitating collaboration between regulators. Ofcom and the ICO are 
also both members of the UK Regulators network which is a partnership 
between regulators in the financial and transport sectors to share knowledge 
and explore cross-cutting issues.238
142. Kevin Bakhurst, Group Director of Content and Media Policy at Ofcom, 
stated that there is an important role in looking for areas of overlap between 
regulators to ensure that people do not feel as if they are being regulated 
twice. His then-colleague, Tony Close, Director of Content, Standards 
Licencing and Enforcement, told us that whilst they already had a very 
structured relationship with the ASA, a more formal relationship with all 
regulators in this area is likely to be beneficial.239 Louise Edwards of the 
Electoral Commission told us that she could see some advantage to more 
cross-cutting investigations, but stressed the need to share sufficient 
information with other regulators for this to be effective.240
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143. The ICO’s proposal is founded on the idea of regulators in this space still 
maintaining clear independence from each other. Their respective remits 
would define the limits of the proposed cooperation. The Commissioner told 
us that as creatures of statute they need to remain independent and to carry 
out their own intended statutory role.241 However, in light of the economic 
damage caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, there will be increased pressure 
on public sector spending including the funding of regulators. The newly 
created digital levy could provide some of the funding to support online 
regulation, along with additional funding from fines proposed in this 
Chapter and in Chapter 6 on reforming electoral law, but there will be an 
overwhelming need for resources to be used efficiently.
144. Ofcom have relied on a model of being funded by the industries they regulate. 
This may struggle to translate to the digital world. The ASA, for example, has 
seen its funding fall as advertising moves online. This is because Google and 
Facebook are unwilling to levy advertisers in the same way traditional media 
owners do. Traditional media owners levy a fee on advertising to fund the 
ASA allowing advertisers to opt out where they wish to whilst Google allows 
advertisers to opt in. In practice few chose to opt out from traditional media 
and few now choose to opt in online.242 Online platforms have preferred 
to fund and participate in industry bodies such as the Internet Advertising 
Bureau UK which sets voluntary minimum standards for its members. A 
lack of funding is a particular concern as the ASA’s workload has increased 
as it covers online content. Since 2011 the ASA has regulated claims made 
on brand owners’ websites and social media and as of 2019 this made up just 
over a third of the ASA’s workload.243
145. One particular issue we heard about was the need to attract people with digital 
expertise to work for regulators. Rachel Coldicutt, then CEO of Doteveryone, 
told us that many of the people who have this expertise were currently working 
in the industry and more needed to be done to make it attractive for them to 
move into regulatory roles.244 The Institute for Government has previously 
found similar issues across Government in trying to attract people with the 
requisite digital skills.245 Kevin Bakhurst of Ofcom told us that previous 
experience suggested that when their work had expanded to cover new areas 
they were able to attract new talent as individuals were interested in adding a 
regulatory role to their CV. Individuals came to work for Ofcom for a couple 
of years and Ofcom benefited as a result.246 Tony Close told us that there 
was merit in people from the private sector going into the regulator and 
people from the regulator moving into the private sector. Since we heard 
from Mr Close, he has moved to work for Facebook.247 There may be a case 
for creating a central pool of digital expertise from which this talent can be 
drawn which could support the work of the different digital regulators, for 
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example, supporting the Electoral Commission to develop tools to be used 
in a General Election.
146. The CDEI acts as an advisory body to Government situated within the 
DCMS, although it also has its own independent board.248 Its role in bringing 
together policymakers, industry and civil society to help develop the right 
governance regime for data-drive technologies makes it well placed to look 
into the question of how regulators should oversee this area.
147. The Government should introduce legislation to enact the ICO’s 
proposal for a committee of regulators that would allow for joint 
investigations between regulators in the model of the Regulatory 
Reform (Collaboration etc between Ombudsmen) Order 2007. This 
committee should also act as a forum to encourage the sharing of 
best practice between regulators and support horizon scanning 
activity.
148. The CDEI should conduct a review of regulatory digital capacity 
across the CMA, ICO, Electoral Commission, ASA and Ofcom to 
determine their levels of digital expertise. This review should be 
completed with urgency, to inform the Online Harms Bill before it 
becomes law. The CDEI should work with Ofcom to help determine 
its role in online regulation. The review should consider:
(a) What relative levels of digital expertise exist within regulators, 
and where skills gaps are becoming evident;
(b) How these regulators currently draw on external expertise, 
and what shared system might be devised for seeking advice 
and support;
(c) What changes in legislation governing regulators would be 
needed to allow for a shared pool of digital expertise and staffing 
resource that could work between and across regulators;
(d) How this joint pool of staffing resource could be prioritised and 
funded between regulators.
248 Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport and Department for Business, Energy & Industrial 
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CHAPTER 4: TRANSPARENCY
149. In the previous Chapter we made proposals for how technology platforms 
should be held to account. This requires greater transparency. Transparency 
helps effective regulation by enabling regulators to understand what they are 
trying to regulate and empowering civil society to spot deficiencies. At the 
same time transparency cannot be thought of by itself and must come with 
measures to secure redress and accountability.
150. Transparency lies at the heart of trust in a democratic society. For the public 
to be able to believe that individuals and organisations with power are not 
abusing their position the public must be able to understand how power 
is being used. For this same reason, openness and honesty are two of the 
tenets in the nolan principles of public life.249 Technology platforms wield 
enormous power over our public conversation and transparency should be a 
condition for permitting that to continue.
151. We are under no illusions about transparency being a panacea, and we 
acknowledge its efficacy depends on accountability mechanisms outlined 
in the previous Chapter. Baroness O’neill of Bengarve warned us that 
transparency was not always effective and can result in data confusing those 
individuals who cannot understand it.250 This frames our general approach to 
this issue. Alex Krasodomski-Jones from Demos told us that it was important 
to establish who transparency is for. As well as transparency for the public, 
maximum transparency must be given to researchers in academia, civil 
society and news media, as well as to Government.251
152. Transparency should look different for different audiences. The act of 
publishing information, by itself, will not solve all problems for all audiences. 
Platforms should tailor the information they release to fit the needs of the 
audience it is intended for. We believe that transparency for the public should 
be based on empowering them to act by providing them with the information 
they need at the time it is most useful to them. We address the public’s needs 
in Chapter 7 on active digital citizens.
153. In this Chapter we focus on the transparency of the processes undertaken 
by technology platforms. It is not realistic to expect individual members of 
the public to read detailed disclosure documents or conduct data analysis. 
The primary audience for this will be independent researchers, civil society, 
regulators and Government. However, these recommendations will empower 
civil society and regulators to interrogate platforms’ activities and provide 
independent explanations to the public. This is vital to ensure public trust in 
digital platforms.
154. Tony Close, then Director of Content Standards, Licensing and Enforcement 
at Ofcom, told us that part of creating effective codes of practice lies in having 
a comprehensive evidence base.252 Too often, a high-quality evidence base 
about online platforms does not exist. As Professor Rasmus Kleis nielsen, 
Director of the Reuters Institute, told us, this area is filled with nuggets of 
information that have developed a life of their own and are treated as an 
249 Committee on Standards in Public Life, ‘The 7 principles of public life’ (May 1995): https://www.gov.
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independent fact, separate from the anecdotal or poor-quality research from 
which they originate.253
155. A more informed public debate is in the long-term interests of all parties as it 
encourages sensible well-evidenced regulation and helps enrich democracy. 
By failing to co-operate with researchers to develop a better understanding 
of how they work platforms foster mistrust and risk incentivising low quality 
regulation focused on the wrong issues. In this Chapter we look at some of 
the areas where evidence is lacking and outline practical ways to improve 
platform transparency.
Do platforms cause polarisation and degrade democratic discourse?
156. One of the key questions our inquiry has looked at is the extent to which 
platforms have structural features which contribute to political polarisation 
and damage political discourse by promoting discord and disharmony. 
Whilst we have heard indications that this might be the case, the evidence 
base at present is far from strong enough to support effective regulation in 
this area. Below we explore possible mechanisms and establish the need for 
more research in each area.
Targeted advertising
157. One of the most commonly suggested mechanisms through which platforms 
could dramatically alter democratic discourse is in facilitating the micro-
targeting of political advertising. Dr Martin Moore of King’s College London 
told us Facebook allows political campaigners to use an extraordinary 
amount of personal data to target political messages at small groups of 
people. He stated that it also gives campaigners the opportunity to engage in 
A/B testing of adverts, where two different versions are tested to see which 
performs better, which can be achieved at a remarkable scale with campaigns 
putting out 50,000 to 100,000 adverts per day.254
158. It is not clear whether advertising on such a scale is persuasive and changes 
the course of democratic events. Dr Moore highlighted the fact that social 
media can elicit a strong behavioural response, influencing people to action 
rather than necessarily having strong persuasive results.255 Paul Bainsfair, 
Director General at the Institute of Practitioners in Advertising, told us that 
from a commercial perspective this behavioural activation was the advantage 
of online advertising. He suggested that online advertising was effective to 
book a holiday if you had already searched online for one but that other forms 
of advertising like TV were better at creating a long-lasting impression about 
a brand.256 Dr Luke Temple and Dr Ana Lager told us that the evidence is 
not clear on the effect of online political advertising as to whether it has any 
persuasive effect or if it simply reminds people to vote for the candidate they 
already preferred.257 Eric Salama, then Chief Executive at Kantar, argued 
that the strength of online targeting was in reinforcing perceptions.258 This 
could mean that weaker opinions that are loosely held are transformed into 
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more strongly held beliefs. He made it clear that the types of data available 
to political parties were similar to those available to commercial advertisers.259
159. Eric Salama also stressed the difficulty of evaluating the efficacy of political 
advertising. He noted that whilst commercial advertisers can look at sales, 
ultimately political adverts aim to influence votes, which happen infrequently, 
and there is no way to verify how someone voted.260
160. Paddy McGuinness, former Deputy national Security Adviser, told us that 
there was a conspiracy of silence around the lack of effect that it was possible 
to have through networks like Facebook. He suggested that this was because 
it was not in the advertising industry’s interest to admit how little effect 
online advertising has.261
161. Ben Scott, Director of Policy and Advocacy at Luminate, presented a different 
picture. He noted that it was a long-term mystery of communication studies 
that research could not find a specific effect of advertising, but they did 
know that if brands stopped advertising their market share declined.262 He 
suggested that the effects of advertising should be thought of as systemic 
rather than having a simple causal relationship. Mr Scott also stated that 
AI researchers believed that targeted messaging combined with AI could be 
used to persuade people and alter their behaviours.
162. In all this evidence it is hard to identify the effect that online microtargeting 
is thought to have, and in what way it could be harmful. Microtargeting 
happens in political campaigns offline as well as online. Parties use large 
datasets of personal information to target leaflets in a similar manner to 
which they target online adverts.263 Consultancies like Cambridge Analytica 
made bold claims suggesting a quasi-magical power to control voters, but 
they have produced no robust evidence of their impact.264 Despite the lack 
of research showing the extraordinary effects claimed by these practitioners 
there are legitimate concerns about their malign impact on democracy. 
Whistle-blowers and independent journalists have highlighted the unethical 
nature of this activity. The work of Cambridge Analytica and others has 
increased the perception of technology as a tool to subvert democracy. In 
this way micro-targeted advertising has undermined trust in our democratic 
system.
163. The Institute of Practitioners in Advertising felt there could be regulation 
to suggest minimum audience thresholds for targeting in order to protect 
open, collective debate.265 In a similar vein, during the course of our inquiry, 
Google changed their policy to ban advertising from being targeted at 
any more granular level than age, gender and postcode.266 At this stage, 
there is insufficient evidence as to whether this sort of change would have 
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a meaningful effect or whether AI and A/B testing could have the same 
suggested persuasive effect at the proposed adjusted scale. nor is the evidence 
currently sufficient to justify a different approach for online microtargeted 
advertising to that of offline microtargeted leaflets.
164. Keith Weed, President of the Advertising Association, argued that from a 
commercial perspective microtargeting was beneficial to the user as they 
were not forced to see irrelevant advertising. The same argument could 
be made about political advertising. Facebook also made the point that, 
whilst less targeted advertising is cheaper per person reached, microtargeted 
advertising allows smaller campaigns to get their message out to specific 
audiences where they would struggle to afford other types of advertising.267
165. There is a need for immediate safeguards that should be in place to prevent 
political campaigns from misusing this technology. We look at these in detail 
in Chapter 6 on free and fair elections. Beyond these immediate safeguards, 
before we can craft effective wider regulation, greater co-operation from 
platforms is needed in order for research to establish the extent to which 
looser targeting criteria changes the persuasive effects of advertising or 
whether there are other elements, specific to online targeted advertising, that 
are a cause for particular concern. This will facilitate future regulation in 
this area.
Foreign interference
166. A more specific worry that we heard was that platforms offer a new frontier 
for hostile governments to interfere with our democratic process. The 
Government told us that there has not been any successful interference in 
UK elections.268 However, whether this statement is true or not depends on 
how success is defined. Presumably the Government’s criteria for success is 
changing the outcome of the election. Yet this is not the only potential criteria 
to consider. Foreign actors could affect the margin of an election result or 
merely be perceived as having done so and in doing so undermine trust in 
democracy. Elisabeth Braw, Director of the Modern Deterrence Project at 
the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), used the example of the US 2016 
presidential elections to show the problems with the Government’s statement. 
She told us that whilst it was hotly debated to what extent Russia influenced 
that election, the important fact was that a large proportion of the American 
population thought that Russia had.269 Lisa-Maria neudert, Commission 
Secretary at the Oxford Technology and Elections Commission, stated that 
interference was not aimed at spreading a specific message but was instead 
focused on sowing mistrust in the political system in general.270 We heard 
from Siim Kumpas, Adviser to the Government Office of Estonia, that no 
politician in Estonia doubts the importance of tackling foreign interference 
from Russia. However, it is unclear what level of threat it presents in the UK.
167. Ben Scott of Luminate argued that while it was difficult to determine the 
effect of foreign interference, it was having an effect. He explained that 
misinformation already exists and circulates online, and foreign states such 
as Russia only have to use their online networks to nudge the conversation 
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in one direction or another.271 Mr Scott told us that we currently lack the 
information we would need to know to what extent this action is decisive, or 
to what extent it represents a small part of an already large misinformation 
system. Paddy McGuinness disagreed about the level of threat foreign 
interference presents but agreed on the same basic fact that foreign states 
were attempting to influence UK democracy using social media.272 He 
argued that the criteria for success for states like Russia were very low as they 
just have to add a little instability at a time when a country is vulnerable. Mr 
McGuinness stated that we do the job of hostile governments for them by 
talking up the threat they pose.
168. There is a need for greater research into the scale of misinformation put out 
by foreign governments. Sir Julian King, former EU Security Commissioner 
told us that there was a need for independent research scrutiny of alleged 
pieces of disinformation in order to map patterns of activity and better 
prepare for dealing with such activity in the future.273
169. For now, addressing this interference should be done through ensuring 
platforms can better tackle misinformation as we examine in Chapter 2, and 
by better preparing our citizens to understand the information we see online 
as discussed in Chapter 7.
Filter bubbles
170. Another way it has been suggested that technology platforms undermine 
democratic discourse is through the creation of filter bubbles. The 
Government told us, and stated in its Online Harms White Paper, that social 
media platforms use algorithms which can lead to filter bubbles where a 
user is presented with only one type of content instead of seeing a range of 
voices or opinions.274 Given the Government’s prominent endorsement of 
this theory in this major policy programme, it could be thought that there 
was strong evidence to suggest that this is a widespread phenomenon and 
represents a particular problem on online platforms. However, this does not 
appear to be the case.
171. Professor Helen Margetts, Professor of the Internet and Society at the 
University of Oxford and Director of the Public Policy Programme at The 
Alan Turing Institute, told us that human beings naturally prefer echo 
chambers. 275 Echo chambers can be a naturally occurring phenomenon 
where people speak to others who have similar opinions as opposed to the 
idea of filter bubbles which are driven by platforms’ algorithms. She said that 
the most perfect echo chamber would be to rely on a single news source like 
Cnn, Fox news or the Daily Express. Professor Margetts told us that the 
research on the subject suggested the idea of online echo chambers has been 
exaggerated, with most social media users seeing a wider variety of news 
sources than non-users. Professor Cristian Vaccari from Loughborough 
University stated that his research from across the globe found that social 
media users were more likely to encounter views they disagreed with online 
and that echo chambers were more likely to exist in face to face conversation 
where people are likely to talk with those with whom they already agree.276 
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Previous research that suggested the existence of echo chambers has been 
criticised for not acknowledging the breadth of different media individuals 
use, and the amount of media choice available online.277
172. Dr Martin Moore told us that whilst there has never been a single public 
sphere, previously it was more constrained, and online platforms, particularly 
smaller platforms, allowed for a more atomised public sphere.278 This 
leads to a situation where some elements become more and more extreme. 
Professor Helen Margetts stated that what evidence there was of filter bubbles 
developing was in groups of older people and parts of the American right.279 
The Oxford Internet Institute suggested that only a small portion of the 
population online were likely to find themselves in political echo chambers.280
173. The Online Harms White Paper suggests there might be a need to ensure 
that social media platforms increase the range of views that individuals 
encounter to counter the rise of echo chambers.281 Given the evidence 
suggests that social media users already encounter a more diverse variety 
of news that non-users, this does not appear to be the right approach. 
What appears to be significant is the design decisions taken by social media 
platforms in determining the content that users see. This suggests that the 
Online Harms White Paper should focus not on a specific action designed to 
counter a problem for which evidence is contested but should instead explore 
how design decisions taken by platforms influence user experiences. More 
research is needed on the relationship between the media people consume, 
social media recommendation systems and polarisation.
174. There is also a need for a greater understanding of the risk factors for the 
minority of users who could end up in echo chambers and ways in which 
these echo chambers can be better identified. Furthermore, research is 
needed to understand whether these echo chambers can normalise extremist 
views for those within them and the behaviours this may create.
Algorithmic design and outrage factories
175. A more general version of this concern is that the structure of platforms 
incentivises divisive content and that they effectively act as ‘outrage 
factories’. However, it is not clear that platforms are unique in functioning 
this way. Dr Ysabel Gerrard told us that the defining feature of social media 
platforms was showing people what they wanted to see, favouring extremism 
and powerful emotion over measured rational expression.282 As discussed in 
the previous Chapter, Mark Zuckerberg argues that people have an innate 
tendency toward more shocking and outrageous content which applies just 
as much to cable news and tabloids as it does to social media platforms.283 
Professor Cristian Vaccari told us that we should think of social media’s 
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connection with traditional media.284 He argued that the biggest outrage 
factory in the US was Fox news and that there was a connection with 
Facebook in that Fox news was the most shared news source on Facebook. 
Professor Vaccari also highlighted the fact that tabloids are outrage factories 
and that they are shared widely on social media. He noted that people 
who shared tabloid stories were also more likely to share misinformation. 
Professor Rasmus Kleis nielsen of the Reuters Institute told us that high 
media literacy was associated with reading more upmarket newspapers and 
being less likely to share disinformation. This suggests that the amount of 
outrageous content on social media partly represents people’s pre-existing 
media habits being shared online.
176. The alternative argument is that social media companies’ business models are 
based on promoting outrageous content. Professor Safiya noble of UCLA 
told us that we should think of these platforms primarily as advertising 
platforms which are designed to optimise performance for those advertisers 
who pay for them.285 Dr Jennifer Cobbe from the University of Cambridge 
argued that this meant that platforms are designed around keeping people 
on the platform longer so that they can be served more advertising.286 
Christoph Schott of Avaaz also told us that the goal of platforms is to keep 
users for as long as possible, which might make them draw on more simple 
emotions such as outrage and hatred as these are what is popular.287 However, 
both Dr Cobbe and Mr Schott stressed that this ends up with advertisers 
appearing alongside content that they would not wish to be associated with, 
and when informed about it, removing their advertising from that content.288 
We also heard from advertisers that they would not want to advertise next 
to dangerous content.289 Facebook has made the argument that it is not in 
its business interest to encourage this type of contentious content as an ugly, 
emotional atmosphere does not make people click adverts.290
177. Targeted advertising, foreign interference and echo chambers can contribute 
to platforms’ role in polarisation. Targeted advertising can spread further if 
it includes outrageous content and is shared organically. Foreign interference 
also uses outrageous content to further its spread. Similarly, extreme content 
created in echo chambers can spread widely and become normalised.
178. Given that advertisers would not wish to be adjacent to outrageous content, 
it is therefore not in the ultimate business interest of social media platforms 
to create or spread outrageous content, the priority is to study the causes 
and prevalence of such content. This could include looking more closely at 
user behaviour to see when and why people share this type of content; and 
what elements of platforms’ design increases or decreases the spread of such 
content, and how the most negative aspects of this situation can be improved.
Access for independent researchers
179. In each of the cases identified above, more research is needed, which requires 
independent researchers to have greater access to data from technology 
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platforms. Whilst on occasion the experts we heard from disagreed, their 
clear consensus was that there was not enough data because platforms did 
not allow independent research to audit their performance. Ben Scott from 
Luminate told us that the anecdotal data he had seen suggested targeted 
advertising and foreign interference were platform problems but that we are 
forced to rely on incident reports rather than comprehensive data due to 
platforms not sharing their data.291 He suggested that we need an independent 
review of the effects of platforms to ensure we understand exactly what 
is going on. Paddy McGuinness disagreed about what he thought the 
anecdotal data showed but agreed that it was essential for independent non-
state organisations to look at the data and explain to the public what was 
happening.292 Both stressed that in order to trust technology platforms we 
must be able to verify their activities and effects.
180. Researchers told us that it was very difficult to study the effects of the large 
platforms. Alex Krasodomski-Jones from Demos told us that over the past 
five or six years many of the tools that he used to monitor these spaces have 
stopped functioning, meaning that is harder to understand what is happening 
on these platforms.293 Professor Helen Margetts told us that no one had the 
types of data needed to do the necessary research.294 A recent review of the 
data sharing policies across the major platforms found major issues on each 
platform with the exception of Reddit.295 Professor Margetts stated that it 
was very difficult to measure the effects of echo chambers, misinformation 
or hate speech without access to this data.296 Professor Cristian Vaccari 
similarly told us that in many areas there were legitimate concerns but no 
data, and without that one cannot determine the size of the effect or the 
number of people it applies to.297 Professor Vaccari told us that initiatives he 
had worked with had failed to secure voluntary collaboration from Facebook 
to release more data and that in order for there to be progress it would be 
necessary for countries to mandate that platforms release data to researchers 
as a condition of operating in that country.298
181. In the period between us hearing from academic researchers and taking 
evidence from the technology platforms, there was a breakthrough in data 
sharing with Facebook. In February, Facebook gave Social Science One, 
a collaboration between Facebook and researchers like Professor Vaccari, a 
dataset including more than a billion gigabytes of data about URLs299 that 
had been shared on Facebook.300 This will be a useful dataset that will help 
researchers better understand some of the issues we have identified. Whilst 
revealing the potential for collaboration between platforms and researchers, 
improvements are needed as access remains limited to only select researchers 
and progress in granting access to data has been slow.
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182. We heard that Social Science One have found Facebook’s interpretation of 
the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) to be quite restrictive, 
making data sharing difficult. Overcoming this barrier has proven especially 
difficult as Facebook has so far refused to release its legal analysis. We asked 
Karim Palant from Facebook if they would consider publishing this legal 
analysis and he stated that their legal assessments are subject to legal privilege 
and remain confidential. 301 It is worth noting that it appears that Facebook 
do not have such a restrictive interpretation of GDPR when it comes sharing 
data with their commercial partners. Facebook’s commercial partners have 
greater data access in some areas than external researchers.302
183. The Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI) have suggested that the 
best way forward would be for the Online Harms regulator to consult with 
the ICO to develop a model that ensures all access to data is provided in 
full compliance with the GDPR with the ICO producing a statutory code of 
practice for researcher access to platform data. The GDPR allows for data 
sharing for research purposes under Article 89 and allows states to create 
codes of conduct under Article 40 and this is reflected in Section 128 of the 
Data Protection Act 2018.303
184. There are some quick wins that can be achieved without requiring additional 
innovation in establishing users’ privacy.304 Platforms have Application 
Programming Interfaces (APIs) that allow commercial partners to access 
data from their platforms. Access to these APIs would help researchers. 
Beyond this there is a need for deep partnership between platforms and 
independent researchers to collaborate and publish research into matters of 
public interest. There is also a need for innovation from platforms to provide 
researchers with access to sensitive data in controlled environments. The 
practice of research ‘clean rooms’ allows researchers to access and manipulate 
data with an environment controlled by the data provider. Facebook has 
previously established similar protocols for advertisers.305 There is a need to 
develop and more widely facilitate this clean rooms model to enable future 
high-quality research.
185. Ben Scott told us that the best empirical analysis of what is happening on 
digital disinformation lies within research universities across the world but 
that they need resources and more data to pursue this work. This should be 
a priority.306
186. Vint Cerf from Google told us that Google works with and funds researchers 
that have gone through their internal peer review process.307 However, this 
cannot be the extent of research access to these important platforms. For this 
research to be trustworthy it must be truly independent of these platforms and 
the research topic must selected by be the regulator and the academic rather 
than the platforms themselves. In practice, this means that Ofcom should 
have the power to compel companies to facilitate research on topics that 
are in the public interest. This could be done by instructing Ofcom to work 
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with UKRI and the research councils to run a rolling funding call whereby 
researchers could propose projects that require currently unavailable data 
access. Ofcom would form part of the assessment panel, and act to facilitate 
successful research calls. In line with established research requirements, this 
publicly funded research would then need to be published on an open access 
platform to ensure its use for the public good. If platforms fail to comply 
then they should be seen to be failing to fulfil their duty of care and be 
sanctioned for it.
187. Ofcom should be given the power to compel companies to facilitate 
research on topics that are in the public interest. The ICO should, 
in consultation with Ofcom, prepare statutory guidance under 
Section 128 of the Data Protection Act 2018 on data sharing between 
researchers and the technology platforms. Once this guidance is 
completed, Ofcom should require platforms to:
(a) Provide at least equivalent access for researchers to APIs as 
that provided to commercial partners;
(b) Establish direct partnerships with researchers to undertake 
user surveys and experiments with user informed consent on 
matters of substantial public interest;
(c) Develop, for sensitive personal information, physical or virtual 
‘clean rooms’ where researchers can analyse data.
Algorithmic transparency
188. Alongside this call for data transparency, we heard of the need for additional 
transparency about how platforms use algorithmic recommendation 
systems. Caroline Elsom of the Centre for Policy Studies told us that there 
was a need to compel social media platforms to be more transparent about 
how their algorithms work.308 Matthew d’Ancona, Editor and Partner at 
Tortoise Media, told us that platforms’ algorithms are black boxes that that 
they do not want to open but that are used to reinforce prejudice and to shut 
down debate.309
189. Platforms have been very reluctant to provide additional transparency. 
Vint Cerf argued that additional transparency was not necessarily due to the 
fact that its ranking criteria and properties are public, so researchers can do 
experiments to determine if Google’s intent in its criteria are being realised.310 
However, this does not accurately describe the reality of how YouTube works.
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Box 4:  How Google’s algorithms work
Vint Cerf provided a short explanation of how Google Search weights different 
pages using its algorithm:
“The amount of information on the world wide web is extraordinarily large. 
There are billions of pages. We have no ability to manually evaluate all that 
content, but we have about 10,000 people, as part of our Google family, who 
evaluate websites. We have perhaps as many as nine opinions of selected pages. 
In the case of search, we have a 168page document given over to how you 
determine the quality of a website.
… Once we have samples of webpages that have been evaluated by those 
evaluators, we can take what they have done and the webpages their evaluations 
apply to, and make a machinelearning neural network that reflects the quality 
they have been able to assert for the webpages. Those webpages become the 
training set for a machinelearning system. The machinelearning system is then 
applied to all the webpages we index in the world wide web. Once that application 
has been done, we use that information and other indicators to rankorder the 
responses that come back from a web search.
There is a twostep process. There is a manual process to establish criteria and a 
goodquality training set, and then a machinelearning system to scale up to the 
size of the world wide web, which we index.”311
 311
190. It is not possible to assess how Google produces the training datasets for 
YouTube. Google has published the evaluation criteria that it uses to assess 
Google Search results and claims that these are the same used to evaluate 
YouTube results.312 However, the document published solely uses examples 
from Google Search to explain what quality looks like and does not indicate 
what quality looks like in a YouTube video. This document is used to rate 
web pages from high to low quality to determine search weightings for 
Google Search. YouTube’s borderline content programme does not rely on 
a rating from high to low quality but instead produces a binary decision of 
whether to include a YouTube video within its recommendation system or not. 
This would strongly suggest a quite different document exists for evaluating 
YouTube content. When we asked Google how it determines borderline 
content on YouTube, we were directed to its community guidelines.313 These 
do not explain this process. Despite repeated questioning of Google on 
this important point we failed to achieve greater transparency on how this 
programme works.
191. Google have sought to contrast its algorithmic ratings with subjective 
determinations by humans of the truth.314 However, these ratings ultimately 
boil down to the subjective ratings of the humans who evaluate web pages. 
This is presumably why Google collects up to nine reviews of each page 
it ranks.315 Katie O’Donovan, Head of UK Government Affairs and Public 
Policy at Google, told us that Google works with external experts to ensure 
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their machine learning tools correctly determine what is an authoritative 
response, but Google has not told us who these experts are.316
192. At the other end of the algorithm, it is not possible to determine what YouTube 
is recommending to users of its website. YouTube recommends videos to 
people based on the content that they have seen before. Its recommendation 
system is personalised. This means that external attempts to study YouTube’s 
algorithm are limited either to using anonymous recommendations (based 
on a person with no viewing history) or creating artificial profiles. The 
lack of data available here has led to disputes in the research community 
about whether or not YouTube’s algorithm can have a radicalising effect.317 
Researchers on both side of the dispute agree that all studies are limited by 
the lack of access to data on what personalised recommendations YouTube 
is making.318
193. Katie O’Donovan told us that Google’s reticence to be more transparent 
was based on negative previous experience. She explained that in Google’s 
early days it published a paper on its search algorithm and quite quickly and 
systematically websites began paying to game the system.319 Whilst this is an 
argument against publishing additional details it does not apply to providing 
regulators with additional access. Dr Jennifer Cobbe told us that transparency 
to oversight bodies provided less risk of people using that information to 
game the system as they would not have access to it.320 She explained that it 
was reasonable for platforms to have concerns around commercial secrecy 
but they can be confident that regulators will not pass on the information. 
Alaphia Zoyab from Avaaz reiterated the fact that regulators routinely see 
commercially sensitive information and social media companies should not 
be exempt from that degree of scrutiny.321
Algorithmic bias
194. One particular problem with algorithmic recommendation systems is that 
they can have biases against certain groups. Roger Taylor, Chair of the CDEI, 
told us that there was clear evidence of bias in these systems although it is 
often unintentional. He cited the example of the fact that in many scenarios 
it is cheaper to target advertising online toward men than towards women.322 
Dr Jennifer Cobbe told us that it is exceptionally difficult, if not impossible, 
to fully remove bias from machine-learning systems.323 This can be due to 
the fact that the dataset the model is trained on is not large enough and that it 
will de-prioritise things that it has not been trained on. Dr Cobbe also stated 
that this can be due to the system being trained on historical datasets that 
encode into the algorithm the structural issues that existed in society when 
that dataset was collected. She explained that if the designer has not tested 
or audited the system widely enough then potential biases will materialise.
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195. One real life disputed example of this phenomena comes from YouTube. A 
number of LGBT+ YouTube creators are suing YouTube in the US because 
they claim that YouTube is disproportionately removing advertising from 
LGBT+ creators’ videos.324 This removes their ability to make money from 
their videos and reduces the viability of LGBT+ media outlets using YouTube 
as a platform. One study of YouTube’s algorithm found that an otherwise 
identical video would be demonetised if it used words related to LGBT+ 
people.325 Conversely, when words like “gay” and “lesbian” were changed 
to random words like “happy” the status of the video changed to being 
advertiser friendly. When we asked representatives from Google about this 
phenomenon we were told that it could not comment on live cases.326 Whilst 
it is understandable that Google did not wish to comment on something 
subject to current litigation, lack of transparency here makes it difficult to 
know what went wrong in this situation and how it could be stopped in the 
future.
196. One informed guess for why this might have happened is that the data that 
YouTube used to train its algorithm included more LGBT+ content in its 
non-advertiser friendly example data (for example LGBT+ sex education 
videos are not advertiser friendly) than in its advertiser friendly example 
data.327 This may be because content on YouTube that explicitly states it is 
LGBT+ in its title is more likely to be ‘non-advertiser friendly’ than content 
that does not. However, this does not justify removing the ability of all 
LGBT+ content to receive income from advertisers.
197. Dr Jennifer Cobbe told us that platforms could prevent their algorithms 
from discriminating against specific groups by auditing and testing these 
algorithms as broadly as possible and making sure that the datasets used 
to train the algorithms were as representative as possible.328 However, she 
warned that there would need to be legal and regulatory incentives in order 
to persuade companies to undergo this testing.329 In other areas this sort of 
testing is being done by regulators. Guy Parker, CEO of the ASA, told us 
that they were conducting avatar monitoring where they were creating online 
profiles to resemble those of different aged children and testing whether they 
were receiving adverts which were inappropriate for their age group.330 If 
YouTube undertook this sort of auditing it is unlikely that it would have 
discriminated against LGBT+ creators in the way that is alleged.
198. There is already law in this area that is relevant. The Equality Act 2010 
prevents direct discrimination against people with certain protected 
characteristics (including sexual orientation and gender reassignment). It 
also prevents indirect discrimination. Indirect discrimination occurs when a 
provision, criterion or practice which applies in the same way for everybody 
has an effect which disadvantages people with a protected characteristic. 
Where a particular group is disadvantaged in this way, a person in that group 
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is indirectly discriminated against if he or she is put at that disadvantage, 
unless the person applying the policy can justify it as a proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim. In the absence of further evidence, 
it is unclear whether the alleged algorithmic demonetisation is direct or 
indirect discrimination and to what extent it is a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim. There is a case that could be made however that 
in order to comply with existing equality law, platforms should already be 
engaged in algorithmic audits to ensure against discrimination on the basis 
of characteristics protected in the Act. This may be an area that the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission should investigate.
199. The Equality Act 2010 includes the characteristics of age, disability, gender 
reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, 
race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation.331 There may be a case 
for platforms to audit their algorithms for characteristics beyond this. One 
potential area is political bias. However, we acknowledge that there are clear 
challenges to auditing for this. There are political opinions that are banned 
on online platforms. Facebook has an explicit ban on praising, supporting 
and representing white nationalism and white separatism.332 Policy aiming 
to reduce political bias in algorithms should not seek to reverse this. It would 
therefore be difficult to establish a spectrum of acceptable political viewpoints 
on which platforms should be audited, especially at the global scale that these 
platforms operate. Another possible area would be auditing to ensure against 
bias on the basis of socio-economic class. This would be less straightforward 
than auditing for characteristics under the Equality Act which have more 
established practices partly due to having existed in legislation for a decade. 
However, it is possible that methods could be developed.
200. Ofcom should issue a code of practice on algorithmic recommending. 
This should require platforms to conduct audits on all substantial 
changes to their algorithmic recommending facilities for their 
effects on users with characteristics protected under the Equality 
Act 2010. Ofcom should work with platforms to establish audits on 
other relevant and appropriate characteristics. Platforms should 
be required to share the results of these audits with Ofcom and the 
Equalities and Human Rights Commission if requested.
201. Ofcom should be given the powers and be properly resourced in order to 
undertake periodic audits of the algorithmic recommending systems 
used by technology platforms, including accessing the training data 
used to train the systems and comprehensive information from the 
platforms on what content is being recommended.
202. There is a common thread between the need for transparency 
of algorithmic processes and researchers’ access to platforms. 
Platforms must be entirely open to the regulators to ensure proper 
oversight. Ofcom can only ensure that platforms are meeting their 
duty of care if it has access to all data from these platforms and the 
ability to use additional research expertise to better understand what 
that data means. The exact details of what data Ofcom will need 
will change as technology develops therefore these powers must be 
suitably broad.
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203. Ofcom should have the power to request any data relevant to ensure 
that platforms are acting in accordance with their duty of care.
Transparency in content moderation
204. In the previous Chapter we recommended accountability measures to 
improve content moderation; however, in order for these to be effective 
there must be more transparency in the moderation processes they 
seek to improve. Professor Daniel Kriess, Associate Professor at the 
University of north Carolina, argued that accountable moderation decisions 
require a clear justification framework. This would need to include a moral 
argument for the democratic case for removing content and providing evidence 
of how this is done in practice.333 He told us that, in practice, platforms have 
been highly reactive to negative press coverage and public pressure and have 
changed to ameliorate bad news coverage. This has resulted in an ongoing 
and confusing set of changes in the content moderation approaches of the 
major platforms. Professor Kriess explained that it was difficult to find clear 
explanations of changes in policies, rationales for content takedowns, or even 
to confirm if changes in policy took place. He also told us that individual 
incidences of content moderation often required external pressure to ensure 
platforms honour and enforce their own policies.
205. Katie O’Donovan from Google suggested that Google and YouTube were 
transparent in their moderation policy and practice. She told us that they 
made it clear to their creator community when they changed community 
guidelines and that these guidelines set out in in detail and plain English 
what their policy was. However, it is unclear how this statement can be 
reconciled with reality. For example, last summer, Steven Crowder, a 
comedian with 3.8 million subscribers, was reported to YouTube for repeated 
racist and homophobic abuse of Carlos Maza, a gay Cuban-American 
journalist.334 This was followed by large quantities of abusive messages 
across social media platforms and phone messages on Mr Maza’s personal 
mobile from Mr Crowder’s supporters. YouTube decided that Mr Crowder’s 
videos should not be removed from their platform due to the fact that it 
was not the primary purpose of the video to incite hatred.335 However, until 
YouTube published this blog post, the company’s community guidelines 
did not mention whether incitement was the primary purpose of the video, 
only stating that incitement was against the guidelines.336 It has since been 
updated but it is unclear if this was a change in policy or a change in how 
YouTube’s previous policy was explained to the public.337 YouTube employees 
have anonymously spoken to the press to indicate that they are prevented 
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from enforcing the rules consistently and that more senior employees stop 
sanctions from being applied to high profile creators.338
206. This lack of clarity and consistency in moderation policies and practices has 
consequences for public trust in those systems. Professor Sarah Roberts told 
us that research with users who had had their content removed by platforms 
found that almost everyone surveyed believed that they were being personally 
targeted and persecuted due to their political beliefs.339 It is unlikely that 
platforms are persecuting all of the different political beliefs of those covered 
in the study but a lack of clarity over platforms’ moderation activity helps 
create this perception.
207. Additional transparency could improve this. Caroline Elsom of the 
Centre for Policy Studies told us that it is important for content that has 
been taken down to be kept somewhere and be publicly available so that 
independent researchers can examine platforms’ moderation practices.340 
Researchers and concerned civil society organisations have asked platforms 
to keep a database of misinformation they have removed about COVID-19 
to help individuals working in public health and human rights to understand 
the effect of online information on health outcomes.341
208. There is a model for more transparent content moderation in Facebook’s 
Third-Party Fact Checking network. Fact checkers in this programme 
publish an article explaining which parts of the content that they moderate 
are misinformation and why this is the case.342 This means that it is possible 
to go to the fact checkers’ websites and find out what misinformation they 
have marked. However, this programme does not mandate fact checkers to 
include a copy of the misinformation itself and as a result is only of limited 
use for this purpose. We discuss this programme in more detail in Chapter 2 
which focuses on misinformation.
209. The need for additional transparency in this area has been highlighted by the 
actions of platforms in response to the COVID-19 crisis. Multiple platforms 
have removed content posted by Jair Bolsonaro, the current president of 
Brazil.343 This content broke platforms’ policy by promoting misinformation 
about a possible cure for COVID-19. However, platforms have not published 
a prominent fact check with detailed reasoning for why they have removed 
this content. Instead they have given statements to the press indicating that 
the content broke their terms of service. There are worrying questions about 
transparency and accountability when a platform removes the content of a 
nation’s leader without explaining in detail why they have done so.
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Box 5: President Trump and content moderation study
On 26 May 2020 Twitter took the decision to add a link giving additional 
context to a Tweet from President Trump on the subject of postal voting. 
President Trump in his Tweet asserted that postal voting forms would be 
sent to all individuals living in California and that it was an attempt to rig the 
2020 presidential election through fraud. This was untrue. The proposal in 
California was to send them to individuals who were registered to vote in the 
state. Twitter’s response gave accurate details of the scheme alongside citing 
political journalists stating that evidence does not suggest that postal voting will 
be used for fraud. Twitter did this as its civic integrity policy states that it will 
take action against misleading claims about electoral processes.344
The response from Twitter was not a clear fact check and did not fully meet the 
standards set by the IFCn. The IFCn’s code of principles requires that fact 
checkers use the best available primary source or if that is not available, that 
they explain the use of a secondary source. By quoting from political journalists 
rather than citing the actual research on postal voting, Twitter failed to live up to 
this standard. Twitter’s response is also not transparent about its methodology 
nor does it have a clear corrections policy, both of which are required by the 
IFCn.
President Trump responded to Twitter by criticising it for relying on “Fake 
news Cnn and the Amazon Washington Post” and argued that Twitter was 
stifling his free speech. As we set out in Chapter 3 on accountability, freedom 
of expression is not unjustly infringed by reducing the spread of harmful speech 
and as we argue in Chapter 2, fact checking, when done to a high standard and 
transparently, only adds to the quality of public debate.
On 29 May 2020 Twitter took action again against President Trump for a 
Tweet about protests in the US that they believed broke their rules on glorifying 
violence. Twitter placed the Tweet behind a warning stating it broke the rules 
for glorifying violence but that it was in the public interest for the Tweet to stay 
on their service.345 This is an effective approach in keeping with the principles 
we have set out.
President Trump posted the same content on mail fraud and US protests to 
his Facebook page however, Facebook chose to not take action against either 
post because they believed that it did not breach their relevant policies. It treats 
threats of state use of force differently from non-state force and only removes 
threats from non-state actors. Facebook also have different policies on electoral 
misinformation to Twitter. It excludes elected officials from its third-party-
fact-checking initiative but will still remove content that they view as voter 
suppression. In response to criticism from inside and outside of the organisation 
Facebook has committed to reviewing its policies on voter suppression and state 
use of force.346
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Facebook’s response encapsulates the failures that we have outlined in the 
previous three Chapters. Their restriction of their fact checking programme 
to not include elected individuals creates the impression of unequal treatment. 
Although both have been discussed publicly by Facebook neither their voter 
suppression policy nor their state force policy are clearly articulated within the 
community standards including examples of what would and would not count.347 
This has led to individuals inside and outside of the company believing that 
President Trump broke these rules whilst Facebook’s official judgement is that 
he did not. The overall effect of this is that a critical decision about public 
debate is made by unaccountable individuals on the basis of rules that are not 
transparent.
210. Mackenzie Common, an academic at LSE, has suggested that content 
moderation systems could be improved by platforms publishing a collection 
of decisions that act as precedent.348 Terms and conditions would be given 
shape by expanding on the various categories of prohibited content and 
indicating how borderline cases are decided. Those examples could be 
anonymised and could include a short explanation of why each decision was 
made. Crucially, the database of previous decisions could be used to ensure 
consistency in content moderation decisions and improve accountability for 
these decisions. Users or civil society organisations could identify problematic 
individual decisions or trends in decisions and challenge them.
211. Such a database would fit well with the ombudsman system recommended in 
the previous Chapter. Civil society groups could raise specific cases that they 
believe pose a problem with the content ombudsman either because that case 
does not resemble previously published examples or because the published 
examples are problematic. If there were a broader issue identified with 
moderation policy, then civil society groups could raise it with Ofcom. The 
system would be more meaningful and effective with more representative 
example decisions and if platforms included high profile decisions without 
anonymisation.
212. The proposed database should not include all types of content moderation 
decisions. Karim Palant of Facebook told us that Facebook contributed to 
shared databases of inappropriate child abuse and terrorism material and 
that these were rightly only used by law enforcement agencies and other 
platforms.349 As discussed in the previous Chapter, the key decisions that 
should be publicly available for democratic discussion are those taken around 
impersonation, misinformation, hate speech and abuse and these are the 
decisions that any database should focus on.
213. Katy Minshall of Twitter told us that their rules already contained 
hypothetical examples of Tweets that would not be allowed on their platform.350 
An example of this is their hateful content policy, which forbids conduct 
that promotes violence against, directly attacks, or threatens another person 
on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, caste, sexual orientation, 
gender, gender identity, religious affiliation, age, disability or serious disease. 
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Their policy includes the case of“ Hoping that someone dies as a result of a 
serious disease, for example, ‘I hope you get cancer and die.’”.351 Whilst this 
is more helpful than a vague statement forbidding hateful content, it does 
not provide the detail needed for civil society to understand what is ‘hateful’ 
to the point that it breaks their community rules and would be taken down. 
This prevents an informed debate on whether this line is in the right place 
to preserve freedom of expression whilst also ensuring that violence is not 
incited against people with protected characteristics. Critically, no platforms 
provided an example of the types of content which would not be removed. 
This means that it is difficult to understand when something has not been 
taken down whether this is due to it not breaking the rules of the platform or 
if it has simply not been seen by a content moderator. In turn, it is difficult 
to assess the quality or consistency of decision making.
214. When questioned on this subject, representatives from Facebook, Twitter 
and Google did not comment on the feasibility of this approach. However, 
previous research on the subject has suggested that solutions being scalable 
is key to improving moderation policies and processes. An anonymous 
Facebook employee explained to Dr Tarleton Gillespie that unless policy 
is repeatable at scale then it is not really a policy and all that remains are 
good aspirations and chaos.352 However, the model of a database of previous 
examples guiding future decisions can fit with existing processes at these 
platforms. As explained in Box 4, platforms train the content moderation 
algorithms based on a sample dataset of moderation decisions. The sample 
dataset could form the basis of a public database of decisions. Similarly, leaked 
slides from internal human moderators show extensive use of examples in 
training their training.353 Twitter told us that they use anonymised example 
Tweets to train their content moderators.354 From reporting, we know that 
Facebook moderators make their decisions on the basis of a known questions 
document and a mixture of constantly changing pieces of contradictory 
advice.355 Facebook views its moderators as making simple binary decisions 
based on policy. A senior lawyer at Facebook explained it to the Harvard 
Law Review as moderators being asked to tell the difference between red 
or blue rather than deciding between beautiful and ugly.356 A searchable 
database of previous decisions, showing what content should be removed, 
no longer recommended or kept as is, could be an improvement for internal 
procedures, and scale better than existing workflows, as well as having the 
benefits for democracy we have outlined.
215. Throughout this section we have referred to content as singular, however 
not all moderation decisions are based on a single piece of content. Some 
of the examples used could include a pattern of content showing abuse or 
351 Twitter Help Centre, ‘Hateful conduct policy’: https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/hateful-
conduct-policy [accessed 13 May 2020]
352 Dr Tarleton Gillespie, Custodians of the Internet: platforms, content moderation, and the hidden decisions 
that shape social media, (new Haven: Yale University Press 2018) p 138
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theguardian.com/news/gallery/2017/may/24/hate-speech-and-anti-migrant-posts-facebooks-rules 
[accessed 13 May 2020]
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other misuse of the platform rather than solely focusing on a single piece of 
content.
216. Ofcom should issue a code of practice on content moderation. This 
should require companies to clearly state what they do not allow 
on their platforms and give useful examples of how this applies 
in practice. These policies should also make clear how individual 
decisions can be appealed. Platforms should be obligated to ensure 
that their content moderation decisions are consistent with their 
published terms and conditions, community standards and privacy 
rules.
217. The code of practice on content moderation should also include the 
requirement that all technology platforms publish an anonymised 
database of archetypes of content moderation decisions on 
impersonation, misinformation, hate speech and abuse. Where 
decisions differ from existing published examples the platform 
should be obliged to explain the decision to the individuals affected 
and to create a new anonymised decision. Failure to ensure 
consistency between content moderation practices and published 
examples should be seen as a failure in the duty of care and result 
in sanctions against the platforms. An archive of removed content 
should be made available to researchers for analysis.
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CHAPTER 5: INCLUSIVE DEBATE ACROSS SOCIETY
218. As a Committee, we were keen to explore the full effects of digital technologies 
on democracy, including the positive effects. In our evidence, we have detected 
a tension between technology as a democratising force that has enabled 
citizens to contribute to democratic debate, and as a threat to democracy. 
We have seen, in recent years, optimism towards technology’s potential for 
enabling democracy in the wake of events, such as the Arab Spring in 2011, 
giving way to pessimism and distrust.357
219. This Chapter will set out how technology can better support democracy 
by encouraging inclusive debate across society. We begin by discussing 
how technology can support democracy and aid in tackling some of the 
challenges it faces now and into the future. We then go onto consider how 
Parliament and government at all levels could better use technology to 
enhance democracy. The potential exists to build on the nolan principle 
of accountability–digital technologies can greatly aid the process of holding 
authorities accountable regarding the decisions and actions they take. We 
are optimistic, but realistic, about the positive effect technology can have on 
democracy in this country, and caution that technology should not be seen 
as a panacea, nor a cheap and easy way of tackling the structural issues that 
have in recent years undermined support for representative democracy.
220. Our evidence on this was taken before the COVID-19 pandemic resulted 
in lockdown measures across the UK and forced most people to rely on 
digital technologies far more than usual. This has demonstrated why it is so 
important that we use digital innovation to enhance democracy at all levels.
The role of technology in tackling the challenges facing democracy
Supporting technological innovation in democracy
221. The argument that democratic processes have not kept up with societal 
expectations brought about by digital technology has been raised with us 
repeatedly. This is important because there is a danger that democracy may 
be considered increasingly outmoded and irrelevant in a digital era.
222. The democratising potential of technology was made clear to us by leading 
academics. Professor Helen Margetts from the University of Oxford told us 
that social media “allows new tiny acts of political participation that were 
not possible before. Politics used to be very lumpy; it was the preserve of 
an activist elite” and that “we should not lose sight of the fact that social 
media allows anybody with a mobile phone to fight injustice or campaign for 
policy change.”358 Dr Martin Moore from King’s College London warned 
against being either utopian or dystopian about technology, but agreed 
that we were undergoing a period of “radical transformation” and that the 
hurdles to participation have reduced, whereby “the gatekeepers, particularly 
the mainstream media and the main political parties, have essentially lost 
their monopoly and dominance of the [democratic] process.”359 Research 
conducted by Professor Cristian Vaccari from Loughborough University has 
found that social media both deepens and broadens political participation: 
357 Hans Kundnani, The Future of Democracy in Europe: Technology and the Evolution of Representation 
(March 2020) p 11: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/CHHJ7131-Democracy-Techno 
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it deepens participation by increasing the range of activities one can do; 
and broadens it by bringing in citizens who were previously less likely to 
participate.360
223. We also heard that UK democracy has not kept pace with advancements 
in technology. Efforts to aggregate basic information about local elections, 
candidates and results were being made by small civic technology 
organisations such as Democracy Club and MySociety, many of whom rely 
on volunteer efforts to support a small core of paid staff. Democracy Club 
suggested that people were using technology to find out basic information 
about the UK’s democratic process. They stated that the most searched for 
questions on Google around elections include ‘where do I vote’ and ‘who are 
my candidates’. There is no central source of information about candidates, 
polling locations and results. Democracy Club run a volunteer scheme to 
collect and supply this information to the Electoral Commission and several 
news organisations. However, they were clear that they are not a sustainable 
long-term source for citizens to get this sort of information which they rely 
upon.361
224. Joe Mitchell from Democracy Club used the comparator of the way in 
which technology had transformed transport information. He explained that 
transport apps on people’s phones that help people travel are made possible 
by public bodies publishing open data. Mr Mitchell explained that an 
equivalent app to help engagement with democratic processes is not possible 
because there is not the same amount of open data.362
225. One of the most widely touted benefits of digital technology for democracy 
is the democratisation of information. Dr Alan Renwick, Deputy Director 
of the UCL Constitution Unit, has argued for a wide array of information 
to be available for the public to use.363 He has suggested that this should 
include basic procedural information, on when, where and how to vote; 
factual information, about candidates including their biographies; positional 
information to help voters find out where parties and candidates stand on 
specific policy issues; and analytical information, assessing the likely effect 
of manifesto policies from each party. The provision of this information 
is also important to counter against the misleading alternative sources of 
information which arise around election time.364
226. Tim Hughes, Director of Involve, a public participation charity, told us that 
some of the best uses of digital technology so far have made some of the 
processes of representative democracy easier for people to engage with. He 
pointed to MySociety’s work on this and to platforms such as TheyWorkForYou, 
a parliamentary monitoring site, and WhatDoTheyKnow, a site designed to 
help people make Freedom of Information requests, both of which make it 
a lot easier for citizens to engage with representative institutions.365 Around 
360 Q 46 (Professor Cristian Vaccari)
361 Written evidence from Democracy Club (DAD0045)
362 Q 259 (Joe Mitchell)
363 Dr Alan Renwick and Michela Palese, ‘Doing Democracy Better: How can information and 
discourse in election and referendum campaigns in the UK be improved?’, March 2019: https://
www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/sites/constitution-unit/files/184_-_doing_democracy_better_0.pdf 
[accessed 18 April 2020]
364 ‘Tactical voting website criticised for ‘bogus’ advice’ The Guardian (30 October 2019) https://www.
theguardian.com/politics/2019/oct/30/tactical-voting-could-deliver-remain-victory-in-election-study 
[accessed 24 April 2020]
365 Q 268 (Tim Hughes)
76 DIGITAL TECHnOLOGY AnD THE RESURRECTIOn OF TRUST
elections, projects are set up by small civic technology organisations that 
enable people to engage with manifestos, with quizzes encouraging people to 
see which political party best fits their view, with polling station finders and 
much more.366
227. The COVID-19 pandemic will be the subject of analysis of all types for 
many years to come. However, it has brought the arguments made by 
Mr Hughes and Dr Renwick into a new context. Digital tools can be used to 
expand participation and access to information in situations where both the 
knowledge and impact are local. Council processes could be opened up for 
general observation and participation, easing access for both local residents 
and local journalists. We advocate government support of innovative uses of 
digital technologies in local government.
228. There are 650 Westminster parliamentary constituencies in the UK. 
This essentially means that at a General Election there are 650 local 
campaigns happening at once. On top of this, at defined points, there are 
local government elections, elections to the devolved institutions, mayoral 
elections, and Police and Crime Commissioner elections. However, factual 
data about elections is not aggregated online by an official institution. The 
Electoral Commission’s website shows upcoming elections based on a given 
postcode, but this is far from a comprehensive list of how to vote, where to 
vote and who the candidates are.
229. We currently lean far too heavily on tiny civic organisations, who aggregate 
information and do a lot of work out of goodwill and a genuine desire to 
open up the democratic process. Democracy Club suggested that if local 
authorities were to publish data to certain standards then it could be easily 
aggregated and shown to people more widely. We agree that local authorities 
are well placed to publish this information, but local authority capacity is 
already stretched. Many local authorities already do put out information on 
their web pages on which elections are taking place. However, this should be 
comprehensive, machine-readable and uniformly available across all local 
authorities.
230. The House of Lords Select Committee on Citizenship and Civic Engagement 
recommended in 2018 that local authorities should improve the way they 
notify the public about electoral information using open and machine 
readable formats and that the Government should ensure that across all 
levels of Government, data for democratic engagement is available in an open 
digital format. On the former point, the Government responded that it was 
for local authorities to determine how best to notify citizens. On the latter, 
the Government pointed towards their ‘Atlas of Democratic Variation’, which 
consists of visual maps displaying data and trends in democratic engagement 
across different areas.367 This is a pdf document that was last updated in 
January 2019.368 It is not sufficiently informative, it is difficult to find, not 
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widely known about and is not kept up to date. It is an underwhelming 
resource and does not show a particularly engaged commitment to digitising 
and aggregating democratic information.
231. If debate is to be truly inclusive, it is important that any information 
published about elections is comprehensive and accessible to people of 
different education levels; all eligible members of society must be able to 
access information designed to ease participation, rather than raising the 
barriers of understanding further.
232. Local authorities should be required to publish open, machine-
readable information on elections, including what elections are 
taking place, who the candidates are and where polling stations are 
located.
233. Any information about democratic processes published by 
government at any level should be available in accessible language.
Online voting
234. One of the topics that is often raised when democracy and digital technologies 
are discussed is the issue of online voting. We heard from Siim Kumpas, 
an Adviser to the Government Office of Estonia, about Estonia’s extremely 
popular internet voting system. He said that this worked because “basically 
everything” was online and so people had become accustomed to digital 
public services.369 We also note that the COVID-19 pandemic has brought 
the question of online voting to greater prominence; an example would be 
the 2020 Democratic Wisconsin primary, which took place in the midst 
of the pandemic, which contributed to the record number of people who 
voted ‘absentee’ (not in person).370 It is likely that the pandemic will affect 
how political campaigning, and perhaps even voting itself, is conducted 
in the coming months and years. We received a small amount of evidence 
that was in favour of online voting.371 In the round, however, opinion was 
overwhelmingly against introducing voting online.
235. We heard that online voting might cause people to question the trustworthiness 
of election results and create fertile ground for conspiracy theories. On the 
day that we heard from experts on foreign interference and democratic 
resilience, the news was dominated by the 2020 Iowa Democratic caucuses, 
where a three-day delay in reporting results was due, in part, to problems 
with an app used to report voting totals. Elisabeth Braw from RUSI told us 
that the perception of interference, rather than proven fact, was a crucial 
factor. She suggested that the Iowa Democratic caucus was the perfect 
example of electoral interference–without knowing what happened to the 
apps, everybody’s assumption would be that they were hacked and while “It 
could be just that an inept IT company developed it … now we are already 
worrying about the legitimacy of the outcome of the Democratic nomination 
in Iowa.”372 Ben Scott added that this type of event provided fertile ground 
for conspiracy theories, which could easily be spread on social media, and 
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amplified by hostile actors aiming to undermine the democratic process.373 
The public need to fundamentally trust the electoral process if they are to 
have faith in democracy; the electoral process is more difficult to safeguard 
and vulnerable to attack when it is online.
236. Joe Mitchell from Democracy Club rejected the idea that people do not 
vote because it is not made available on an app and referred to polling 
Democracy Club had conducted at the 2019 Election. They found that the 
people they polled did not vote because they did not have enough information. 
He also cited security reasons as an argument not to introduce online voting.374 
MySociety suggested that online voting posed a security risk and increased 
barriers to participation.375 Privacy International stated that electronic voting 
processes were often implemented without sufficient consideration for their 
privacy and security implications.376 The Open Rights Group pointed to 
the examples of the netherlands, who stopped using online voting several 
years ago, citing security concerns, and norway, who curtailed trials of 
online voting after finding that it did not increase turnout amongst under-
represented groups.377 We strongly warn against using technology simply for 
its own sake.
237. Exercising your democratic vote is an important act that should have some 
ceremony about it; visiting a polling station, for those for whom this is 
possible, is an important part of this. We should not seek to substitute or 
undermine this significant and important act with an online process.
Technology as a tool, but not a panacea for problems facing democracy
238. We heard about the important role that technology can play in engaging 
people with the democratic process. Academics have been debating 
democratic decline and deconsolidation in the West for decades; some have 
posited that harnessing technology might be a solution to confronting that 
decline. However, we note Dr Martin Moore’s warning against the adoption 
of extremes, whether uber positive or negative, when discussing ways in 
which technology may or may not be a useful tool for enhancing democracy.378
239. We were warned about the dangers of using technology badly. MySociety 
cautioned that in order for engagement to be effective, there should be a 
closed feedback loop, otherwise the experience “can be likened to shouting 
into a great void: it may be cathartic, but it is unlikely to achieve anything.”379 
In its 2017 Digital Democracy report, nESTA warned against digital 
engagement for its own sake, explaining that it is important to demonstrate 
to citizens how their contributions have been considered and to offer tangible 
outcomes.380 Dr Rebecca Rumbul, Head of Research at MySociety, told us 
that while people were willing to engage once, there was a danger that if 
that interaction were negative, it would turn people off from engaging with 
democracy.381 Tim Hughes from Involve reinforced this view, stating, “Our 
373 Q 115 (Ben Scott)
374 Q 262 (Joe Mitchell)
375 Written evidence from MySociety (DAD0051)
376 Written evidence from Privacy International (DAD0041)
377 Written evidence from Open Rights Group (DAD0079)
378 Q 46 (Dr Martin Moore)
379 Written evidence from MySociety (DAD0051)
380 nESTA, Digital Democracy: The tools transforming political engagement (February 2017): https://media.
nesta.org.uk/documents/digital_democracy.pdf [accessed 18 April 2020]
381 Q 275 (Dr Rebecca Rumbul)
CHAPTER 5: InCLUSIVE DEBATE ACROSS SOCIETY 79
mantra has always been that bad engagement is worse than no engagement 
at all.”382
240. The scale and reach benefits of technology were highlighted by Peter Baeck, 
Co-Head of the Centre for Collective Intelligence Design at nESTA.383 
Indeed, technology is often cited as a cheaper way of reaching people at 
scale in a timely manner. However, Dr Rebecca Rumbul warned against 
seeing technology as a way of doing deliberative activity “on the cheap” 
and suggested that using digital tools was not just a solution to a budgeting 
issue. She stated that: “an awful lot of the time, doing digital democracy 
seems like a really lazy way of trying to solve a very institutional problem 
with the education levels of general society in terms of how Parliament and 
Government work.” She continued:
“Working for a digital organisation, I find myself saying, more often than 
not, ‘no, don’t do that digitally’ because I want to see only really good-
quality digital components being used. A lot of the time, these kinds 
of digital activities are used as an excuse to do it on the cheap. Doing 
it digitally is not just a solution to a budgeting issue. If it is not high 
quality on a digital level, it is not going to be high-quality engagement 
for anyone .”384
241. Using technology to cut costs is tempting where resources are scarce, as 
they may often be across all levels of government (but particularly at local 
level). However, we advise that any use of technology to enhance democratic 
participation must be thought through rigorously, be appropriate, and 
not simply a cost-reducing exercise. Such uses should be purpose-led, not 
technology-led. We have seen, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a raft of new 
digital possibilities emerge as options for communication. It is important to 
consider and embrace the new possibilities this crisis has facilitated for digital 
technologies, but equally vital to consider whether technology is always the 
best solution and recognise that it is one among a number of tools in our 
hands.
242. Technology can play an important role in engaging people with 
democratic processes. Parliament and government, at all levels, 
should not seek to use technology simply to reduce costs, and must 
ensure that appropriate technology is used to enhance and enrich 
democratic engagement.
243. There is a risk that policymakers may become overzealous towards 
technology’s ability to transform democracy. It is reductive, and at worst 
plain lazy, to regard the use of technology as the only tool for engagement. We 
do not believe that technology can replace entirely face-to-face engagement, 
both between representatives and the public, and amongst policymakers. We 
have seen this in attempts to conduct an entirely virtual Parliament which, 
although facilitating some processes, has resulted in less in-depth scrutiny of 
Government.
244. Peter Baeck and Dr Rebecca Rumbul both warned against a mentality of 
digital exceptionalism. Mr Baeck stated that technology fails when people 
apply it without thinking about the parallel offline engagement that needs to 
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happen. He gave the examples of positive work undertaken in Paris, Madrid 
and Taiwan that combined online with offline engagement. 385
245. Professor Graham Smith, Professor of Politics and the 
University of Westminster, told us that designing public engagement should 
be problem-led rather than technology-led. He cautioned against digital 
solutionism, stating, “The number of people who come to me each year with 
the app that is going to solve everything is frightening”, and suggested that 
what policymakers are likely to find is that a blended approach is required.386
246. We note that the COVID-19 pandemic throws these comments into a 
different light and has made engaging digitally just about the only way 
to engage, however Professor Smith’s argument that designing public 
engagement should led by the problem and not technology stands. We must 
learn lessons in engagement from the pandemic, but these should not be 
simply that technology should replace in-person engagement.
247. A positive, UK-based example of engagement blending digital and face-to-
face participation are the various citizens’ assemblies that have taken place in 
recent years. The Government’s Innovation in Democracy programme was 
a one-year programme that aimed to trial models of deliberative democracy 
and involve citizens in local decision-making. Three citizens assemblies were 
set up at borough council-level to tackle issues such as regenerating the town 
centre, reducing congestion and improving public transport. Tim Hughes 
of Involve, who helped to run the assemblies, told us that the programme’s 
use of digital allowed residents and other stakeholders to feed into a more 
traditional offline citizens’ assembly process.387 Professor Graham Smith 
explained that digital citizens’ assembly participants had to be much more 
focused than their offline equivalents as people would not stay in front of 
a screen for five days.388 Dr Rebecca Rumbul from MySociety told us that 
it was possible to build appropriate platforms for engagement on specific 
issues, but that this required considerable thought and planning.389 There 
was unanimous agreement that citizens’ assemblies and similar deliberative 
initiatives required a face-to-face element, but that these experiments with 
participatory democracy should be actively encouraged.
248. A notable development in response to the COVID-19 pandemic was that 
the Climate Assembly UK moved online at the end of March 2020. Climate 
Assembly UK is the first UK-wide citizens’ assembly on climate change. It 
was commissioned by six House of Commons committees to look at how 
the UK should meet its target of net-zero emissions. This was the first UK 
citizens’ assembly to take place entirely online. At the end of the process, 
when assembly members had experienced the assembly in person and online, 
51 per cent of respondents said that a mixture of in-person and online was 
ideal for a citizens’ assembly; 46 per cent said that entirely in-person was 
ideal and only three per cent said that entirely online was preferred.390
249. The opportunities for scale and reach that digital provides should be 
harnessed to enable a greater number of citizens to engage with democratic 
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processes but must not be used as an excuse to abandon non-digital 
engagement. When asked what his one recommendation would be to 
Government, Professor Graham Smith chose to recommend a programme 
to look at blending face to face and digital engagement which focused on 
solving problems rather than using tools for their own sake.391
250. Technology is a tool to aid, rather than replace, democratic decision making. 
Technological democratic engagement may be appropriate for some forms 
of engagement, but not for others, and it is often most effective when it is 
combined with offline engagement. Online and offline engagement are not 
mutually exclusive.
251. It is imperative that voters have access to unbiased and trusted sources of 
information. Dr Alan Renwick told us about his findings on the different 
types of information that it is important for voters to have access to in order 
to participate fully in democracy. Dr Renwick found that high-quality 
information has multiple features, but there are four primary characteristics: 
accuracy; relevance; accessibility and balance.392 Voters need to be able to 
trust the information that they are searching for, something which is more 
difficult to achieve when information arises from multiple sources.
252. Peter Baeck from nESTA called for more research in this area and suggested 
that there was a need for a national evidence centre that captures knowledge 
on what works in this sphere, in order to better understand how technology 
affects different kinds of conversations.393 This could be used to advise local 
government regarding the sort of tools they could be using and what the 
evidence base is for different types of intervention. Mr Baeck also cautioned 
that attempts to promote democratic engagement can fail when they are 
aligned with a political agenda, rather than simply part of a public service 
reform agenda. Such efforts needed to be institutionalised, rather than made 
into a political project for a particular party.
253. Joe Mitchell further suggested that there was a gap in democratic digital 
services that cannot be filled by an existing institution. He pointed out 
that democracy goes beyond merely what happens in Parliament and is 
therefore not just the responsibility of the Parliamentary Digital Service 
and the parliamentary authorities. Moreover, local authorities may not have 
the resources to design democratic digital services. Rachel Coldicutt, then 
from Doteveryone, told us that the BBC was underused and underpowered 
and might have a role to play.394 However, in further evidence submitted to 
us, Joe Mitchell, Dr Alan Renwick and Michela Palese suggested that the 
BBC may not be suitable because the content needed is not ‘journalistic’. 
They also pointed out that the Electoral Commission would not be suitable 
because it is primarily a regulatory body not designed to take on a large, 
innovative role in information provision; the Electoral Commission has also 
repeatedly stated its opposition to an expanded remit in this area.395 We leave 
open the question of who should fill the gap in democratic digital services, 
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but note than the value of public service broadcasters to inform has been 
shown through their coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic.
A democratic information hub
254. To tackle this deficiency, Dr Alan Renwick, Joe Mitchell and Michela Palese 
recommended the establishment of a ‘democratic information hub’. The 
hub would establish a coordinated brand that voters could trust, with ready 
pathways to different forms of information so that they can easily find what 
they need. The hub’s work would be overseen by a board of directors and a 
representative panel of citizens. It would be publicly funded and, the authors 
suggest, cost-neutral, as it could divert funding from the delivery of polling 
station addresses. The authors made the point that public funding to support 
information is widespread in other democracies, including Ireland, Germany 
and Canada.396 The hub would coordinate the aggregation and creation 
of information content that voters require. This could include making 
information produced by others more accessible, with information published 
by the Institute for Fiscal Studies and the Office for Budget Responsibility 
cited as examples.
255. The Cairncross Review of the future of journalism proposed establishing an 
Institute for Public Interest news to coordinate efforts between publishers, 
broadcasters and online platforms to ensure a future for quality reporting. 
While this proposal was meant to amplify efforts to ensure the future 
sustainability of public-interest news, the set up would not be too dissimilar 
to the proposed democratic information hub. The Review proposed that this 
Institute would become a centre of excellence and good practice, carrying 
out or commissioning research, building partnerships with universities and 
developing the intellectual basis for measures to improve the accessibility and 
readership of quality news online.397 The Government rejected this proposal 
on the grounds that it was not its place to lead on this issue, or decide what 
qualifies as ‘public interest’ news and that “even an arm’s length relationship 
risks perceptions of inappropriate government interference with the press.”398 
We acknowledge the difficulties any Government faces in deciding what 
qualifies as public interest news. However, we hope that the Government 
recognises that there is a need to inform the public better about the core 
aspects of UK democracy and that investing in democracy is essential to its 
wellbeing.
256. We consider the proposal for a democratic information hub to be thoroughly 
sensible and believe that a new source is required to centralise and make 
information about democracy available to voters. This source must be 
independent and politically neutral.
257. The hub would have two purposes: the first and most important would 
be to inform the public. The hub could provide ‘basic’ information about 
democracy, including how to vote, where to vote and who the local candidates 
are for all levels of elections. It could then build its services up gradually 
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once it had gained some brand recognition and achieved a trusted status. 
The second purpose would be to bring together and inform policymakers, 
government of all levels and civil society organisations. For this audience, 
the hub would act as a centre for innovation, research and promotion for 
what works in digital engagement. The hub could connect policymakers to 
access and better understand the successful digital innovations taking place 
in civil society.
258. The Government should establish an independent democratic 
information hub. This would be both a public-facing hub that 
provides information about democracy, starting with basic 
information about democratic procedures, and a means of sharing 
best practice in digital democracy between policymakers and civil 
society organisations.
How Government and Parliament could better use digital tools
259. To a large extent, Government, and especially Parliament, use analogue 
systems. The COVID-19 pandemic has caused both to innovate at great 
speed. Parliament’s proceedings usually rely on Members being physically 
present in debates and passing through division lobbies in person. The 
COVID-19 pandemic and attempts at a ‘virtual parliament’ have revealed 
areas where greater use of digital technologies could enhance and improve 
parliamentary work.
260. Professor Cristina Leston-Bandeira from the University of Leeds told us that 
there was not a systematic, integrated approach to the use of technology by 
Parliament.399 Professor Leston-Bandeira and Joe Mitchell both raised the 
issue that public representatives in institutions such as Parliament should be 
thinking about how technology can help them to listen better to the public.400 
Peter Baeck told us that it was important for technological expertise to be 
embedded into existing institutions as another tool to enable them to do 
their job well.401
261. We were told that how Parliament communicates and the ways in which it 
presents information could also be improved. Dr Rebecca Rumbul argued 
that much of what MySociety does on the TheyWorkForYou website should 
be done by Parliament itself.402
262. Parliament and Government have in the past been perceived as slow-moving 
when it comes to adopting digital. We heard from Professor Leston-Bandeira 
that public institutions are not as developed in the use of digital as the private 
sector and that there was a need for these institutions to bring in more skills 
to make improvements in this area. This problem could perhaps be explained 
by issues in resourcing. Tony Close, then from Ofcom; albeit a regulator, not 
a governmental body, told us that while they struggle to compete with the 
private sector because they could not attract people with generous salary 
packages, they could attract people whose values align with Ofcom’s.403
263. There has been some innovation undertaken by the devolved institutions and 
a greater willingness to adopt digital practices. Professor Leston-Bandeira 
399 Q 259 (Professor Cristina Leston Bandeira)
400 Q 259 (Professor Cristina Leston-Bandeira and Joe Mitchell)
401 Q 266 (Peter Baeck)
402 Q 277 (Dr Rebecca Rumbul)
403 Q 282 (Tony Close)
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told us that the Scottish and Welsh Parliaments have many good examples 
of how to use technology for engagement purposes. We are also aware that 
some local authorities have experimented with tools such as participatory 
budgeting. However, we do believe that more could be done, particularly after 
the COVID-19 pandemic, which showed that business could be conducted 
virtually for many public bodies.
264. This is not to say that Parliament or Government could fulfil the functions 
performed by actors operating in the civic technology space. Firstly, 
Parliament, like all large and historic institutions, is inherently bureaucratic 
and change is cumbersome. For example, Professor Graham Smith argued 
that MySociety is a nimbler organisation and that Parliament and local 
authorities can be a dead hand on creativity and innovation.404 Many of 
the civic tech organisations are staffed by small numbers of highly-skilled 
volunteers; the start-up nature of these organisations is perhaps precisely 
what allows them to build projects so quickly in response to perceived need.
265. Professor Smith suggested that there should be a mix, with institutions 
acting for themselves as well as paying for services from others who are 
in a better position to innovate. We concur. It is necessary for Parliament 
and Government both to show that they are adapting to the digital world, 
and to support organisations that can do this better, faster and in a more 
sophisticated manner. These civic technology organisations do need 
financial help, which could be provided by Government. Such partnerships 
would be mutually beneficial to both the institutions and civic technology 
organisations. A proposed source of funding could be the money raised 
by the incoming Digital Services Tax, which will be levied on a group’s 
businesses that provide a social media, search engine or online marketplace 
to UK users. Those businesses will be liable to the tax when the group’s 
worldwide revenues from those digital activities are more than £500 million 
and more than £25 million of these revenues are derived from UK users. 
This should not be confused with the traditional form of outsourcing.
266. The COVID-19 pandemic has necessitated a rapid response from parliaments 
across the world, including those in the UK. We argue for a sensible 
optimisation of the use of digital technologies based on the lessons learned 
during the pandemic.
267. Parliament, and national, devolved and local government must 
acquire and develop greater digital capacity and skills to facilitate 
digital democratic engagement. This should be a mix of inhouse 
development and the funding of specialist external organisations as 
appropriate.
404 Q 277 (Professor Graham Smith)
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CHAPTER 6: FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS
268. It is the responsibility of all of us to ensure that representative democracy is 
supported, rather than undermined in the digital era, and that, above all, 
elections remain free, fair and trusted. The inability of our electoral law to 
reflect the rise in digital campaigning places that trust at risk.
269. Digital campaign tools can make it easier and cheaper for campaigners to 
communicate with voters. This in itself is no bad thing. Electoral Commission 
statistics show that the proportion of money spent on digital political 
advertising has steadily increased.405 It is also possible, given the currently 
unknown impact of COVID-19 that digital campaigning will become ever 
more important.
270. However, there is growing uncertainty about the way in which digital 
campaigning is regulated and how much online electoral processes can be 
trusted. The nolan Principles of honesty, leadership and openness are of 
particular relevance here. Holders of public office, and those who seek it, 
should act in an open and transparent manner; they should be truthful, and 
they should actively promote these principles and be willing to challenge 
poor behaviour wherever and whenever it occurs. We cannot be certain 
that our leaders are adopting these behaviours when it comes to online 
electioneering, which creates fertile ground for trust in democracy to be 
undermined. The Committee on Standards in Public Life launched a review 
of electoral regulation in June. We look forward to reading their conclusions 
and hope that this Chapter will inform that review.406
271. The LSE Truth, Trust and Technology (T3) Commission expressed the 
urgency of the situation neatly:
“If the policy framework is not updated, the ability of ‘rules of the game’ 
to ensure that elections are free, fair and legitimate will increasingly be 
called into question. The UK should not find itself having to go to the 
polls again before the legislative framework is modernised.”407
272. There is no clear definition of a ‘campaigner’ in law. We formulate a definition 
in the box below.
405 Electoral Commission, Report: Digital campaigning – increasing transparency for voters (August 
2019):https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/changing-electoral-
law/transparent-digital-campaigning/report-digital-campaigning-increasing-transparency-voters 
[accessed 2 June 2020]
406 Committee on Standards in Public Life ‘Review of electoral regulation – public consultation’ 
(8 June 2020): https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-of-electoral-regulation-public-
consultation [accessed 9 June 2020]
407 Written evidence from the LSE T3 Commission (DAD0078)
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Box 6: Definition of campaigner
There is no single definition of campaigning in law that can be readily used to 
define what a campaigner is. The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums 
Act 2000 (PPERA) has separate definitions of campaign spending for registered 
parties, third parties and referendum campaigners. The Representation of the 
People Act 1983 has another definition for election spending by candidates.
Advancements in digital technologies also bring the question of what a 
campaigner is into focus. The PPERA, drafted 20 years ago, does not account 
for the present situation.
In their 2018 ‘Democracy Disrupted’ report, the Electoral Commission used the 
term ‘campaigner’ loosely as an umbrella term for political parties, third parties, 
permitted participants, unregistered referendum campaigners and candidates.
We define a ‘campaign’ as coordinated activity that promotes electoral success 
or promoting a referendum outcome. This applies to political parties, registered 
and unregistered third parties and candidates in local and national elections.
273. We add our voices to those calling for reform of UK electoral law. We detail 
what should be included in this piece of legislation and what the Government 
should urgently consider as part of this reform.
Electoral law
274. In the most fundamental sense, the voters have to trust the electoral process 
in order for them to accept its results. Elections are the mechanism through 
which we decide our representatives; that they are trusted, and their results 
accepted, are the keystones upon which democracy rests.
275. Electoral law has not kept pace with changes to digital campaigning and as 
such it fails to regulate modern electoral campaigns effectively. In recent 
years a succession of public bodies have called for the significant reform of 
electoral law. In March 2020, the Law Commission published the final report 
of its nine-year review of electoral law. It concluded that our electoral laws are 
outdated, confusing and no longer fit for purpose. Its main recommendation 
was that reforms were needed to bring electoral law into a single, consistent 
legislative framework.408
276. As has been put to us many times, developments in digital technology far 
outpace the response rate of legislation. Spending on digital campaigning 
has increased at each General Election in recent years, as Figure 3 below 
illustrates. The graph below shows spend by political parties and permitted 
participants and only looks at spending on a small selection of digital 
platforms which were reported as ‘spending on advertising’. Given that 
this chart does not reflect third-party spending and the full range of digital 
platforms, it is likely that the true picture of digital spend is much greater 
than is shown.
408 The Law Commission, Electoral Law: A joint final report (March 2020) pp 17: https://s3-eu-west-2.
amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2020/03/6.6339_LC_Electoral-Law_
Report_FInAL_120320_WEB.pdf [accessed 27 April 2020]
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Figure 3: Reported spending by campaigners on digital advertising as a 








Source: Electoral Commission Report: Digital campaigning–increasing transparency for voters (August 
2019):https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/changing-electoral-law/transparent-
digital-campaigning/report-digital-campaigning-increasing-transparency-voters [accessed 2 June 2020]
277. And yet, the main Acts governing our electoral law date from 1983 
(Representation of the People Act) and 2000 (PPERA) respectively. The 
Law Commission pointed out that the 1983 Act has its origins in the Corrupt 
and Illegal Practices Act 1883 and that much of it had not been updated 
since. The Figure below illustrates the absurdity of this.
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278. The Law Commission suggested that modernising the framework of 
electoral law would mean that making changes to the law would be less 
complicated, allowing the law to respond faster to societal and technological 
developments. The Electoral Commission told us that wholesale reform of 
electoral law would be their main request to Government.409
279. Furthermore, the Electoral Commission suggested that not only were these 
Acts outdated, there is a deficiency in how they interrelate. This means that 
the party and candidate regulatory frameworks are not always well-aligned. 
This lack of alignment has led to several deficiencies in compliance with, 
and enforcement of, the regime. Louise Edwards, Director of Regulation at 
the Electoral Commission, suggested that the public were probably confused 
about the current state of electoral law, explaining that the current legal 
framework does not work for some of the techniques that people use online.410
Devolution
280. Devolution will have a significant impact on reforming electoral law. Some 
electoral law is devolved to the Scottish and Welsh Parliaments. The Scottish 
and Welsh governments have the power to make rules for parliamentary 
and local government elections in those jurisdictions. However, as the 
Law Commission explained, there are some rules for those elections that 
remain the responsibility of the UK Parliament. These include the rules 
regulating the registration of parties and donations to registered political 
parties.411
281. The Law Commission recommended what it calls ‘rationalisation’–a 
single, consistent framework that applies to all elections and referendums, 
with a consistency of approach across all the UK legislatures. The 
devolved administrations would maintain their current devolved legislative 
competence; rationalisation of electoral law here would not mean repatriation 
of devolved powers.
282. When we asked the Government about their response to the Law Commission’s 
report, Chloe Smith MP, Minister of State at the Cabinet Office, told us that 
consolidation was not her priority, and that her focus spanned “operations, 
resilience and security”.412 Whilst we would not dispute these goals are 
important, the two are not mutually exclusive: the rationalisation of electoral 
law to make it fit for the digital age should improve operations, security and 
most importantly, public trust in democracy. It is also long overdue.
283. Electoral law should be modernised, rationalised and brought into the 
21st century. Whilst we focus in this Chapter on how this should be done in 
relation to digital technologies, we urge the Government to consider seriously 
the Law Commission’s proposals in their final report on reform of electoral 
law. In this report we focus on modernising electoral law to make it fit for 
the digital age, without altering the devolution settlement, in line with our 
remit; however, the Law Commission’s report goes much further than this 
and focusses on simplifying and clarifying the law.
409 Q 225 (Craig Westwood)
410 Q 207 (Louise Edwards)
411 The Law Commission, Electoral Law: A joint final report, p 14
412 Q 345 (Chloe Smith MP)
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284. The Government should bring forward a Bill based on the proposals 
set out by the Law Commission that comprehensively modernises 
electoral law. This should be completed in all its stages before the 
next General Election.
Imprints
285. The issue of digital imprints is unavoidable when considering how to make 
electoral law fit for the modern era.
Box 7: Imprints
Election material is published material that can reasonably be regarded as 
intended to influence voters to vote for or against a political party or a category 
of candidates at certain elections.
Whenever (offline) election material is produced, it must contain certain 
details, which are referred to as an ‘imprint’, to show who is responsible for the 
production of the material. This helps to ensure there is transparency about who 
is campaigning.
286. Imprints are an important consideration because they mark a key difference, 
and a gap in transparency, between the regulation of offline and online 
election material. The PPERA requires printed campaign materials to carry 
an imprint, but, dating from 2000, it makes no equivalent requirement for 
digital campaign materials.
287. The Electoral Commission has been calling for digital imprints since 2003. 
They argue that the gap in transparency is affecting voter confidence and 
the Commission’s ability to enforce the rules.413 The Electoral Commission’s 
2019 Election Report found that nearly one in five people were not confident 
that the election was well run.414 Many of these people selected reasons 
related to concerns about campaigning or the media to explain their lack of 
confidence. The Electoral Commission stated that it is often too unclear who 
is behind digital election campaign material, and significant public concerns 
about the transparency of digital election campaigns risk overshadowing 
their benefits. Extending imprints to digital campaigning would go some 
way towards reducing this confusion. The Electoral Commission currently 
advises campaigners to include an imprint even though it is not required 
under law, however, it is unclear if there has been widespread, consistent 
application of this advice.
288. In our evidence, there was overwhelming support for introducing digital 
imprints. The network for Media and Persuasive Communication at 
Bangor University, for instance, told us that imprints were important for 
transparency, and that it was important to make clear who was behind an 
advert.415 The recommendation to introduce digital imprints was endorsed by 
413 The Electoral Commission, ‘Response to UK Government policy consultation: Protecting the debate’ 
(August 2019): (https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/changing-
electoral-law/transparent-digital-campaigning/response-uk-government-policy-consultation-
protecting-debate [accessed 27 April 2020]
414 The Electoral Commission, ‘UK Parliamentary General Election 2019’ (April 2020) p 10: https://
www.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/default/files/2020–04/UKPGE%20election%20report%20
2020.pdf [accessed 27 April 2020]
415 Written evidence from the network for Media and Persuasive Communication at Bangor University 
(DAD0019)
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academics and many different organisations.416 The Royal Statistical Society 
noted that extending imprints to include online political campaigning 
had been recommended no less than eight times in the last two years by 
other committees and inquiries.417 MySociety suggested that introducing 
transparency through measures such as imprints would not automatically 
resolve actual or perceived issues in campaign finance, but it would enable 
greater potential for examining and discovering wrongdoing sooner.418 
The Conservative Party told us that they support and advocate the extension 
of imprints to electronic campaigning material, and that the imprint would 
provide a check and balance against inappropriate content, as the publisher 
or promoter could be held to account publicly for the content.419 Many 
other pieces of evidence advocated the introduction of imprints on digital 
campaign material.420
289. In calling for digital imprints, we add our voice to a strong chorus of bodies 
and organisations who have consistently recommended this measure. 
The Law Commission recommended extending imprints to online material, 
to reflect the growth of online campaigning and the use of social media 
in recent years.421 The House of Commons DCMS Select Committee’s 
inquiry into fake news suggested a similar reform to the law. The Committee 
suggested that there was a need for additional clarity and new definitions 
of what constitutes online political advertising and that there should be 
“absolute transparency of online political campaigning, including clear, 
persistent banners on all paid-for political adverts and videos, indicating the 
source and the advertiser.”422 The Committee on Standards in Public Life 
has endorsed the Electoral Commission’s recommendation.423 The 
Oxford Internet Institute’s Technology and Elections Commission final 
report recommended that imprints should be provided on all digital ads and 
sponsored content as one of their immediate proposals for action.424
290. The Government consulted on introducing digital imprints in late 2018, 
and in May 2019 committed to bringing forward the technical proposal for 
imprints by the end of 2019. no such proposal has emerged, and an election 
has taken place since that commitment. In their evidence to us dated April 
2020, the Government provided no further indication of when imprint 
legislation, or even legislative proposals, will be introduced, saying that 
further details would be announced “in due course.”425 It is extraordinary 
that with such overwhelming support for this proposal, to which the 
Government has repeatedly stated its commitment, no progress has been 
416 Written evidence from the Institute for Practitioners in Advertising (DAD0026), Doteveryone 
(DAD0037), Full Fact (DAD0042), the Coalition for Reform in Political Advertising (DAD0071)
417 Written evidence from the Royal Statistical Society (DAD0084)
418 Written evidence from MySociety (DAD0024)
419 Written evidence from the Conservative Party (DAD0095)
420 Written evidence from Mr Roy Jakes (DAD0010), Dr Ana Langer and Dr Luke Temple (DAD0048), 
Avaaz (DAD0073)
421 The Law Commission, Electoral Law: A joint final report, p 157
422 DCMS Committee, Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Final Report (Eighth report, Session 2017–19, 
HC 1791)
423 The Committee on Standards in Public Life, ‘Intimidation in Public Life: A Review by the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life’ (December 2017) p 61: https://assets.publishing.service.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/666927/6.3637_CO_v6_061217_
Web3.1__2_.pdf [accessed 28 April]
424 Oxford Technology and Elections Commission, ‘Ready to vote: Elections, Technology & Political 
Campaigning in the United Kingdom’ (October 2019) p 9: https://oxtec.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/
uploads/sites/115/2019/10/OxTEC-Ready-to-Vote.pdf [accessed 27 April 2020]
425 Supplementary written evidence from HM Government (DAD0102)
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made. This delay is unacceptable; “in due course” provides no clarity and 
we question how many more election campaigns will be run, and how much 
further public trust will be eroded, before this proposal is put into law. We 
draw the Government’s attention to the substantial number elections that 
were due to take place in May 2020 which have been postponed until May 
2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, including English local councils, 13 
directly elected mayors in England and 40 police and crime commissioners 
in England and Wales. These elections will take place on the same day as the 
Welsh and Scottish Parliament elections which are due to take place in 2021.
291. We note that there is a digital imprint requirement to show the name and 
address of the person responsible for the online campaign material contained 
in the Referendums (Scotland) Act 2020, passed by the Scottish Parliament 
on 19 December 2019. Digital imprints were also in place for the Scottish 
Independence Referendum in 2014.426 This is notable because it provides 
an example of a poll conducted in the UK that took place with digital 
imprint legislation enacted and therefore simply proves it can be done. 
Each of the devolved administrations must decide for themselves, but we 
advocate consistency across the UK in line with the rationalisation aim of 
the Law Commission’s proposals.
292. Whilst we add our voices to those who have been calling for digital imprints to 
be enshrined in primary legislation, we also wish to draw the Government’s 
attention to the fact that the PPERA contains a specific power for the 
Secretary of State to use regulations to extend the imprint rules to non-
printed material, which would include digital and online materials. As the 
Law Commission’s report makes clear, electoral law in the UK is fragmented 
and complex. There are various pieces of legislation that cover rules relating 
to parties or candidates and separate pieces of legislation covering UK-
wide elections, and elections in England and the devolved administrations. 
There are imprint rules in all those pieces of legislation, which could be 
extended via secondary legislation. This secondary legislation power means 
that the Government has more flexibility to change this part of electoral law 
compared to other aspects of law which can only be changed via primary 
legislation, and therefore progress can be made whenever the Government 
decides it would like to prioritise this.427
293. Whilst we urge the Government to undertake a holistic reform of electoral 
law, we are mindful that the Government has committed to action on the 
issue of imprints and that developments in technology move fast. Clarity 
about the Government’s intention is desperately needed, and the use of 
secondary legislation could provide a remedy in the short-term. We note 
that recent advert labelling initiatives by the technology companies, albeit 
in a patchy and inconsistent fashion, show that digital imprints would be 
workable. We encourage the Government to introduce this as an urgent first 
step in reforming electoral law to make it fit for the digital age.
426 The Electoral Commission, Overview of referendum campaigning - referendum on independence for 
Scotland (2014) p 8: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/default/files/pdf_file/to-ris-ref-
campaigning.pdf [accessed 18 June 2020]
427 The Electoral Commission, ‘Response to UK Government policy consultation: Protecting the debate’ 
(August 2019): https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/changing-
electoral-law/transparent-digital-campaigning/response-uk-government-policy-consultation-
protecting-debate [accessed 27 April 2020]
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294. The Government should legislate immediately to introduce imprints 
on online political material. This could be done through secondary 
legislation.
Electoral Commission powers
295. Campaign spending is regulated by the Electoral Commission, which derives 
its powers from the PPERA, and reports to Parliament. On numerous 
occasions we heard that the Electoral Commission’s powers were insufficient 
to properly regulate electoral conduct in a digital age. Their budget is 
determined by the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission. 
Baroness O’neill of Bengarve told us that the one thing she would impress 
upon the Government to enact in the short term would be, “sorting out the 
powers of the Electoral Commission.”428
Outside the formal investigation period
296. The Electoral Commission has extensive powers once it has declared a 
formal investigation into an alleged breach or breaches of electoral law, but 
limited powers beyond this. One of the rules of the PPERA is that political 
parties, campaigners, members associations and elected officials must report 
spending, donations and loans above £500 to the Electoral Commission. If 
these rules are broken, the Commission will investigate.
297. Louise Edwards from the Electoral Commission told us that the resourcing 
of the Commission was not the problem, but that the present legal framework 
does not allow them to regulate elections in a digital age. For example, they 
do not currently have the power to go to a social media company outside of an 
investigation to find out who is behind a particular online campaign.429 The 
Commission requested further powers to obtain information from others, 
beyond those they regulate, where it is in the public interest to do so. They 
argued that this would allow them to deal with compliance issues in real time, 
and compel organisations, for example social media companies, to give them 
information about the source of an online campaign.430 In their 2018 report, 
they asked for the power to request relevant information and explanation 
from outside parties who may hold relevant material outside of formal 
investigations. They argue that this would bring the Electoral Commission’s 
powers in line with those of the ICO. Craig Westwood told us that the most 
important thing was to “move quickly and reassure the public in what is a 
live campaigning period, when people are trying to influence people every 
day and people are already starting to put in postal votes.”431
298. Our concern here is trust. Voters must be able to trust what they believe they 
are being told and who is trying to influence them. In the context of increasing 
voter concerns about the conduct of online campaigning,432 people need to 
be assured that the regulatory system is working in an effective way, and that 
those who breach it will be dealt with adequately and in a timely manner. 
To do this, the Electoral Commission must be able to acquire information 
from third parties such as social networks. We note that the ICO also 
have the power to issue assessment and enforcement notices in addition to 
information notices. We limit our recommendation to information notices for 
428 Q 11 (Baroness O’neill of Bengarve)
429 Q 212 (Louise Edwards)
430 Written evidence from the Electoral Commission (DAD0058)
431 Q 221 (Craig Westwood)
432 Q 207 (Louise Edwards)
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the Electoral Commission, on account of a lack of evidence that assessment 
and enforcement notice powers are desirable for the Electoral Commission.
299. The reform of electoral law should grant the Electoral Commission 
the power to acquire information from external parties such as 
social networks about campaigners’ activities outside of a formal 
investigation.
Campaigners’ receipts
300. The rise of digital campaigning has arguably confused the public. The 
Electoral Commission’s 2019 General Election Public Opinion Survey found 
that public perceptions of political information online were that it is unclear 
and untrustworthy.433 46 per cent of respondents were concerned about why 
and how political ads were targeted at them; only 29 per cent agreed that 
they could find out who had produced the political information they saw 
online, such as who had paid for it and who produced it; more than half (52 
per cent) of respondents felt that ‘inadequate control of political activity on 
social media is a problem’ and almost two-thirds (60 per cent) of respondents 
thought that information available online about politics is not trustworthy.
301. Members of the public expressed concern to us about the lack of clarity as 
to how much was being spent online during campaigns. Christina Eager 
suggested that there must be rigorous checks and the ability to impose punitive 
sanctions on organisations and individuals who break the rules.434 John 
Brace told us that he routinely inspects candidate election expense returns 
in the local government area and has observed that candidate expenses do 
not always reflect the true cost of digital campaigning. He stated that some 
costs that should be declared are sometimes left out or other basic errors are 
made on returns.435
302. The Electoral Commission recommended in their 2018 report that 
campaigners should be required to submit detailed and meaningful receipts 
from their digital suppliers and that parties should have to break down 
their spending returns into additional sub-categories.436 As it currently 
stands, national regulations in each of the UK’s legal jurisdictions do not 
require sufficient detail in campaigners’ submissions for observers to have 
a meaningful understanding of parties’ online activities. Spending on 
campaign activity is declared under broad categories such as ‘advertising’; 
there is no specific legal category for digital campaigning. This is unhelpful 
and provides no real insight into how campaigners are spending money on 
digital technologies and online. The information must be meaningful for 
everyone who uses it, so that the public can better understand how online 
campaigns are being conducted.
303. However, Dr Luke Temple from the University of Sheffield and 
Dr Ana Langer from the University of Glasgow raised the issue of additional 
rules on transparency possibly having a detrimental effect on small civil 
society organisations’ ability to take part in democratic debate. They stated 
that these organisations do not have access to the lawyers and accountants 
433 The Electoral Commission, UK Parliamentary General Election 2019, pp 12–3:
434 Written evidence from Christina Eager (DAD0002)
435 Written evidence from John Brace (DAD0009)
436 The Electoral Commission, Digital campaigning: Increasing transparency for voters (June 2018) p 12: 
https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/default/files/pdf_file/Digital-campaigning-imp roving-
transparency-for-voters.pdf [accessed 28 April 2020]
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needed to navigate these rules. They suggested that transparency rules should 
be accompanied by well-resourced providers of free advice on how these 
rules apply.437We agree that the barriers to entry to democratic debate should 
not be raised unnecessarily, yet current spending categories are insufficient 
and do not provide any meaningful or practical insight into how campaign 
money is spent online. The Electoral Commission should therefore be 
encouraged to provide clear and accessible guidance about the level of detail 
that campaigners should include in their spending returns.
304. Electoral law needs to change to ensure parties must submit detailed returns 
and provide a meaningful account of their online spending. A possible 
further reform for the Electoral Commission to consider would be to link 
digital imprints to spending returns, so that the full information and context 
is available to the public.
305. The reform of electoral law should support the Electoral Commission 
in creating statutory guidance on the level of detail campaigners set 
out in receipts concerning digital spending and in their spending 
returns to the Commission, to provide the public with a greater 
understanding of the breadth and nature of online campaigns.
Sanctions
306. Since 2010, the Electoral Commission has had powers to investigate potential 
breaches of the rules set out in the PPERA, and to issue sanctions if breaches 
are found to have occurred, including variable fines up to a maximum of 
£20,000.
307. Looking at national spending, in the 2017 election the Conservative Party 
spent more than £18.5 million. The Labour Party spent £11 million and 
the Liberal Democrats spent £6.8 million. Taken together, there was a total 
spend at the 2017 election of £41.6 million by a combination of 75 parties 
and 17 non-party campaigners.438In this context, the Electoral Commission’s 
maximum financial sanction of £20,000 is a grossly insufficient sum 
indicating that the regulator lacks the power to drive proportionate 
compliance. In the Electoral Commission’s 2018 report and evidence to this 
Committee, it suggested that the current £20,000 maximum fine could be 
considered the cost of doing business for some campaigns and does not act 
as an effective deterrent to stop campaigners from committing offences.439
308. Dr Robert Dover from the University of Leicester also argued that fines 
must be levied at a significant rate to avoid the conclusion being drawn 
that investigations and fines associated with breaches of electoral rules are 
now transaction costs in the process.440 The principle of the application 
of bigger fines by the Electoral Commission was also endorsed by the 
LSE T3 Commission.441 The APPG on Electoral Campaigning Transparency 
in its report on Democracy in a Digital Age suggested removing the cap on 
the fines the Commission could levy.
437 Written evidence from Dr Luke Temple and Dr Ana Langer (DAD0048)
438 ‘Tories spent £18.5m on election that cost them majority’, The Guardian (19 March 2018): https://
www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/mar/19/electoral-commission-conservatives-spent-lost-majority-
2017-election [accessed 13 May 2020]
439 The Electoral Commission, ‘Digital campaigning: Increasing transparency for voters’, p 22
440 Written evidence from Dr Robert Dover (DAD0027)
441 Written evidence from the LSE T3 Commission (DAD0078)
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309. By way of comparison with the Electoral Commission, the ICO can levy 
fines of up to €20 million or in the case of an undertaking, up to four per 
cent of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial 
year, whichever is higher.442 Even before the introduction of the large fines 
available under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the 
Information Commissioner was able to fine up to £500,000 under the Data 
Protection Act 1998.443 The Electoral Commission noted that this is an 
uneven benchmark with the ICO able to levy substantially higher fines than 
themselves.444 The Information Commissioner herself advocated an update 
in the Electoral Commission’s powers, resources and compliance tools. She 
stated that the maximum fine the ICO were able to levy was a significant 
power to drive compliance.445
310. We note that many fines are caused by local volunteers not accurately 
reporting the donation received. It is important that the fines levied are 
proportionate to the offence; many of the fines currently given out by the 
Commission are in the £200-600 range. However, proportionality works 
both ways: the Electoral Commission must be given effective deterrent 
powers in an age where millions of pounds are spent at UK wide elections 
and referendums, especially on digital campaign activities. Campaign spend 
here uses the definition of campaign expenditure as set out in the PPERA, 
“expenses incurred on or on behalf of the party… for election purposes.”446
311. As part of the reform of electoral law, the maximum fine the 
Electoral Commission can levy should be raised to £500,000 or four 
per cent of a campaign’s total spend, whichever is greater.
Oversight powers
312. A concern repeatedly raised with us was the ability of digital campaigning 
techniques to blur the boundaries between local candidate and national 
spending. The emergence of micro-targeting techniques, particularly 
targeting based on location, means there is greater uncertainty about 
whether an advert falls under local or national-level spending limits. The 
Open Rights Group suggested that the targeting abilities of social media 
platforms does indeed blur the line between differentiated spending limits 
traditionally placed on actors by candidate, party or national designations 
to the point where these are essentially cosmetic.447 Dr Martin Moore also 
suggested that parties were using digital technology to circumvent limits on 
local spending.448 Bethany Shiner told us that the regulation of the different 
caps in spending for local and national elections must be strengthened to 
avoid the funnelling of money into swing seats which should fall under local 
spending, but might be paid for out of the national budget.449 Dr Luke Temple 
and Dr Ana Langer suggested that increased transparency would mean 
442 ICO, ‘Penalties’: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-law-enforcem 
ent-processing/penalties/ [accessed 28 May 2020]
443 ICO, ‘Data Protection Act 1998’: https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1043720/ico-
guidance-on-monetary-penalties.pdf [accessed 28 May 2020]
444 Written evidence from the Electoral Commission (DAD0058)
445 Q 290 (Elizabeth Denham)
446 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, section 72(2)
447 Written evidence from the Open Rights Group (DAD0079)
448 Q 50 (Dr Martin Moore)
449 Written evidence by Dr Bethany Shiner (DAD0011)
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rethinking the distinction between constituency and national spending, as 
digital technologies have made them increasingly hard to distinguish.450
313. The LSE T3 Commission pointed out the discrepancy whereby targeting 
voters online in particular constituencies is defined as national spending, for 
which limits are set far higher than for constituency spending. They argued 
that this undermines the principle of a level playing field at a local level.451 
The Law Commission in their electoral law report also noted concerns about 
blurring the line between national and constituency expenditure.452
314. The distinction between national and local spending is somewhat murky: 
the criteria is whether a particular advert is trying to promote the election 
of a candidate or encourage people to vote for that party. Louise Edwards 
from the Electoral Commission told us that, “In practice, even if an advert 
is targeted at a single constituency, it comes down to whether the content 
of that advert is about the candidate or the party’s national policies. If it is 
about the party’s national policies, it is still party spending.”453
315. However, Ms Edwards told us that there was no evidence that the distinction 
between national and local spending was not working. After the 2015 Election, 
the Electoral Commission fined a party a significant amount of money for 
reporting some candidate spending as party spending, but Ms Edwards told 
us this was an anomaly.454
316. nevertheless, the APPG on Electoral Campaigning Transparency 
recommended that the Electoral Commission should oversee local candidate 
spending in addition to national spending, which they currently regulate.455 
The Electoral Commission told us that they had wished to oversee local 
candidate spending for a long time and that there were obvious benefits to 
the same regulator overseeing national and local spending declarations.456 
Currently, the Electoral Commission cannot take further action themselves 
if they find inaccuracies in candidate spending; it is the responsibility of the 
police to deal with any allegations that a return is inaccurate.
317. The Law Commission stated that it excluded national spending regulations 
from its review as the issue was too political for a neutral body to consider 
but did state that any holistic reform of electoral law should include both 
areas. The Law Commission’s report suggested merging as many of the 
different rules governing elections into simple single codes that are easier to 
understand. On this proposal specifically, the Law Commission concluded 
that there are a number of practical barriers to overcome because the 
Electoral Commission does not have a register of candidates and so would not 
be able to determine if a candidate had failed to submit a spending return. In 
its interim report, it recommended that should spending returns go digital 
in the future they should be overseen by the Electoral Commission. The 
450 Written evidence from Dr Luke Temple and Dr Ana Langer (DAD0048)
451 Written evidence from the LSE T3 Commission (DAD0078)
452 The Law Commission, Electoral Law: A joint final report, p 156
453 Q 216 (Louise Edwards)
454 Q 216 (Louise Edwards)
455 APPG on Electoral Campaigning Transparency, Defending our Democracy in the Digital Age (January 
2020): https://1u5lpf242yxl2669iu2mp449-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/
Defending-our-Democracy-in-the-Digital-Age-APPG-ECT-Report-Jan-2020.pdf [accessed 28 April 
2020]
456 Q 216 (Louise Edwards)
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Law Commission also concluded that it could be an area of future work for 
itself.457
318. The Electoral Commission should be given oversight of local 
candidate spending as well as national spending and should review 
what types of spending are included in each category.
Small donations and spending
319. Under the PPERA, any contribution of goods, property or services given to 
a political party with a value of less than £500 is not considered a donation 
and therefore does not have to be registered.458 Actors who spend below the 
£500 limit therefore avoid scrutiny.
320. In its report, Defending Democracy in the Digital Age, the APPG on 
Electoral Campaigning Transparency’s first recommendation was to regulate 
all donations by reducing permissibility check requirements from £500 to 1p 
for all non-cash donations, and £500 to £20 for cash donations. The APPG 
made the point that the £500 limit on donations was conceived at the time 
when tracking such sums of money was relatively simple; today £500 can 
be transferred from anywhere in the world instantaneously.459 Dr Bethany 
Shiner told us that foreign and automated donations made through PayPal 
make it possible to escape the prohibition on the £500 limit.460
321. The Open Rights Group suggested that digital technology had allowed 
for a proliferation of ‘astroturf’ campaigns, that claim grassroot status but 
are coordinated and funded by larger established commercial lobbying 
organisations or pre-existing political campaigns. Most organisations do not 
have to register as a non-party campaigner unless they are spending £20,000 
in England or £10,000 in Scotland. The Open Rights Group stated that it 
is relatively easy under present circumstances for political campaigners to 
obscure the sources of their funding.461
322. The Electoral Commission told us that lowering the current spending limits 
would impose a regulatory burden on small campaign groups and would 
require a large amount of resources from the Electoral Commission. They 
contrasted the US system where campaigners are required to register with 
the Federal Election Commission (FEC) with the UK’s system which has 
no such comprehensive register. The FEC register allows online imprints 
through Facebook to connect directly to the organisation’s registration with 
the FEC. MySociety told us that stronger requirements for parties to know 
the identity of donors would help address concerns that funding limits can 
be circumvented through multiple donations below the £500 limit, before 
stronger disclosure standards come into effect. It cited the example of the 
US FEC site as a good model.462
323. We propose that the Electoral Commission should look into the feasibility of 
a secondary registration scheme for campaigners that fall below the £20,000 
457 The Law Commission, Electoral Law: A joint final report, p 159
458 The Electoral Commission, ‘Overview of donations to political parties’, p 3: https://www.
electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/default/files/pdf_file/to-donations-rp.pdf [accessed 28 April 2020]
459 APPG, Electoral Campaigning Transparency Democracy in the Digital Age (January 2020) p 11: https://
fairvote.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Defending-our-Democracy-in-the-Digital-Age-APPG-
ECT-Report-Jan-2020.pdf [accessed 28 April 2020]
460 Written evidence by Dr Bethany Shiner (DAD0011)
461 Written evidence from Open Rights Group (DAD0079)
462 Written evidence from MySociety (DAD0024)
98 DIGITAL TECHnOLOGY AnD THE RESURRECTIOn OF TRUST
threshold at which they have to register as non-party campaigners with the 
Electoral Commission. This is with the aim of transparency, which here 
refers to an understanding of linked business interests; it is not our intention 
to make onerous demands on small campaigners, and hence we recommend 
that only the identity of a small campaign’s trustees if they are incorporated 
or legally responsible persons if they are not, and the identity of their five 
largest funders. This should go some way in restoring the public’s trust that 
democracy is protected from automated donations.
324. The Electoral Commission should explore whether it would be 
feasible to create a secondary registration scheme for campaigners 
who would otherwise fall below current spending limits. These 
campaigners would only be required to register the identity of their 
trustees or legally responsible persons and the identity of their five 
largest funders. They would not be required to disclose spending. 
This information could then be used to improve the transparency of 
online imprints.
325. The Government should then consider whether this secondary 
registration scheme should form part of the reform of electoral law.
Advert databases
326. We received copious evidence calling for the creation of a database for 
political adverts. The Electoral Commission’s 2018 report called for social 
media platforms to keep online databases of adverts that followed the UK’s 
rules for elections and referendums.463
327. Facebook and Google both highlighted their current attempts at advertising 
transparency. Facebook told us that they launched a public advert library 
that contains a comprehensive, searchable collection of all adverts that are 
active and running on Facebook and Instagram.464 Google highlighted 
their transparency report that includes a searchable election advert library.465 
Louise Edwards from the Electoral Commission acknowledged that social 
media companies have stepped in and taken voluntary action in this area, 
which she welcomed.466
328. However, both Google and Facebook’s advert libraries have been criticised 
as incomplete and Google’s has been criticised for containing inaccurate 
information. Ms Edwards told us that the current advert libraries do not 
capture everything that falls within the legal definition of election material. 
For example, she explained that the Electoral Commission wanted to see 
better and more reliable data on spending; some of the advert libraries have 
large spend brackets, which makes it difficult to understand exactly how 
much a particular campaign has spent.467 During the 2019 General Election, 
Google published a weekly transparency report including updates on how 
much money had been spent by political parties on adverts on their platform. 
Major inaccuracies were recorded weekly. For example, in the week the 
election was called Labour had a recorded spend of just £50 on adverts 
and nothing at all in the following week. However, Labour was advertising 
heavily in that period, spending tens of thousands of pounds on adverts on 
463 The Electoral Commission, ‘Digital campaigning: Increasing transparency for voters’, p 13
464 Written evidence from Facebook (DAD0081)
465 Written evidence from Google (DAD0086), Q 256 (Vint Cerf)
466 Q 202 (Louise Edwards)
467 Q 205 (Louise Edwards)
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Google Search. Google told us that occurred because of human error,468 but 
they have not yet stated what types of quality control they conduct on their 
spending transparency report or why they were initially reluctant to correct 
the record about a party’s spending during a contested election campaign.469 
Furthermore, the reliability of these advert libraries has been called into 
question. Less than 48 hours before the 2019 General Election, tens of 
thousands of political ads went missing from Facebook’s archive.470
329. Chloe Smith MP, Minister of State at the Cabinet Office, told us that 
the efforts of tech companies have shown that the sector is capable of 
creating transparency to voters itself, and that she was not persuaded the 
Electoral Commission needed more powers in this area.471
330. Whilst we welcome voluntary efforts made on the part of technology 
companies, unlike the Government we do not believe it appropriate that these 
companies should be setting the criteria for transparency. Alex Krasodomski-
Jones from Demos told us, “we do not know what we do not know, and that is 
not acceptable. I cannot accept the idea that Facebook, Google and Twitter 
can tell us what an advert library or transparency looks like.”472 Leaving 
the companies to establish transparency for elections is at best naïve, and 
at worst complacent; the examples above establish why we cannot rely on 
technology companies to correctly design, update and police these advert 
libraries.
331. Mozilla have suggested that platforms should create a database of all adverts 
on their platforms. This would ensure that the public does not have to rely 
on the platform’s definition of what a political advert is and reduces the ways 
in which bad actors can exploit the system. Mozilla have also provided a 
list of criteria that these databases should adhere to. We endorse this list 
and encourage future regulation of online advertising databases to use these 
principles as a basis.
468 Supplementary written evidence from Google (DAD0101)
469 ‘Google admits major underreporting of election and spend’ The Guardian (19 november 2019): 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/nov/19/google-admits-major-underreporting-of-
election-ad-spend [accessed 29 April 2020]
470 ‘Facebook under fire as political ads vanish from archive’ The Financial Times (10 December 2019): 
https://www.ft.com/content/e6fb805e-1b78-11ea-97df-cc63de1d73f4 [accessed 29 April 2020]
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Box 8: Mozilla Guidelines for Effective Advert Archives
Mozilla have published five guidelines that advert archive APIs must meet in 
order to truly support election influence monitoring and independent research.
Comprehensive political advertising content
The APIs should include paid political adverts and issue-based adverts, without 
limiting access on the basis of pre-selected topics or keywords. non-paid, public 
content that is generated by users who are known political content purveyors 
should also be available.
The content of the advertisement and information about targeting 
criteria, including:
• The text, image and/or video content and information about where the ad 
appeared.
• The targeting criteria used by advertisers to design their ad campaign, as 
well as information about the audience that the ad actually reached.
• The number of impressions that an ad received within specific geographic 
and demographic criteria (e.g. within a political district, in a certain age 
range), broken down by paid vs. organic reach.
• The amount of engagements that an ad received, including user actions 
beyond viewing an ad.
• Information about how much an advertiser paid to place the ad.
• Information about microtargeting, including whether the ad was a/b tested 
and the different versions of the ad; if the ad used a lookalike audience; 
the features (race, gender, geography, etc.) used to create that audience; if 
the ad was directed at platform-defined user segments or interests, and the 
segments or interests used; or if the ad was targeted based on a user list the 
advertiser already possessed.
Functionality to empower, not limit, research and analysis, including:
• Unique identifiers associated with each advertisement and advertiser to 
allow for trend analysis over time and across platforms.
• All images, videos, and other content in a machine-readable format 
accessible via a programmatic interface.
• The ability to download a week’s worth of data in less than 12 hours and a 
day’s worth of data in less than two hours.
• Bulk downloading functionality of all relevant content. It should be feasible 
to download all historical data within one week.
• Search functionality by the text of the content itself, by the content author 
or by date range.
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Up-to-date and historical data access, including:
• Availability of advertisements within 24 hours of publication.
• Availability of advertisements going back 10 years
• APIs should be promptly fixed when they are broken
• APIs should be designed so that they either support or at least do not 
impede long-term studies
Public access
The API itself and any data collected from the API should be accessible to and 
shareable with the general public.
Source: The Mozilla Blog, ‘Facebook and Google: This is what an effective ad archive API looks like’ (27 March 
2019): https://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2019/03/27/facebook-and-google-this-is-what-an-effective-ad-archive-api-
looks-like/ [accessed 13 May 2020]
332. According to these guidelines, John Lloyd from Mozilla told us that Google’s 
advert API met four of the five minimum standards, with important 
omissions. There was no information on its targeting criteria, nor does the 
advert API provide engagement data. Facebook fared even worse; their API 
met only two of the five minimum standards. He pointed out that a lot of the 
time, the advert archive did not work at all.473
333. The LSE T3 Commission advocated a regulator to encourage the 
introduction of a UK political advertising directory and monitor outcomes of 
the initiatives of relevant institutions to ensure that databases such as Google 
and Facebook’s advert libraries are independently overseen.474
334. The Electoral Commission in their report on the 2019 General Election 
recommended that in order to support trust and confidence in election 
campaigns, social media companies needed to provide more detailed and 
accurate data about campaign spending in advert libraries on their platforms, 
so that they and voters can see more information about who is campaigning.475 
The Electoral Commission suggested to us that the Online Harms regime 
should set common standards and obligations for what the social media 
companies should publish in these libraries. It should also define political 
campaigning.476
335. This responsibility should lie with Ofcom, rather than the 
Electoral Commission because the former look at content, whereas the latter 
primarily regulate political donations and expenditure by parties, rather than 
social media platforms. The Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI) 
also recommended in their review of online targeting that the Online Harms 
regulator should have powers to enforce online platforms’ compliance with 
hosting accessible advertising archives.477
473 Q 128 (Jon Lloyd)
474 Written evidence from the LSE T3 Commission (DAD0078)
475 The Electoral Commission, UK Parliamentary General Election 2019 (April 2020) p 14: https://www.
electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/default/files/2020–04/UKPGE%20election%20report%202020.
pdf [accessed 27 April 2020]
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477 Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation,’ Review of Online Targeting: Final report and recommendations’ 
(February 2020) p 107: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/864167/CDEJ7836-Review-of-Online-Targeting-05022020.pdf [accessed 28 
April 2020]
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336. The Government has not announced any intention to regulate these 
advertising libraries. The Government’s response to the DCMS Committee’s 
inquiry into fake news highlighted that the Online Harms White Paper 
proposed that the code of practice for disinformation include expectations 
for companies to improve the overall transparency of political advertising 
on their platforms. 478 This would suggest that Ofcom would regulate the 
databases of political advertising. Kevin Bakhurst from Ofcom told us that if 
this area was within scope of its regulatory powers then advert libraries could 
be a powerful tool for transparency.479
337. Ofcom should issue a code of practice for online advertising setting 
out that in order for platforms to meet their obligations under the 
‘duty of care’ they must provide a comprehensive, real time and 
publicly accessible database of all adverts on their platform. This 
code of practice should make use of existing work on best practice.
Campaigners’ use of personal data
338. Elections in the modern age are increasingly data driven, both online and 
offline. Campaigns use digital technologies to collect and analyse large 
amounts of personal data about individuals in order to target their messaging 
both through targeted online advertising and through leaflets sent through 
the post.480 Although this data analysis is not new, there is a need for far 
greater transparency in how campaigners obtain and use data. Polling by the 
CDEI found that the level of understanding of the technology that drives 
online targeting was low and participants were shocked at the scale and 
sophistication with which it takes place.481
339. Under the GDPR, there must be a valid lawful basis in order to process 
personal data. There are six available lawful bases under Article 6 GDPR 
for data falling short of “special category data”: consent, contract, legal 
obligation, vital interests, tasks in the ‘public interest’ and legitimate 
interests. Section 8 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) has augmented 
the definition of “public interest” in Article 6 in the GDPR to include “an 
activity that supports or promotes democratic engagement.”482
340. The GDPR provides heightened protection for certain sensitive categories of 
information, as “special category data” in Article 9 GDPR. ‘Political opinions’ 
are “special category data”. Article 9(1) GDPR prohibits the “processing of 
data revealing” special category data, including political opinions, unless one 
of ten exemptions in Article 9(2) GDPR apply. These include Article 9(2)(g), 
which allows processing that ‘is necessary for reasons of substantial public 
interest’. The DPA extends the concept of “substantial public interest” with 
a particular exemption for political parties to process special category data.
478 DCMS Committee, Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Final Report: Government Response to the Committee’s 
Eighth Report of Session 2017–19 (Seventh Special Report, Session 2017–19, HC 2184)
479 Q 286 (Kevin Bakhurst)
480 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Digital Microtargeting (2018): https://
www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/digital-microtargeting.pdf [accessed 30 April 2020]
481 Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation Public Attitudes Towards Online Targeting (2019): 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/863025/1901705901_Attitudes_to_Online_Targeting_Report_FInAL_PUBLIC_030220.pdf 
[accessed 30 April 2020]
482 Oxford Technology & Elections Commission, ‘Political Campaigning: The law, the gaps and the way 
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341. The ICO’s draft guidance on political campaigning states that the vast 
majority of processing for political campaigning falls under the GDPR bases 
of consent or legitimate interests or the DPA extension of processing for 
democratic engagement. However, it warns that the democratic engagement 
basis is often misunderstood as an overarching exemption for political 
campaigning activities. This use only allows the processing of personal data 
that is proportionate and necessary for an activity that supports or promotes 
democratic engagement. The ICO states that this must be more than just 
useful or standard practice but must be targeted and proportionate in 
achieving the specific purpose.483
342. Bethany Shiner from the University of Middlesex suggested that there was 
currently ambiguity about the democratic engagement provision in the 
GDPR. She told us that often data processing reveals political opinions, 
which is special category data attracting higher protections under the 
GDPR and DPA. Political opinions can be inferred through combining 
freely given information with other datasets such as the electoral register to 
make a prediction about that individual’s lifestyle, habits and political views. 
However, Ms Shiner told us it is unclear whether the parties consider inferred 
data is subject to the additional safeguards. She pointed out that political 
parties’ privacy notices cite this justification generically, as if by existing 
as a political party there is automatically a ‘public interest’ justification.484 
However, the converse is true, that the parties are processing data likely to 
be revealing of political opinions which in turn needs to meet the safeguards 
within the data protection regime. In particular, that processing must be 
limited to what is necessary and proportionate. The ICO make clear in their 
2018 Democracy Disrupted report that inferred data is personal information 
and the requirements of data protection law apply to it.485
343. Pascal Crowe of the Open Rights Group told us that the public needs to 
understand that data-driven political campaigning is not limited to the use of 
political ads on social media. He explained that electoral roll data was used by 
the political parties, mixed with sources of commercially available data, such 
as Experian credit history information. That information is processed and 
turned into a profile. He also told us that responsibility lies at the political 
parties’ door just as much, if not more, as it does for social media platforms.486
344. We invited the Conservative Party, Labour Party and Liberal Democrats to 
give us evidence, as the main nationwide parties. Only the Liberal Democrats 
were willing to send a representative; the Conservatives offered to send in 
written evidence in lieu of appearing before the Committee; the Labour Party 
were due to send a representative but pulled out the day before the session. 
We then asked for written responses to the questions we had wished to ask 
them in person. We found their responses wanting in ways specific to each 
party.
345. The political parties’ understanding of the provisions of the DPA appear 
to differ widely and seldom conforms to the best practice suggested by the 
483 ICO, ‘Guidance on political campaigning: Draft framework code for consultation’ (2019) p 38: https://
ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/consultations/2615563/guidance-on-political-campaigning-draft-
framework-code-for-consultation.pdf [accessed 30 April 2020]
484 Written evidence from Bethany Shiner (DAD0011)
485 ICO, Democracy disrupted? Personal information and political influence (July 2018) p 30: https://ico.org.
uk/media/action-weve-taken/2259369/democracy-disrupted-110718.pdf [accessed 30 April 2020]
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ICO. The Conservative Party cited the extensions in Section 8 of the DPA 
for “processing of ‘democratic engagement’ as a task in the public interest” 
and argued that Section 8 was not an extension at all. They further cited 
provisions of the DPA “for political parties to process the ‘special category 
data’ of political opinions.” However, the Conservative Party did not explain 
their position on those extensions, such as how they approach the necessity 
and proportionality tests in those provisions or if they considered there to be 
any limit on their processing activities.487 The Labour Party maintained that 
specific statutory bases for processing ‘democratic engagement’ data was in 
the public interest and special category data was essential to the functioning 
of political parties.488 Like the Conservative Party, Labour did not explain 
how they interpreted these provisions, nor if they considered there to be 
any limit on what they considered permissible processing. The provisions 
within the DPA are not a door to immunity for data users, rather, they 
allow for necessary and proportionate data processing for certain ends. Both 
parties’ stances contradict the ICO’s guidance that in most circumstances 
campaigners should not use special category data for political messaging 
without the explicit consent of the individual.489 Only the Liberal Democrats 
stated that they only use special category data with the explicit consent of 
the individual,490 however this may not be true, as the party reportedly used 
special category data to profile voters without their explicit consent in the 
run up to the 2019 UK General Election.491
346. The Labour Party stated that they do not purchase any information 
from outside companies and that they primarily use their own data. 
The Liberal Democrats also claimed that they do not purchase any 
information from data brokers or social listening platforms and that they 
primarily use their own data. This directly contradicts the evidence given 
to us by the Open Rights Group.492 Furthermore, we heard from the 
University of Bangor that the Labour Party spent more money on Experian 
data in the 2017 election than the 2015 election. After the 2017 election, 
the Information Commissioner sent all parties a warning about the usage 
of such data brokers. We asked the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties to 
confirm that they did not use any data brokers’ services in the 2019 election 
and to detail the reasons for this change in operating procedures. The 
Liberal Democrats confirmed this and stated that they decided that using 
data brokers would not be GDPR compliant and therefore unsuitable for 
online campaigning and that social listening tools would be of limited value 
to their campaign objectives. 493 The Labour Party did not reply.
347. The Conservative Party stated that it uses analytics data in order to determine 
how well their content has performed, however they did not answer whether 
the importance and usage of data from companies that monitor the public’s 
online activity has changed significantly in recent years. They also confirmed 
that they purchase commercially available data and that this was stated in 
487 Written evidence from the Conservative Party (DAD0095)
488 Written evidence from the Labour Party (DAD0096)
489 ICO, ‘Guidance on political campaigning: Draft framework code for consultation’ (2019) https://
ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/consultations/2615563/guidance-on-political-campaigning-draft-
framework-code-for-consultation.pdf [accessed 30 April 2020]
490 Written evidence from the Liberal Democrats (DAD0094)
491 Sky news, ‘The Lib Dems are using data to profile every voter in the UK – and give you a score’ (14 
October 2019): https://news.sky.com/story/the-lib-dems-are-using-data-to-profile-every-voter-in-uk-
and-give-you-a-score-11828202 [accessed 26 May 2020]
492 Q 125 (Pascal Crowe)
493 Supplementary written evidence from the Liberal Democrats (DAD0105)
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their privacy policy. However, they did not state what they do with that 
data, for example whether it gets amalgamated with other data to profile 
individuals.494
348. Ailidh Callander from Privacy International told us that her organisation 
had written to all political parties ahead of the 2019 General Election asking 
for transparency in how they use data. none were forthcoming.495
349. Pascal Crowe told us that regulators need to keep a closer eye on the data 
gathering that parties are doing outside of the regulated period. He argued 
that there is a need for a mechanism to hold political parties to account 
for their use of personal data, both for the value that might bring to their 
political campaign and the ways it might help them reduce their spending in 
other areas of their campaign.496 The Open Rights Group suggested that the 
Electoral Commission and ICO jointly conduct data audits of parties prior 
to the regulated period. These audits would include a financial assessment 
of all data assets that are to be used in a campaign.497 What is difficult to 
ascertain is the value of the data that political parties hold. Louise Edwards 
told us this is difficult to calculate.
350. The ICO’s Democracy Disrupted report, published in July 2018, called for 
political parties to be required to do due diligence on whether third-party 
data brokers received appropriate consent for their use of individuals’ data, 
including suggested audit powers. This followed the finding of a significant 
shortfall in transparency and provision of fair processing information by 
political parties. It also called for a statutory code of practice to be introduced 
governing political campaigners’ use of personal data.498 In August 2019 the 
ICO published a draft framework code of practice for consultation. This 
followed a previous consultation launched in October 2018 on what should 
be included in this code. The draft framework includes guidance for parties 
on using third-party data brokers and provides clarity and advice to help 
those processing personal data in political campaigning to comply with the 
law. The ICO told us that this guidance is a candidate to become a statutory 
code under Section 128 of the DPA and that there is now time to turn this 
guidance into such a code.499 The responsibility for this lies with Government 
and Parliament.
351. It is important to note that political advertising is not limited to the regulated 
period before an election. Political advertising should be seen as a year-round 
issue, with greater stringency required in election periods. The political 
advertising infrastructure in election periods would be more sophisticated 
but having data collection between election periods is required to give us a 
full picture of how parties use personal data.
352. When we asked the Minister about the Government’s intention to put the 
ICO’s code of practice onto statutory footing, we were told that the Minister 
had “concerns” about the code and that she would be concerned that such 
a code should not restrict elected representatives in being able to report 
494 Supplementary written evidence from the Conservative Party (DAD0106)
495 Q 128 (Ailidh Callander)
496 Q 129 (Pascal Crowe)
497 Written evidence from The Open Rights Group (DAD0079)
498 The Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Democracy disrupted? Personal information and political 
influence’ (July 2018) p 5: https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2259369/democracy-disrupted 
-110718.pdf [accessed 30 April 2020]
499 Q 290 (Elizabeth Denham)
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back to their constituents.500 This was an unconstructive response and the 
Government should work with the ICO to address their concerns. The 
framework provides guidance to parties processing personal data to comply 
with the law, which as we have seen in our evidence, is currently interpreted 
in various ways by the main political parties. The Government must take 
this seriously and should not be complacent with the use of people’s data.
353. The Government should legislate to put the ICO’s draft code on 
political campaigners’ use of personal data onto a statutory footing.
500 Q 351 (Chloe Smith MP)
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CHAPTER 7: ACTIVE DIGITAL CITIZENS
354. A country’s education system needs to prepare its people for their role as 
citizens. In the digital world, this means they need to be empowered to 
be critical, digitally literate consumers of information. In this Chapter 
we recommend that in order to secure democracy, people of all ages need 
to be taught critical digital media literacy skills suitable for a digital age. 
Some responsibility, however, must also lie with social media organisations 
who should ensure their products are accessible and understandable to the 
public. Oversight is needed to ensure that platforms are understandable to 
the public, while digital literacy is necessary for individuals to be empowered 
to thrive in a digital world.
Political literacy
355. Part of preparing children for their role in democratic society is understanding 
how the country is governed through a serious commitment to civic education. 
Democracy Club’s evidence suggested that many adults do not understand 
the UK’s electoral system, with people asking why Jeremy Corbyn or Theresa 
May were not listed on their ballot paper in the 2017 General Election.501
356. Civic competencies, like participating in democratic systems, are affected by 
developments in the digital world. Particular knowledge and expertise are 
required when people engage with democratic processes online. This throws 
a new, digital imperative on existing debates around civic education.
Digital skills and digital media literacy
357. Over the course of our inquiry, we heard various definitions of digital and 
media literacy. Dr Elinor Carmi, a Research Associate in Digital Culture 
and Society at the University of Liverpool, told us that there is no unified 
definition among academics.502 The Government’s definition of digital skills 
focusses on five elements: communicating, handling information, transacting, 
problem-solving and safety.503 The Government is also developing an online 
media literacy strategy, which should include a definition of media literacy.504 
Our evidence consistently mentioned was the need for critical questioning 
and critical thinking skills as key elements of any definition and push for 
digital literacy. Angie Pitt, Director of newsWise, a cross-curricular news 
literacy project for nine to 11-year-olds across the UK, told us that people 
may well be able to use a tablet, “but they do not have the critical skills to 
question how that information reaches them and how they are using it.”505
501 Written evidence from Democracy Club (DAD0045)
502 Q 137 (Dr Elinor Carmi)
503 Department for Education, Essential digital skills framework (April 2019) https://www.gov.uk/gover 
nment/publications/essential-digital-skills-framework/essential-digital-skills-framework [accessed 8 
April 2020]
504 Written evidence from HM Government (DAD0034)
505 Q 137 (Angie Pitt)
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Box 9: Definition of digital media literacy
We use the term ‘digital media literacy’ because our purposes go beyond, but do 
include, the functional skills required to use technology.
We define digital media literacy as being able to distinguish fact from fiction, 
including misinformation, understand how digital platforms work, as well as 
how to exercise one’s voice and influence decision makers in a digital context.
358. The House of Lords Digital Skills Committee in 2015 advocated greater 
digital literacy in the UK and set as one of its objectives for a Government 
Digital Agenda that the population have the right skill levels to use 
relevant digital technologies, including a culture of learning for life, with 
responsibility shared between Government, industry and the individual. The 
Government’s response focussed mainly on the report’s recommendations 
around infrastructure and failed to commit to upskilling the UK population 
with the necessary digital skills to thrive in the modern world.
359. Too often digital media literacy is confused with computer science. Having 
the prerequisite skills to understand how digital technologies function is 
essential to a solid digital media literacy education, but it is not enough to be 
merely a technically proficient consumer of digital technologies.
360. When asked about how the Government were equipping teachers 
to effectively teach digital media literacy, nick Gibb MP, Minister 
of State for School Standards, told us that they had established the 
national Centre for Computing Education.506 Michelle Dyson from the 
Department for Education highlighted the Government’s computer science 
programme, which aims to train one teacher in every secondary school, 
and its inclusion in the Government’s relationships and sex education 
curriculum, rather than specifically addressing digital media literacy. The 
Government’s evidence stated that it was “taking action to help people attain 
the digital skills needed to fully participate and thrive in an increasingly 
digital world.”507 This included introducing digital literacy as a core part of 
the national curriculum and publishing a media literacy strategy in 2020. As 
yet, no media literacy strategy has been forthcoming. The Government also 
focussed on the reformulation of the computing curriculum, which covers 
the principles of e-safety. Below we have laid out where digital media literacy 
is presently taught in the curriculum in England.
361. As can be seen in Table 1, digital media literacy is primarily taught in 
computing, citizenship and relationships education. Liz Moorse from the 
Association of Citizenship Teaching told us that “the Government have made 
a shambolic mess of the relationships and sex education framework and tried 
to shoehorn something in that probably does not belong.”508 Ms Moorse also 
told us that subjects such as citizenship are neglected in terms of funding, 
adequate Continuous Professional Development (CPD) for teachers and in 
expertise at Ofsted. Jonathan Baggaley, CEO of PSHE Association also told 
us that whilst the statutory status for PSHE was welcome, more needed to be 
done by the Government to encourage schools to prioritise this.509
506 Q 354 (nick Gibb MP)
507 Written evidence from HM Government (DAD0034)
508 Q 148 (Liz Moorse)
509 Q 149 (Liz Moorse, Jonathan Baggaley)
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Table 1: Digital Media Literacy and Digital Skills in the Curriculum
Subject Key Stage510 Content
Computing 2 Understand computer networks, including 
the internet; how they can provide multiple 
services, such as the World Wide Web, 
and the opportunities they offer for 
communication and collaboration.
Use search technologies effectively, 
appreciate how results are selected and 
ranked, and be discerning in evaluating 
digital content. 
Citizenship 2 Explore how the media present information.
Relationships 
Education511
1-2 Pupils should know about online 
relationships, including how to be safe 
online and how information and data is 




3 Pupils should be taught the rules and 
principles for keeping safe online. This will 
include how to recognise risks, harmful 
content and contact, and how and to whom 
to report issues. Pupils should have a strong 
understanding of how data is generated, 
collected, shared and used online, for 
example, how personal data is captured on 
social media or understanding the way that 
businesses may exploit the data available to 
them.
 510 511
362. The Government’s focus on computing education is insufficient; basic 
digital skills are not enough to create savvy citizens for the digital era. 
The Department of Education would appear to be struggling to anticipate 
the implications of the technological challenges of the 21st century. The 
5Rights Foundation recommends that children must understand the 
purposes of the technology they use, have a critical understanding of the 
content it delivers, have the skills and competencies to participate creatively, 
and a reasonable, age-appropriate understanding of potential outcomes, 
including harms.512 We believe that the requirement for these skills should 
extend to adults.
363. The focus on computer science, rather than critical digital media literacy 
skills, is important because we received numerous pieces of evidence that 
suggested insufficient progress had been made on improving digital media 
literacy in the UK. The Digital Life Skills Company stated that only two 
per cent of children have the skills needed to critically evaluate news and 
that young people do not realise that YouTube does not fact check its content 
510  Key Stage 1 refers to pupils aged 5-7, Key Stage 2 refers to children age 7-11, Key Stage 3 refers to 
children age 11-14.
511  Relationships Education applies to all schools providing primary education; Relationships and Sex 
Education applies to all schools providing secondary education.
512 Written evidence from 5Rights Foundation (DAD0082)
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or always remove inaccurate content.513 Angie Pitt warned that while we call 
primary school children ‘digital natives’, she would warn against calling them 
“critical digital natives” because they do not all have the critical literacy skills 
needed to be discerning users of digital technologies.514 5Rights Foundation 
stated that children are disproportionately affected by issues such as fraud, 
data protection and online targeting, given their developmental vulnerabilities 
and their status as ‘early adopters’ of emerging technologies.515
364. The Commission on Fake news and the Teaching of Critical Literacy Skills 
in Schools, a joint venture between the All Party Parliamentary Group on 
Literacy and national Literacy Trust, found that in 2018 in the UK, 54 
per cent of 12 to 15-year-olds use social media to access online news and 46 
per cent of those who source news in this way say they find it difficult to tell 
whether or not a social media news story is true.516
365. A lack of adequate digital media literacy is not, however, just seen in 
children. Many adults also lack the ability to evaluate critically what they 
see online. Ofcom’s Adult Media Lives 2019 report found that there had 
been little change in critical awareness in the past few years, with many 
still lacking the skills needed to identify when they are being advertised to 
online. Ofcom also found that the percentage of those who do not use the 
internet increases as people get older, with 33 per cent of 65 to 74-year-
olds and 48 per cent of those aged 75 and over not using the internet.517 
Care England and the national Pensioners Convention both raised 
the issue of older people finding it harder to take part in online debate.518 
Index on Censorship and Dr Ana Langer and Dr Luke Temple, respectively 
from the Universities of Glasgow and Sheffield, stated that those over the 
age of 65 are most likely to share fake news and should be a focus of concern 
for digital literacy efforts.519 Helen Milner, Group Chief Executive of 
Good Things Foundation told us that adults who lack digital literacy skills 
have low learning confidence and that part of the challenge is how to build 
up their confidence and resilience.520
366. Other evidence we received linked social exclusion to digital exclusion. 
Dr Elinor Carmi told us that her research showed that: “The lower your 
income, the more limited your use and understanding are.”521 MySociety 
suggested that the most economically disadvantaged do not have the 
necessary digital skills to engage online and that rural areas are held back 
by a lack of a good internet connection.522 Good Things Foundation stated 
that individuals without digital skills are most likely to be from socially 
excluded groups with a lack of digital skills being far more common in lower 
socioeconomic groups.523 national Literacy Trust suggested that adults with 
513 Written evidence from The Digital Life Skills Company (DAD0033)
514 Q 140 (Angie Pitt)
515 Written evidence from 5Rights Foundation (DAD0082)
516 national Literacy Trust, Fake news and critical literacy: The final report of the Commission on Fake 
news and the Teaching of Critical Literacy in Schools (June 2018) p 5-6: https://cdn.literacytrust.org.
uk/media/documents/Fake_news_and_critical_literacy_-_final_report.pdf [accessed 8 April 2020]
517 Ofcom, ‘Adults: Media use and attitudes report 2019’ (May 2019) p 1-3: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__
data/assets/pdf_file/0021/149124/adults-media-use-and-attitudes-report.pdf [accessed 8 April 2020]
518 Written evidence from Care England (DAD0003) and national Pensioners Convention (DAD0018)
519 Written evidence from Index on Censorship (DAD0032) and University of Sheffield (DAD0048)
520 Q 139 (Helen Milner)
521 Q 140 (Dr Elinor Carmi)
522 Written evidence from MySociety (DAD0051)
523 Written evidence from Good Things Foundation (DAD0039)
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lower levels of education stand to benefit most from increased support and 
confidence in news literacy.524 Professor Sonia Livingstone, Chair of the 
LSE T3 Commission, sees reaching adults not in education or training as 
one of the key educational challenges in media literacy.525
367. The reason why a lack of digital media literacy is so concerning is, as 
Will Moy, Chief Executive of Full Fact, put it, “Bad information can ruin 
lives. It damages people’s health. It promotes hate and it hurts democracy.”526 
A pertinent example of misinformation and why digital media literacy is so 
crucial has been brought home by the COVID-19 pandemic. Misinformation 
has come in a myriad of forms online, including: supposed at-home cures like 
‘avoiding ice cream’ and ‘drinking silver’527; that COVID-19 was created and 
weaponised by the West528; and linking 5G technology to the virus outbreak.529 
Lisa-Maria neudert offered us this example of how disinformation can cause 
real-world harm:
“As a recent example, the World Health Organization is currently 
co-operating with Google to bring out public health information 
on conspiracy theories and disinformation about coronavirus. The 
most popular theories that have been spreading are that you can 
vaccinate yourself against coronavirus by inhaling sulphurous fumes 
from fireworks and that you can use garlic to protect yourself from 
coronavirus, which is obviously very wrong. To stick with epidemiology, 
it is enough for one person to believe that. If one person thinks, “I can 
actually vaccinate myself by inhaling a firework”, there will be a terrible 
health effect no matter what. If that person then contracts coronavirus, 
because he thinks he cannot get it, and spreads it, we have a real-world 
impact from a piece of disinformation. In this analogy, we have a disease 
that is arguably spreading just as quickly as disinformation.”530
Lessons from abroad
368. The UK ranked twelfth out of 35 countries across wider Europe at promoting 
societal resilience to disinformation activities, according to the Open Society 
Institute Media Literacy Index.531 Throughout our inquiry, we heard positive 
examples from abroad, particularly from the Baltic countries, as to how 
digital media literacy can be promoted to citizens. Liz Moorse directed us 
towards the example of Finland. She explained that the Finnish government: 
“have worked for some decades to make sure that democracy education, 
citizenship and media literacy are part of every child’s education. They have 
put resources into it and trained teachers.”532
524 Written evidence from national Literacy Trust (DAD0065)
525 Sonia Livingstone, ‘Media literacy: what are the challenges and how can we move towards a solution?’, 
LSE blog (13 March 2019): https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/parenting4digitalfuture/2019/03/13/media-literacy-
what-are-the-challenges/ [accessed 9 April]
526 Q 85 (Will Moy)
527 BBC news, ‘Coronavirus: The fake health advice you should ignore’ (8 March 2020): https://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-51735367 [accessed 13 April 2020]
528 ‘EU warns of pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign on coronavirus’, Financial Times, (17 March 
2020): https://www.ft.com/content/d65736da-684e-11ea-800d-da70cff6e4d3 [accessed 13 April 
2020]
529 Bloomberg, ‘5G Virus Conspiracy Theory Fueled by Coordinated Effort’ (9 April 2020): https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020–04-09/covid-19-link-to-5g-technology-fueled-by-coordinated-
effort [accessed 13 April 2020]
530 Q 116 (Lisa-Maria neudert)
531 Q 227 (Sir Julian King)
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369. We heard from Siim Kumpas, Adviser to the Government Office of Estonia, 
about his country’s successful attempts to improve the quality of their digital 
media literacy. He told us that an awareness among the public of the threat 
level was a “prerequisite” to any work in building societal resilience through 
digital literacy. Mr Kumpas stated that digital skills education starts in 
kindergarten with basic education, and media literacy is ingrained in other 
subjects. Estonia also has a 35-hour compulsory course called ‘media and 
manipulation’ which gives high school students a basic understanding of the 
role media and journalism play, and how they work.533
Table 2: Digital pedagogy in Estonia and Finland
Estonia
Estonia has its own national definition of ‘digital competence’ alongside the 
EU-wide definition (DIGCOMP) and sets out standards of digital competence 
for teachers.534
Estonia’s desired ‘digital competence’ is defined as: the ability to use 
developing digital technology in a quickly changing society; using digital 
means for finding and preserving information and to evaluate the relevance 
and trustworthiness of the information; participating in creating digital 
content; using suitable digital tools and methods for solving problems, 
communicating and cooperating in different digital environments; awareness 
of online dangers and know how to protect one’s privacy, personal information 
and digital identity; following the same moral principles as offline535
Estonia is one of only three EU states where digital competence frameworks 
must be taken into consideration while developing Initial Teacher Education 
programmes.
Estonia’s education strategy is known as the Lifelong Learning Strategy 
2020, which sets “A digital focus in lifelong learning” as one of five key policy 
aims.536
The government of Estonia cofounded a programme which as of February 
2019 had supplied 44 per cent of kindergartens with IT and programming 
equipment and training.537
Estonia is one of only five EU states to apply assessment criteria in digital 
competencies at both primary and secondary education level.538
Estonia monitors and evaluates its strategies for digital education at school 
level at regular interviews, one of only eight EU states to do so (exc Finland).539
534 535 536 537 538 539 
533 Q 181 (Siim Kumpas)
534  European Commission, ‘Digital Education at School in Europe’: https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-
policies/eurydice/sites/eurydice/files/en_digital_education_n.pdf accessed 15 April 2020
535  European Commission, ‘EACEA national Policies Platform’: https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-
policies/en/content/youthwiki/68-media-literacy-and-safe-use-new-media-estonia [accessed 15 April 
2020]
536  Republic of Estonia Ministry of Education and Research, ‘The Estonian Lifelong Learning Strategy 
2020’: https://www.hm.ee/sites/default/files/estonian_lifelong_strategy.pdf [accessed 15 April 2020]
537  nESTA, ‘Digital Frontrunners Spotlight: Estonia’: https://www.nesta.org.uk/blog/digital-frontrunn 
ers-spotlight-estonia/ [accessed 15 April 2020]
538  European Commission, ‘Digital Education at School in Europe’
539  Ibid.
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Finland
Finland has adopted the EU-wide definition of digital competence 
(DIGCOMP), which includes: browsing, searching and filtering information; 
engaging in online citizenship and collaborating through digital channels; 
netiquette and managing digital identity; developing content and 
programming; protecting personal data, health, and the environment; 
identifying needs and technological responses; innovating and creatively using 
technology.540
Finland has no digital competence framework for teachers but promotes 
the use of self-assessment tools for teachers to evaluate their level of digital 
competence and thereby define their development needs.541
In 2013, Finland’s Ministry of Education and Culture prepared policy 
guidelines to promote media literacy among children and adolescents. The 
national Core Curricula for Pre-Primary Education and Basic Education 
include ICT competence. 542
Finland does not apply assessment criteria in digital competences at both 
primary and secondary level.543
Finland’s curriculum seeks to tackle hostile online activity by pursuing a 
broader media literacy, rather than a specifically ‘digital’ one, and frames 
media literacy as a civic competence.
The Ministry of Culture deems media literacy to include:
the traditional ability to read and write text, critical literacy, digital literacy, 
data literacy; emotional skills, social skills, empathy skills; competence in 
issues related to ethics and morality media criticism and source assessment; 
safety-related issues such as data security and privacy, cyber security and 
grooming.544
Finland monitors and evaluates its strategies for digital education at school 
level on an ad hoc basis.545
540 541 542 543 544 545
370. Elisabeth Braw, Director of the Royal United Services Institute’s (RUSI) 
Modern Deterrence Project, pointed out than in Latvia all high schools in the 
country teach a national security curriculum where children are taught what 
the threats are facing the country, including online threats. She suggested 
that this was important because: “If we are not taught about that as citizens, 
our instinct will always be to think that the Government can somehow put 
up a more powerful or larger umbrella over us, so that we do not have to 
worry about this or that threat.”546 Similarly, Ben Scott, Director of Policy 
and Advocacy at Luminate, pointed out that the government of Finland ran a 
public service campaign stating that it was the patriotic duty of every Finnish 
citizen to tell the difference between truth and falsehood online, because of the 
540  European Commission, ‘DIGCOMP: A Framework for Developing and Understanding Digital 
Competence in Europe’: https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC83167/lb-na-
26035-enn.pdf accessed 15 April 2020
541  European Commission, ‘Digital Education at School in Europe’
542  Finland Ministry of Education and Culture, Media Literacy in Finland (2019): https://medialuk 
utaitosuomessa.fi/mediaeducationpolicy.pdf [accessed 15 April 2020]
543  European Commission, ‘Digital Education at School in Europe’
544  Finland Ministry of Education and Culture, Media literacy in Finland
545  Ibid.
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threat from Russia.547 Sir Julian King, Former EU Security Commissioner, 
told us that Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Estonia were the countries that 
best achieved societal resilience to disinformation through education.548 We 
note that the curriculum requirements, outlined in Table 1 are not as robust, 
nor as far reaching, as those from Estonia and Finland, as outlined in Table 
2. This is symptomatic of a chronic lack of ambition by the UK in this regard.
371. We understand that in these countries, because of the geopolitical context, 
the issue of having a digitally literate citizenry that can identify disinformation 
is of existential importance to their democracy. We, of course, recognise 
that Estonia and Finland have a combined population smaller than that of 
London, and that the challenges of scaling such attempts to a country such 
as the UK will be significant. However, we believe that the UK Government 
should nevertheless look to and learn from examples of excellent digital 
media literacy strategies, wherever they are to be found.
Who has responsibility for digital media literacy?
372. We heard about the fragmented nature of the provision of digital media 
literacy teaching and resources. Full Fact highlighted the need to map and 
make coherent currently fragmented digital literacy schemes initiated by 
Government, for profit and non-profit organisations, to identify and share 
best practice. This activity was seen to be a cost-effective way of improving 
digital literacy.549
373. A number of existing initiatives aiming to raise digital literacy are being 
shaped and promoted by technology platforms. Google highlighted the work 
they do to support digital literacy. For example, they run a programme with 
the Institute for Strategic Dialogue which encourages young people aged 13-
15 to have a positive voice online and provides training in social media and 
critical thinking. Google also fund the Stanford History Education Group’s 
online digital literacy content which seeks to teach young people to read 
laterally by searching for more information about the sources they find 
online.550 Facebook listed numerous initiatives and measures they have in 
place to improve media literacy.551
374. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, England’s teachers reported that less 
than half frequently used ICT for classwork and just over a quarter had not 
covered the use of ICT for teaching in their formal training.552 The crisis 
has now demonstrated the need for better pedagogic training in using 
technology for teaching, in general and digital media literacy in particular. 
The Sutton Trust found wide gaps and variability in provision of online 
learning, with poorer students less likely to have access to some types of 
provision. It stated that supporting more teachers to deliver online content 
was an immediate challenge, and students in schools with greater deprivation 
were less likely to have access to more intensive approaches such as recorded 
or live online classes. Secondly, as discussed earlier in this Report, the online 
misinformation about COVID-19 has resulted in real world harm and has 
547 Q 118 (Ben Scott)
548 Q 227 (Sir Julian King)
549 Written evidence from Full Fact (DAD0042)
550 Written evidence from Google (DAD0086)
551 Written evidence from Facebook (DAD0081)
552 TALIS – The OECD Teaching and Learning International Survey, TALIS 2018 Results, Volume II 
(March 2020): http://www.oecd.org/education/talis/talis-2018-results-volume-ii-19cf08df-en.htm 
[accessed 1 June 2020]
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made clear that it is vital that citizens of all ages are able to identify and 
evaluate what is trustworthy or credible content.
375. We consider it admirable that companies such as Google and Facebook are 
aiding media literacy initiatives. The digital media literacy organisations that 
we heard from explained how tight budgets were, and certainly global tech 
companies have the resources to help such smaller organisations. However, 
we have significant concerns that technology companies are setting the 
terms of media literacy, omitting the content that explains their business 
models and critiques their practices. What is most concerning is the absence 
of governmental leadership in shaping and designing digital media literacy 
programmes and taking them to scale; the Government would appear to 
have abandoned its role in this partnership.
376. We heard that Government was best placed to take the lead on unifying 
these approaches. Full Fact suggested that there was a role for Government 
or a regulator like Ofcom, who have a statutory responsibility to promote 
digital literacy, to co-ordinate initiatives to share best practice between 
providers.553 It should be noted that the ICO have a responsibility for data 
literacy. The LSE T3 Commission called for Government to mobilise an 
urgent, integrated new programme in media literacy for children in schools, 
adults in further and vocational education, as well as parents, teachers and 
the children’s workforce.554 As Professor Rasmus Kleis nielsen, Director of 
the Reuters Institute told us:
“the Government are the one actor that could make a difference. I do 
not see that it could come from civil society organically or through the 
competition between different for-profit businesses alone.”555
377. Within Government, it is unclear where responsibility for digital literacy 
falls. The need for cross-departmental collaboration and communication is 
evident. Helen Milner of Good Things Foundation argued that responsibility 
and interest from government was diffuse among departments. She stated 
that part of the problem was that her organisation worked with six different 
government departments, each with a slightly different digital literacy focus.556
378. The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) oversees 
digital policy and is the lead department on the Online Harms White Paper, 
one of the major strands of which is to improve digital and media literacy.557 
However, the Department for Education administers education policy in 
England, with devolved administrations taking responsibility in the other 
nations of the UK, and this includes the way in which digital literacy is 
incorporated into the school curriculum. The difference in approaches can 
be seen in the variation between the list of online harms in the guidance 
for teachers by the Department for Education in teaching online safety, and 
the list of online harms in the White Paper owned by DCMS. Whilst there 
is a great deal of overlap, they reflect different priorities within the Online 
Harms White Paper, with DCMS focusing on more concrete harms and the 
teaching guidance prioritising the general mental wellbeing of young people. 
553 Written evidence from Full Fact (DAD0042)
554 Written evidence the LSE T3 Commission (DAD0078)
555 Q 144 (Professor Rasmus Kleis nielsen)
556 Q 144 (Helen Milner)
557 DCMS and Home Office, Closed consultation: Online Harms White Paper (February 2020): 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/online-harms-white-paper/online-harms-white-
paper#empowering-users-1, [accessed 9 April 2020]
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It is not clear to what extent Department for Education is contributing to the 
regulation of platforms proposed in the White Paper with a view to making 
them more understandable, or to what extent DCMS are feeding into digital 
literacy programmes based on their proposed regulation of online platforms. 
neither take a holistic approach.
379. Again, for adult digital literacy it is not clear which part of Government 
is leading in this area. The Online Harms White Paper calls for more 
messaging and resources for adults. However, the only actor identified in 
the White Paper is Ofcom, which is assessing existing research to help guide 
policy makers to identify gaps and opportunities for future action. How these 
assessments have influenced government thinking is also unclear.
380. Ofcom has a statutory duty to promote media literacy under Section 11 of the 
Communications Act 2003. Ofcom interpret this as providing an evidence 
base of UK adults’ and children’s understanding and use of electronic media 
and share this evidence base with stakeholders. 558 They do not appear to run 
any digital media literacy programmes, although Tony Close, then Ofcom 
Director of Content Standards, Licensing and Enforcement, highlighted 
the Making Sense of Media programme, which aims to bring organisations 
working in the digital literacy space together.559 In response to the COVID-19 
pandemic, the Making Sense of Media panel collected a set of resources to 
provide people with useful tools to navigate news and information about 
the virus, including debunking misinformation and how to seek out reliable 
content.560
381. The White Paper also identifies digital literacy as an area that the new 
Online Harms Regulator will cover. A previous public information 
campaign designed to reduce the spread of misinformation was disseminated 
by, and appears to have come from, the budget of the Cabinet Office.561 
Caroline Dinenage MP, Minister for Culture and Digital, told us that 
DCMS leads on adult media literacy and digital policy, but that they worked 
closely with Department for Education. She stated that the Government 
had conducted an analysis of adult media literacy initiatives and that this 
showed there was a large proportion of initiatives focused on children and 
their parents, but less targeted at adults.562
382. Many bodies have called for the various media literacy initiatives to be made 
more cohesive. The Cairncross Review into the sustainability of journalism 
in the UK recommended that the Government should develop a media 
literacy strategy, working with Ofcom, the online platforms, news publishers 
and broadcasters, voluntary organisations and academics, to identify gaps in 
provision and opportunities for more collaborative working.563
558 Ofcom, ‘About media literacy’: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/research-and-data/media-literacy-research /
media-literacy [accessed 9 June 2020]
559 Q 284 (Tony Close)
560 Ofcom, ‘Cutting through the Covid-19 confusion’, (9 April 2020): https://www.ofcom.org.uk/research-
and-data/media-literacy-research/coronavirus-resources [accessed 14 April 2020]
561 Cabinet Office, FOI329095, Freedom of Information Request (2 January 2020): https://www.
whatdotheyknow.com/request /625594/response/1493795/attach/3/FOI329095%20REPLY.
pdf?cookie_passthrough=1 [accessed 13 May 2020]
562 Q 356 (Caroline Dinenage MP)
563 The Cairncross Review, A Sustainable Future for Journalism (February 2019) p 90: https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/779882/021919_
DCMS_Cairncross_Review_.pdf [accessed 9 April 2020]
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383. Channel 4 also called for these initiatives to be brought together: “What 
is most crucial is policymakers encourage the coordination of all existing 
media literacy and digital skills activities into a cohesive strategy to have 
the greatest impact. Whilst there are myriad of industry-funded civil society 
programmes, there is a need for greater emphasis and support on the 
organisations and educational materials that have a proven impact e.g. the 
work of Media Smart and Internet Matters.”564
384. The House of Lords Digital Skills Committee in 2015 stated that the 
Government has a responsibility to accelerate the attainment of digital 
literacy across the population and that the Government was responsible for 
ensuring the UK’s population keeps pace with the best in the world.
385. We would certainly add our voice to these calls for a large-scale evaluation of 
the landscape. However, we recommend that the Department for Education 
should take responsibility and lead on this with Ofcom. We also believe that 
much can be learned from what works internationally. Additionally, we think 
it is vital to place a clear time limit on our recommendation, as we believe 
enough recommendations have already been made to the Government for it 
to take this issue seriously, and act with urgency. This exercise is only made 
more urgent by the COVID-19 pandemic, which saw misinformation posing 
a threat to people of all ages.
386. Ofsted, in partnership with the Department for Education, Ofcom, 
the ICO and subject associations, should commission a large-scale 
programme of evaluation of digital media literacy initiatives. This 
should:
(a) Review the international evidence of what has worked best in 
digital media literacy initiatives;
(b) Map existing digital media literacy initiatives across the UK, 
inside and outside of schools, aimed at all age groups;
(c) Commission research to evaluate those UK initiatives that 
appear to be most successful;
(d) Report in time for the lessons learned to be implemented at 
scale in the 2021–22 academic year.
Teaching digital media literacy
387. We heard that part of the issue was that teachers did not feel empowered 
to teach digital media literacy skills, nor did they have the resources and 
curricular time to do so. The Digital Life Skills Company found that 
teachers lack the skills necessary to help children better understand the 
online world, tending towards an ‘avoidance’ strategy when it comes to 
digital information.565
388. We heard consistently that a cross-curricular approach was best, and 
that digital media literacy could and should be embedded into most 
subjects. national Literacy Trust stated that critical literacy was taught 
most effectively through a whole-school, cross-curricular approach. They 
stated that many skills were already included within several programmes 
564 Written evidence from Channel 4 (DAD0055)
565 Written evidence from The Digital Life Skills Company (DAD0033)
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of study and therefore did not advocate for a specific curriculum change.566 
Stanford History Education Group highlighted that the effects of digital 
literacy interventions will be minimal as long as they are seen as an add-on to 
the regular school curriculum. They stressed that digital literacy initiatives 
must be embedded into other subjects and across the curriculum.567
389. Ben Scott from Luminate told us that integrating digital literacy into existing 
curricula was more successful and popular with teachers and students, 
because they were not asked to digest new material from scratch that is 
unrelated to anything they have ever taught before.568
390. Countries that have been highlighted as examples of good media literacy 
education incorporate digital media literacy across the curriculum. In 
Finland, for example, the curriculum for Upper Secondary Education 
includes cross-curricular themes in multiliteracy and media as well as 
technology and society. Competencies related to media and information 
literacy are included across different subjects. Siim Kumpas told us that in 
Estonia, as well as a separate course, media literacy efforts are ingrained 
in other subjects. He also told us that the Estonian universities that train 
teachers are obliged, by contract with the Government, to insert elements of 
digital competences in all their training programmes.569
391. Liz Moorse from the Association of Citizenship Teaching highlighted 
the Finnish example, stressing that “every teacher in a Finnish school 
understands democracy education and citizenship education.” We spoke to 
six teachers convened by the Politics Project, who told us that whilst they 
already had significant pressures placed on them they would value more time 
to teach political and media literacy education, and some said that timetabled 
curriculum lessons would be helpful.570 Among the teachers we spoke to, 
there was a keenness to do more, but a significant limit in their capacity.
392. national Literacy Trust in their report on fake news and critical literacy 
argue that a whole-school approach to teaching critical literacy is essential 
to embedding critical literacy across the curriculum. However, they also 
argue that teachers and schools must be provided with the necessary CPD 
and resources to enable them to teach critical literacy actively and explicitly 
within the teaching of any and every subject. We concur and understand that 
incorporating digital literacy across the curriculum may place extra strain on 
teachers and appreciate they also deal with social problems brought about 
by technology. They must be given support to embed this into their subjects 
effectively.
393. The House of Commons DCMS Committee in 2019 called for digital 
literacy to be the “fourth pillar of education alongside reading, writing 
and maths,”571 but the Government rejected the recommendation, 
responding that “digital literacy is already taught across the national school 
curriculum.”572 We support the DCMS Committee’s recommendation and 
566 Written evidence from national Literacy Trust (DAD0065)
567 Written evidence from Stanford History Education Group (DAD0080)
568 Q 119 (Ben Scott)
569 Q 183 (Siim Kumpas)
570 For more information about the digital surgeries held with the Politics Project, see Appendix 4.
571 DCMS Committee, Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Final Report (Eighth report, Session 2017–19, HC 
1791) 
572 DCMS Committee, Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Final Report: Government Response to the Committee’s 
Eighth Report of Session 2017–19
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find the Government’s response to be particularly tepid. We have seen that 
the Government often refers to computer science when discussing digital 
media literacy. The evidence collected by the Joint Council on Qualifications 
(JCQ), below, shows that very few pupils take computing at GCSE and even 
fewer at A-Level, which confirms that relying on computing education as a 
vehicle for digital media literacy is insufficient, particularly where the gender 
disparity is so wide.
Box 10: JCQ Statistics on take-up of computing GCSE and A-level573
In 2019, 80,027 pupils took computing at GCSE. The subject remains dominated 
by boys, who make up 78.6 per cent of entries.
The number of pupils who took computing at A-level was 11,124 in 2019, with 
only 1, 475 girls choosing the subject.
The Department of Education estimates that between 684,000-693,000 pupils 
took GCSEs in 2019, meaning that only around 11 per cent of pupils took 
Computing GCSE.570 
 574
394. It is not this Committee’s place, or aim, to re-organise the education system. 
However, better digital media literacy should be placed in the context of 
the need for a wider change in education in response to the influence and 
use of digital technology. When we asked civil servants about how the 
Government planned to respond to these changes, Michelle Dyson from 
the Department for Education told us that the Government’s “big computer 
science programme … aims to train one teacher in every secondary school… 
both in subject content and pedagogy”.575 We regard this as an underwhelming 
response demonstrating a lack of understanding within the Department 
about what kind of investment and additional commitment is needed to 
bring about change. We remain sceptical as to whether the Government has 
a full understanding of the critical ways in which digital media literacy and 
technical computing skills differ.
395. The Department for Education should review the school curriculum 
to ensure that pupils are equipped with all the skills needed in a 
modern digital world. Critical digital media literacy should be 
embedded across the wider curriculum based on the lessons learned 
from the review of initiatives recommended above. All teachers will 
need support through CPD to achieve this.
Making social media companies understandable to the public
396. We also recognise that responsibility for aiding public understanding of online 
technologies lies with the online organisations themselves. Ed Humpherson 
from the UK Statistics Authority put it in these terms: “you can only be 
literate with something readable.”576 Professor Sonia Livingstone from the 
LSE has called media literacy the ‘policy of last resort’, stating:
573 JCQ, ‘GCSE Outcomes for key grades for UK, England, northern Ireland & Wales, including UK 
age breakdown’ (August 2019): https://www.jcq.org.uk/Download/examination-results/gcses/2019/
main-results-tables/gcse-full-course-results-summer-2019 and JCQ, ‘GCE, A level and GCE AS 
Level Results Summer 2019’ (August 2019): https://www.jcq.org.uk/Download/examination-results/
a-levels/2019/main-results-tables/a-level-and-as-results-summer-2019 [accessed 2 June 2020]
574  Statistics provided by the Department of Education.
575 Q 26 (Michelle Dyson)
576 Q 88 (Ed Humpherson)
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“we cannot teach what is unlearnable, and people cannot learn to 
be literate in what is illegible … we cannot teach people data literacy 
without transparency, or what to trust without authoritative markers of 
authenticity and expertise. So people’s media literacy depends on how 
their digital environment has been designed and regulated.”577
397. Lisa-Maria neudert  from the Oxford Technology and Elections Commission 
pointed out that digital literacy initiatives place a large onus on the citizen. 
Looking at the current digital landscape, she argued that much of the 
malicious material was very sophisticated and could take expert fact-
checkers several hours or even days to identify whether something was fake 
or artificially generated.578 This implies that it is unfair and unrealistic to 
expect the average user to do the same.
398. Dr Elinor Carmi told us that it was important for people to understand 
the online ecosystem and how different platforms were funded. For 
example, research by Ofcom has consistently shown that most people do 
not understand that Google and Facebook are advertising companies, and 
that this affects the way in which they show you information. She told us 
that platforms use dark patterns in their interface designed to deceive people 
into making choices not necessarily in their interests.579 Companies often 
make compliance and reporting procedures obscure and inaccessible. For 
example, placing information about legal compliance on data protection and 
their own terms of service as far away from the user as possible enhances 
information asymmetries between the user and platform.580
399. Part of increasing public trust and understanding is ensuring transparency 
about how personal data is used on websites. Platforms should make this 
more understandable as part of their duty of care to users. The CMA, in 
its Online platforms and digital advertising interim report, suggested a 
fairness by design duty. This would put a duty on platforms to ensure fairness 
in the design of data collection processes and would allow early intervention 
by a regulator to ensure that the duty is adhered to at the design stage. It is 
revealing that the CMA stated that: “we were surprised to find out how little 
testing is done by platforms in relation to consumer control over data and 
use of privacy settings, which stands in stark contrast to the very extensive 
trialling done on a daily basis in other parts of the business.” The CMA 
suggested that the regulator would set the high-level basis of compliance 
with this principle, with an option for ‘engagement and understanding’, 
which would seek to ensure that customers understand and are comfortable 
with the options available to them on an ongoing basis, and could include 
a requirement to help educate consumers about the use of their data in a 
manner agreed by the appropriate regulator.581 We discussed these issues in 
greater detail in Chapter 4 on transparency.
577 Sonia Livingstone, ‘Media literacy: what are the challenges and how can we move towards a solution?’, 
LSE blog (13 March 2019) https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/parenting4digitalfuture/2019/03/13/media-literacy-
what-are-the-challenges/ [accessed 9 April]
578 Q 118 (Lisa-Maria neudert)
579 Q 137 (Dr Elinor Carmi)
580 Ben Wagner, Krisztina Rozgonyi, Marie-Therese Sekwenz, Jennifer Cobbe and Jatinder Singh, 
‘Regulating Transparency? Facebook, Twitter and the German network Enforcement Act’, (2019) 
p 1-11: https://benwagner.org/wp-content/plugins/zotpress/lib/request/request.dl.php?api_user_id=2 
346531&dlkey=ZWMEVW3R&content_type=application/pdf
581 CMA, ‘Online platforms and digital advertising interim report’ (December 2019), p 257-8: https://
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5dfa0580ed915d0933009761/Interim_report.pdf [accessed 9 
April 2020]
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400. Platforms also have obligations under the General Data Protection 
Regulation and Data Protection Act 2018 to ensure public understanding 
of their processes, yet the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI) 
Review of Online Targeting found that only 36 per cent of people surveyed 
believed they have meaningful control over online targeting systems. They 
also found that there was a broad consensus that people should be considered 
responsible for their online behaviour, but that for this to work they needed 
to be genuinely empowered to understand and control their experience. 
Crucially, the CDEI also found that the people who participated in their 
‘public dialogue’ activities agreed that significant changes were required in 
the design of online services and the information and controls afforded to 
users. These participants also thought that it was critical for the Government 
to direct online platforms to change and to scrutinise and enforce this work, 
as they did not trust online platforms to act in the interests of individual 
users or society more widely.582
401. We recommend that Ofcom should require large platforms to user 
test all major design changes to ensure that they increase rather 
than decrease informed user choices. Ofcom should help devise 
the criteria for this testing and review the results. There should be 
genuine and easily understandable options for people to choose how 
their data is used.
402. In its research, Doteveryone found that from a survey of 2,157 individuals, 
50 per cent believed that part and parcel of being online was that people 
would try to cheat or harm them in some way. They described a sense of 
powerlessness and resignation in relation to services online, with significant 
minorities saying that it doesn’t matter whether they trust organisations with 
their data because they have to use them, and that they have to sign up to 
services online, even if they have concerns about the terms and conditions. 
Strikingly, Doteveryone found that two fifths of the public disagreed with 
the notion that companies design their products and services with their best 
interest in mind.583
403. It is clear that platforms need to be more transparent and easier to understand 
but have not been given clear guidelines of what that should look like in 
practice. We believe that the CDEI, as an advisory body that looks to 
maximise the benefits of data-driven technologies, is best placed to conduct 
this research. Their review should focus on how best to explain the ways in 
which individuals have been targeted and should keep accessibility to the 
public front and centre.
404. Dr Elinor Carmi told us that the Government should not silo its education 
policy away from its broader approach to digital.584 We agree and we believe 
it is important that pupils need to be taught why and how they have been 
targeted and what rights they have over their data online. This work on 
transparency should therefore feed into the review of the curriculum 
recommended above.
582 CDEI, ‘Review of Online Targeting: Final report and recommendations’ (February 2020) p 51, 
p 55: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f 
ile/864167/CDEJ7836-Review-of-Online-Targeting-05022020.pdf [accessed 9 April 2020]
583 Doteveryone, People, Power and Technology: The 2020 Digital Attitudes Report, (May 2020): https://www.
doteveryone.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/PPT-2020_Soft-Copy.pdf [accessed 13 May 2020]
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405. The CDEI should conduct a review of the implications of platform 
design for users, focusing on determining best practice in explaining 
how individual pieces of content have been targeted at a user. Ofcom 
should use this to form the basis of a code of practice on design 
transparency. This should feed into the Department for Education’s 
review of the curriculum so that citizens are taught what to expect 
from user transparency on platforms.
Anonymity as a barrier to understanding content on the internet
406. Content can be very difficult to evaluate critically for authenticity and 
trustworthiness when it is posted by an anonymous account. Anonymity 
has traditionally been seen as a core part of the internet, however there is 
an argument that anonymity means that people cannot be held to account 
for disinformation or malicious content that they post. Given that much 
democratic discussion occurs online, is it right that anonymous users are 
able to participate? We have received mixed evidence, which we review here.
407. Different technology platforms have different policies towards anonymity. 
Registering on YouTube (owned by Google) only requires an email address, 
not a real name. Facebook controversially has a ‘real name’ policy that requires 
users to provide the name they use in real life. According to Facebook, this 
policy means “you always know who you’re connecting with.”585 If Facebook 
believes users are not using a real name, it may ask them for ID to prove 
that they are who they claim to be. On Twitter, an account can represent 
whatever the user decides. Twitter requires users to provide either an email 
or a phone number upon signing up but does not require both. YouTube has 
a ‘three strikes and you’re out’ policy for impersonation: content intended to 
impersonate a person or channel for the first time receives a warning with no 
penalty to the channel. If it is the second time, a ‘strike’ is issued against the 
channel.586 The channel is terminated if three of these strikes are received 
(effectively meaning impersonation can occur on multiple occasions). Google 
can disable accounts whose users appear not to be old enough (the minimum 
age is 13 in the UK but varies between countries) and requires users whose 
accounts have been disabled due to age restrictions to confirm their age 
through a copy of government-issued ID or a credit card.587 Twitter’s policy 
on authenticity requires that users do not use Twitter to amplify artificially 
or suppress information or manipulate or disrupt others. Twitter also forbids 
interfering with elections or impersonating others.
408. We heard from Baroness O’neill of Bengarve that there should not be a right 
to take part in democratic discussions anonymously. She told us:
“The question of when anonymity is needed is highly contextual. It 
is sometimes needed, but in my view one of the places where it is not 
needed is in exercising civic rights. As a citizen, I do not stand behind a 
hedge and throw stones; I stand in the public square and speak.”588
585 Facebook, ‘What names are allowed on Facebook?’: https://www.facebook.com/help/112146705538576 
[accessed 13 April 2020]
586 YouTube Help, ‘Policy on impersonation’:  https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801947?hl=en-
GB [accessed 14 April 2020]
587 Google Account Help, ‘Frequently Asked Questions about Google Accounts and Age Requirements’: 
https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/1333913? [accessed 14 April 2020]
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409. However, Katy Minshall from Twitter told us that allowing pseudonymity 
on Twitter enabled people to speak out. She used the example of the account 
@thegayfootballer that sparked a wider conversation about homophobia 
in football and argued that allowing people to be anonymous encouraged 
people to share stories and experiences that they may not feel comfortable 
sharing under their real name.589
410. Professor Derek McAuley and his colleagues from the University of 
nottingham Horizon Digital Economy Research Institute suggested that 
despite the potential downsides of maintaining full anonymity online, 
policymakers should take care in this area in order to avoid a chilling effect 
on the use of online services. They argued that a ‘real-name’ policy may 
present significant threats to the confidentiality of communications; that 
bad actors are likely to circumvent the real name policy with false identities 
and that the policy could potentially expose vulnerable groups to harmful 
retaliation.590 Index on Censorship pointed out that anonymity can be 
important for human rights defenders working under repressive regimes and 
for members of minority groups and journalists.591
411. Full Fact similarly urged us to consider that anonymity and the ability to 
communicate via encrypted messages is relied upon by many, such as whistle 
blowers and those in less democratic regimes. They also highlighted that 
what the UK does in this space will be watched closely elsewhere in the 
world.592
412. We do not advocate that only people’s real names can be used on platforms, 
but we do believe it is important that people should retain the ability to 
identify disinformation promoted by fake accounts. In this, as in other areas 
discussed in this Chapter, platforms could boost free expression and reduce 
harms by doing more to empower their users; it is a false binary that one can 
only choose between anonymity and real names. Twitter currently empowers 
its users not to receive notifications from those who have not confirmed their 
phone numbers or who use the default anonymous profile photo.
413. The Government’s Verify service, which securely allows people to verify 
their identity and is used to access government services such as filing taxes 
or checking driving licence information, could be a resource to help build 
on this approach, allowing users to verify their identities. Another approach 
would be to visually identify users who had securely verified their accounts. 
Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and YouTube all have some form of verified 
user programme denoted with a checkmark next to a user’s name. Platforms 
could develop a similar feature which identified to users if another user had 
authenticated their account through a service like Verify.
414. When we asked the Government whether they had considered using the 
Verify service to allow users to confirm their identity, Caroline Dinenage MP, 
Minister for Culture and Digital, told us that they are running a pilot that 
would allow private sector organisations to use a document-checking service 
that is a component of the Gov.UK Verify service. She also told us that over 
the next 18 months, the Government was replacing Verify with a private 
589 Q 312 (Katy Minshall)
590 Written evidence from the University of nottingham (DAD0040)
591 Written evidence from Index on Censorship (DAD0032)
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sector-led digital identity market, which will make it possible for people to 
confirm their identity without having to show paper documents.
415. A substantial amount of content on digital platforms is posted by anonymous 
users who may not be genuine users at all. Indeed, it is sometimes posted 
by bad actors using sophisticated techniques to spread misinformation and 
abuse, and to undermine democratic debate. In general, we believe there 
should be a presumption against anonymity on digital media however we 
recognise that for many this is not possible.
416. Anonymity can be important to protect freedoms, for example where people 
from ethnic minority groups want to have a voice in debates but are afraid 
of retaliation or abuse, where LGBT+ people may not be ready to come 
out or live in jurisdictions where homosexuality is criminalised, or where 
journalists and citizens are living in autocratic regimes. However, there is a 
significant proportion of those who use anonymity who use it to abuse, to 
troll, to silence alternative views, or to spread hate.
417. We recognise that in a perfect world there would be no need for anonymity, 
but as it stands there remain many legitimate reasons for hiding an online 
identity. A great deal of abuse could be dealt with by robust application of 
platforms’ rules; by swift, consistent and transparent moderation as set out 
in Chapter 4 and by platforms being held responsible for the content they 
recommend as set out in Chapter 3.
418. Users should be empowered to verify themselves; those who wish to 
be anonymous should remain so, but other users should be able to filter 
anonymous users out.
419. Ofcom should work with platforms and the Government’s Verify 
service, or its replacement, to enable platforms to allow users to 
verify their identities in a way that protects their privacy. Ofcom 
should encourage platforms to empower users with tools to remove 
unverified users from their conversations and more easily identify 
genuine users.
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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Informed Citizens
1. The relevant experts in the ASA, the Electoral Commission, Ofcom and the 
UK Statistics Authority should co-operate through a regulatory committee 
on political advertising. Political parties should work with these regulators 
to develop a code of practice for political advertising, along with appropriate 
sanctions, that restricts fundamentally inaccurate advertising during a 
parliamentary or mayoral election, or referendum. This regulatory committee 
should adjudicate breaches of this code. (Paragraph 36)
2. The Online Harms Bill should make clear that misinformation and 
disinformation are within its scope. (Paragraph 40)
3. Ofcom should produce a code of practice on misinformation. This code 
should include a requirement that if a piece or pattern of content is identified 
as misinformation by an accredited fact checker then it should be flagged 
as misinformation on all platforms. The content should then no longer be 
recommended to new audiences. Ofcom should work with platforms to 
experiment and determine how this should be presented to users and whether 
audiences that had previously engaged with the content should be shown the 
fact check. (Paragraph 54)
4. Ofcom should work with online platforms to agree a common means of 
accreditation (initially based on the International Fact Checking network), 
a system of funding that keeps fact checkers independent both from 
Government and from platforms, and the development of an open database 
of what content has been fact checked across platforms and providers. 
(Paragraph 55)
5. The House of Lords Communications and Digital Select Committee should 
consider conducting an inquiry to examine the communication of official 
statistics in an online world. (Paragraph 61)
6. Parliament should establish formal partnerships with broadcasters during 
election periods to make optimal use of its research expertise to help better 
inform election coverage. (Paragraph 65)
7. A new settlement is needed to protect the role of local and public interest news. 
The Government should work urgently to implement those recommendations 
of the Cairncross review which it accepts, as well as providing support for 
news organisations in dealing with the impact of COVID-19. (Paragraph 72)
8. The Competition and Markets Authority should conduct a full market 
investigation into online platforms’ control over digital advertising. 
(Paragraph 73)
Accountability
9. The Government should introduce Online Harms legislation within a year 
of this Report’s publication. (Paragraph 84)
10. The Online Harms work should make clear that platforms’ duty of care 
extends to actions which undermine democracy. This means that the duty of 
care extends to preventing generic harm to our democracy as well as against 
specific harm to an individual. (Paragraph 89)
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11. For harmful but legal content, Ofcom’s codes of practice should focus on 
the principle that platforms should be liable for the content they rank, 
recommend or target to users. (Paragraph 108)
12. The Government should include as a provision in the Online Harms Bill that 
Ofcom will hold platforms accountable for content that they recommend to 
large audiences. Platforms should be held responsible for content that they 
recommend once it has reached a specific level of virality or is produced by 
users with large audiences. (Paragraph 109)
13. The Government should empower Ofcom to sanction platforms that fail to 
comply with their duty of care in the Online Harms Bill. These sanctions 
should include fines of up to four per cent of global turnover and powers to 
enforce ISP blocking of serially non-compliant platforms. (Paragraph 110)
14. The Government should establish an independent ombudsman for content 
moderation decisions to whom the public can appeal should they feel they 
have been let down by a platform’s decisions. This ombudsman’s decisions 
should be binding on the platform and in turn create clear standards to 
be expected for future decisions for UK users. These standards should 
be adjudicated by Ofcom, with platforms able to make representations on 
how they are applied within their moderation processes. The ombudsman 
should not prevent platforms removing content which they have due cause to 
remove. (Paragraph 127)
15. Parliament should set up a joint committee of both Houses to oversee Ofcom’s 
Online Harms work and that of the proposed ombudsman. This committee 
should be constituted so that there can be no Government majority amongst 
its Members. The committee should ensure an adequate budget for this 
portion of Ofcom’s work. Ofcom should be obliged to submit all codes of 
practice to the Committee for scrutiny. (Paragraph 134)
16. The joint committee should set the budget for the content moderation 
ombudsman. The committee should hold an appointment hearing with the 
ombudsman’s proposed chief executive and hold the power of veto over their 
appointment. (Paragraph 135)
17. The Government should introduce legislation to enact the ICO’s proposal 
for a committee of regulators that would allow for joint investigations 
between regulators in the model of the Regulatory Reform (Collaboration 
etc between Ombudsmen) Order 2007. This committee should also act as 
a forum to encourage the sharing of best practice between regulators and 
support horizon scanning activity. (Paragraph 147)
18. The CDEI should conduct a review of regulatory digital capacity across the 
CMA, ICO, Electoral Commission, ASA and Ofcom to determine their 
levels of digital expertise. This review should be completed with urgency, 
to inform the Online Harms Bill before it becomes law. The CDEI should 
work with Ofcom to help determine its role in online regulation. The review 
should consider: (Paragraph 148)
(a) What relative levels of digital expertise exist within regulators, and 
where skills gaps are becoming evident; (Paragraph 148)
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(b) How these regulators currently draw on external expertise, and what 
shared system might be devised for seeking advice and support; 
(Paragraph 148)
(c) What changes in legislation governing regulators would be needed to 
allow for a shared pool of digital expertise and staffing resource that 
could work between and across regulators; (Paragraph 148)
(d) How this joint pool of staffing resource could be prioritised and funded 
between regulators. (Paragraph 148)
Transparency
19. Ofcom should be given the power to compel companies to facilitate research 
on topics that are in the public interest. The ICO should, in consultation 
with Ofcom, prepare statutory guidance under Section 128 of the Data 
Protection Act 2018 on data sharing between researchers and the technology 
platforms. Once this guidance is completed, Ofcom should require platforms 
to: (Paragraph 187)
(a) Provide at least equivalent access for researchers to APIs as that 
provided to commercial partners; (Paragraph 187)
(b) Establish direct partnerships with researchers to undertake user surveys 
and experiments with user informed consent on matters of substantial 
public interest; (Paragraph 187)
(c) Develop, for sensitive personal information, physical or virtual ‘clean 
rooms’ where researchers can analyse data. (Paragraph 187)
20. Ofcom should issue a code of practice on algorithmic recommending. This 
should require platforms to conduct audits on all substantial changes to 
their algorithmic recommending facilities for their effects on users with 
characteristics protected under the Equality Act 2010. Ofcom should 
work with platforms to establish audits on other relevant and appropriate 
characteristics. Platforms should be required to share the results of these 
audits with Ofcom and the Equalities and Human Rights Commission if 
requested. (Paragraph 200)
21. Ofcom should be given the powers and be properly resourced in order to 
undertake periodic audits of the algorithmic recommending systems used by 
technology platforms, including accessing the training data used to train the 
systems and comprehensive information from the platforms on what content 
is being recommended. (Paragraph 201)
22. There is a common thread between the need for transparency of algorithmic 
processes and researchers’ access to platforms. Platforms must be entirely 
open to the regulators to ensure proper oversight. Ofcom can only ensure 
that platforms are meeting their duty of care if it has access to all data from 
these platforms and the ability to use additional research expertise to better 
understand what that data means. The exact details of what data Ofcom 
will need will change as technology develops therefore these powers must be 
suitably broad. (Paragraph 202)
23. Ofcom should have the power to request any data relevant to ensure that 
platforms are acting in accordance with their duty of care. (Paragraph 203)
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24. Ofcom should issue a code of practice on content moderation. This should 
require companies to clearly state what they do not allow on their platforms 
and give useful examples of how this applies in practice. These policies 
should also make clear how individual decisions can be appealed. Platforms 
should be obligated to ensure that their content moderation decisions are 
consistent with their published terms and conditions, community standards 
and privacy rules. (Paragraph 216)
25. The code of practice on content moderation should also include the 
requirement that all technology platforms publish an anonymised 
database of archetypes of content moderation decisions on impersonation, 
misinformation, hate speech and abuse. Where decisions differ from existing 
published examples the platform should be obliged to explain the decision 
to the individuals affected and to create a new anonymised decision. Failure 
to ensure consistency between content moderation practices and published 
examples should be seen as a failure in the duty of care and result in sanctions 
against the platforms.  (Paragraph 217)
Inclusive debate across society
26. Local authorities should be required to publish open, machine-readable 
information on elections, including what elections are taking place, who the 
candidates are and where polling stations are located. (Paragraph 232)
27. Any information about democratic processes published by government at 
any level should be available in accessible language. (Paragraph 233)
28. Technology can play an important role in engaging people with democratic 
processes. Parliament and government, at all levels, should not seek to 
use technology simply to reduce costs, and must ensure that appropriate 
technology is used to enhance and enrich democratic engagement. 
(Paragraph 242)
29. The Government should establish an independent democratic information 
hub. This would be both a public-facing hub that provides information about 
democracy, starting with basic information about democratic procedures, and 
a means of sharing best practice in digital democracy between policymakers 
and civil society organisations. (Paragraph 258)
30. Parliament, and national, devolved and local government must acquire and 
develop greater digital capacity and skills to facilitate digital democratic 
engagement. This should be a mix of inhouse development and the funding 
of specialist external organisations as appropriate. (Paragraph 267)
Free and fair elections
31. The Government should bring forward a Bill based on the proposals set 
out by the Law Commission that comprehensively modernises electoral law. 
This should be completed in all its stages before the next General Election. 
(Paragraph 284)
32. The Government should legislate immediately to introduce imprints on 
online political material. This could be done through secondary legislation. 
(Paragraph 294)
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33. The reform of electoral law should grant the Electoral Commission the power 
to acquire information from external parties such as social networks about 
campaigners’ activities outside of a formal investigation. (Paragraph 299)
34. The reform of electoral law should support the Electoral Commission in 
creating statutory guidance on the level of detail campaigners set out in 
receipts concerning digital spending and in their spending returns to the 
Commission, to provide the public with a greater understanding of the 
breadth and nature of online campaigns. (Paragraph 305)
35. As part of the reform of electoral law, the maximum fine the Electoral 
Commission can levy should be raised to £500,000 or four per cent of a 
campaign’s total spend, whichever is greater. (Paragraph 311)
36. The Electoral Commission should be given oversight of local candidate 
spending as well as national spending and should review what types of 
spending are included in each category. (Paragraph 318)
37. The Electoral Commission should explore whether it would be feasible to 
create a secondary registration scheme for campaigners who would otherwise 
fall below current spending limits. These campaigners would only be required 
to register the identity of their trustees or legally responsible persons and the 
identity of their five largest funders. They would not be required to disclose 
spending. This information could then be used to improve the transparency 
of online imprints. (Paragraph 324)
38. The Government should then consider whether this secondary registration 
scheme should form part of the reform of electoral law. (Paragraph 325)
39. Ofcom should issue a code of practice for online advertising setting out that 
in order for platforms to meet their obligations under the ‘duty of care’ they 
must provide a comprehensive, real time and publicly accessible database 
of all adverts on their platform. This code of practice should make use of 
existing work on best practice. (Paragraph 337)
40. The Government should legislate to put the ICO’s draft code on political 
campaigners’ use of personal data onto a statutory footing. (Paragraph 353)
Active digital citizens
41. Ofsted, in partnership with the Department for Education, Ofcom, the ICO 
and subject associations, should commission a large-scale programme of 
evaluation of digital media literacy initiatives. This should: (Paragraph 386)
(a) Review the international evidence of what has worked best in digital 
media literacy initiatives; (Paragraph 386)
(b) Map existing digital media initiatives across the UK, inside and outside 
of schools, aimed at all age groups; (Paragraph 386)
(c) Commission research to evaluate those UK initiatives that appear to be 
most successful; (Paragraph 386)
(d) Report in time for the lessons learned to be implemented at scale in the 
2021–22 academic year. (Paragraph 386)
42. The Department for Education should review the school curriculum 
to ensure that pupils are equipped with all the skills needed in a modern 
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digital world. Critical digital media literacy should be embedded across the 
wider curriculum based on the lessons learned from the review of initiatives 
recommended above. All teachers will need support through CPD to achieve 
this. (Paragraph 395)
43. We recommend that Ofcom should require large platforms to user test all 
major design changes to ensure that they increase rather than decrease 
informed user choices. Ofcom should help devise the criteria for this testing 
and review the results. There should be genuine and easily understandable 
options for people to choose how their data is used. (Paragraph 401)
44. The CDEI should conduct a review of the implications of platform design 
for users, focusing on determining best practice in explaining how individual 
pieces of content have been targeted at a user. Ofcom should use this to form 
the basis of a code of practice on design transparency. This should feed into 
the Department for Education’s review of the curriculum so that citizens are 
taught what to expect from user transparency on platforms. (Paragraph 405)
45. Ofcom should work with platforms and the Government’s Verify service, or 
its replacement, to enable platforms to allow users to verify their identities 
in a way that protects their privacy. Ofcom should encourage platforms to 
empower users with tools to remove unverified users from their conversations 
and more easily identify genuine users. (Paragraph 419)
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APPENDIx 3: CALL FOR EVIDENCE
The House of Lords Select Committee on Democracy and Digital Technologies 
was established on 13 June 2019 and asked to report by 31 March 2020.
With the growth of digital media, methods of political communication and 
campaigning have evolved. The impact of digital technologies on our democratic 
processes has come under increasing scrutiny. Many are of the view that digital 
technologies offer significant potential benefits for the extension of democracy, 
while others fear that such technologies may actually undermine the democratic 
process. As well as covering the effects of digital technologies on the electoral 
process and political campaigns, the Committee wishes to consider the effects of 
technology on political debate more broadly, and the wider public’s engagement 
with and participation in political discourse.
The Committee has decided to focus on the issue of how representative democracy 
can be supported, rather than undermined, in a digital world. It will primarily 
look across six key areas: transparency in political campaigns; privacy and 
anonymity; misinformation; the effects of digital technologies on public discourse; 
how technology can facilitate democracy and the development of effective digital 
literacy.
The Committee is seeking input on the following questions:
General
(1) How has digital technology changed the way that democracy works in 
the UK and has this been a net positive or negative effect?
(2) How have the design of algorithms used by social media platforms 
shaped democratic debate? To what extent should there be greater 
accountability for the design of these algorithms?
Education
(3) What role should every stage of education play in helping to create a 
healthy, active, digitally literate democracy?
Online campaigning
(4) Would greater transparency in the online spending and campaigning 
of political groups improve the electoral process in the UK by ensuring 
accountability, and if so, what should this transparency look like?
(5) What effect does online targeted advertising have on the political 
process, and what effects could it have in the future? Should there be 
additional regulation of political advertising?
Privacy and anonymity
(6) To what extent does increasing use of encrypted messaging and private 
groups present a challenge to the democratic process?
(7) What are the positive or negative effects of anonymity on online 
democratic discourse?
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Democratic debate
(8) To what extent does social media negatively shape public debate, 
either through encouraging polarisation or through abuse deterring 
individuals from engaging in public life?
(9) To what extent do you think that there are those who are using social 
media to attempt to undermine trust in the democratic process and in 
democratic institutions; and what might be the best ways to combat 
this and strengthen faith in democracy?
Misinformation
(10) What might be the best ways of reducing the effects of misinformation 
on social media platforms?
Moderation
(11) How could the moderation processes of large technology companies be 
improved to better tackle abuse and misinformation, as well as helping 
public debate flourish?
Technology and democratic engagement
(12) How could the Government better support the positive work of civil 
society organisations using technology to facilitate engagement with 
democratic processes?
(13) How can elected representatives use technology to engage with the 
public in local and national decision making? What can Parliament 
and Government do to better use technology to support democratic 
engagement and ensure the efficacy of the democratic process?
(14) What positive examples are there of technology being used to enhance 
democracy?
The deadline for written evidence is 20 September 2019.
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APPENDIx 4: NOTE OF THE COMMITTEE DIGITAL SURGERIES 
ORGANISED WITH THE POLITICS PROJECT
1. On 29 October and 5 november, we held ‘digital surgeries’, organised with 
the Politics Project. Our first surgery took place with pupils and the second 
with teachers involved in the provision of digital literacy.
Digital surgery with pupils from Oasis MediaCity Academy, Salford and 
Queen Elizabeth’s School, Devon
2. On 29 October, we held a videocall with Year 10 pupils from Oasis MediaCity 
Academy in Salford and sixth form pupils from Queen Elizabeth’s School in 
Devon.
3. We discussed how pupils used social media and how they learned about 
current issues and politics online. Pupils from both schools told us that they 
tend to use news websites and apps such as Sky news and BBC news to 
access their news. They also supplemented this with news on Instagram and 
Snapchat. They said that they would cross reference between websites to 
discern whether a news item seen on social media was true. They agreed that 
social media sites encouraged people to share their opinions about current 
issues and that this had both positive and negative implications.
4. We asked where pupils’ digital literacy education fell within the curriculum. 
Pupils from both schools agreed that the subject fell within Personal, Social, 
Health and Economic (PSHE) education. Some pupils told us they had learnt 
about digital literacy within media studies at GCSE and A-level. Pupils in 
both schools believed that teaching about the subject should start in primary 
school, as children have exposure to digital technologies from a young age.
5. The pupils demonstrated knowledge about how they would participate in 
community events to effect change if they were unhappy with something 
in their local area. When asked what the Government could do to help 
pupils feel more empowered, pupils suggested that they could engage more 
with social media to disseminate government initiatives and news amongst 
younger people. One suggestion was to create a Government-backed app 
from which people could get their news, with content tailored to young 
people in simpler language.
Digital surgery with teachers from across the country
6. On 5 november, we held a videocall with six teachers from across the 
country who had responsibility for teaching political education at different 
educational levels.
7. We asked the teachers where political education sat within the curriculum. All 
the teachers agreed that Citizenship was the best place for political education 
and that this should go beyond just focussing on elections. They mentioned 
that Citizenship at Key Stage 3 and 4, used to be compulsory. One teacher 
explained that he incorporated political education into his Religious Studies 
classes, which he tried to make more like a general studies course. There 
was a concern amongst all the teachers that time for political education was 
diminishing. One teacher stated that it was a “grave assumption to think 
that political education can be taught in tutor time”, to the agreement of 
all. The teachers were also concerned that with diminishing time, it would 
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be difficult to persuade non-specialist teachers, some of whom have little 
political understanding, to learn more about political education.
8. We discussed the teaching of misinformation and fake news. The teachers 
agreed that this was a necessary subject to teach and said that they used 
examples such as media reporting about the Duke and Duchess of Sussex to 
help pupils compare information that was put across. This is content that is 
required at Citizenship GCSE, but the teachers said they would like more 
time on this, rather than simply preparing pupils for exams.
9. All the teachers stated they would want more time to teach political education 
and some said that timetabled curriculum lessons would be helpful. One of 
the teachers also told us that they would value media and sociology training, 
in order to teach political education from a wider perspective. One of the 
teachers had recently been on a trip to Washington to learn about media 
literacy and fact checking. They were impressed with the quality of teaching 
and with the focus on trying to separate news online from advertising that 
they observed and noted that lessons could be learnt from teaching practices 
elsewhere.
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APPENDIx 5: REGULATORY INNOVATION WORKSHOP
1. On Wednesday 22 January, we hosted a workshop to discuss the challenges 
that regulators face in adapting to the digital environment, particularly 
in the context of digital campaigning. The event was organised by our 
specialist adviser, sponsored by the journal Political Quarterly and held in 
Collaboration with the Turing Institute and the Crick Centre for the Public 
Understanding of Politics. Professor Helen Margetts, Professor of Internet 
and Society at the Oxford Internet Institute and Director of the Public Policy 
Programme at The Alan Turing Institute, chaired the event.
2. The workshop was attended by just under 30 individuals who work within 
regulatory bodies or government, companies, or charities.
Presentations
3. Presentations were made by Dr Kate Dommett, the Committee’s specialist 
adviser, Ravi naik, the Committee’s legal adviser and Chris Gorst from 
nesta.
4. Dr Dommett’s presentation provided an overview of the current debates 
about the regulation of digital campaigning, including the range of legislative 
proposals made around digital campaigning and the focus hitherto on how 
the powers of regulators need to grow. Dr Dommett highlighted how less 
attention had been given to the issue of regulator capacity and how regulators 
themselves need to adapt, change and upskill in order to be able to adapt to 
regulation in a digital arena. Dr Dommett stressed the need to not only 
consider questions such as how regulation could occur and how regulators 
themselves could be equipped to adapt their regulatory capacities.
5. Ravi naik highlighted several simple fixes that could be made to electoral 
law to boost transparency. He argued that in the future there will be a need 
to focus regulation on the accountability of platforms and data use. He also 
suggested that there is a need to think further about current enforcement 
deficits within the regulatory landscape, stressing the need for regulators to 
have an effective set of sanctions to enforce.
6. Chris Gorst from nesta spoke about the need for anticipatory regulation 
and nesta’s work in this area. He noted that the UK is a well-regulated 
country but diagnosed a tendency to identify specific problems and develop 
regulatory solutions in silos. He argued that there was a need to update 
regulators created in a pre-digital era to the digital world, yet it was necessary 
to ensure that any future system was both good at protecting from risk but 
did not prevent social innovation and the benefits this can deliver.
Discussion
7. Attendees then discussed the issues that had been raised by the speakers. 
The conversation first covered collaboration, both in terms of the need for 
regulators to work more closely with industry, and with one another. There 
was discussion of the need for shared resources and expertise and for more 
inter-regulator discussion and collaboration. One contributor proposed an 
Office for Responsible Technology to sit across Government and promote 
collaboration. There were few examples of places where regulators could 
meet to exchange and discuss ideas. Promoting inter-regulator collaboration 
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was seen to be easy where there were clear overlaps in interests, but harder 
where regulatory responsibilities were unclear.
8. There was also discussion of regulators’ ability to adapt and how this could 
be affected by regulatory remit and statutory foundation.
9. There was an acknowledgment from regulators that they often wanted to do 
more but were curtailed by a limited remit and small budget. This meant 
that regulators often focused on performing core functions and had less 
capacity to pursue collaboration and horizon scanning activities.
10. There was seen to be a need to give regulators more power and to ensure clear 
mechanisms for ensuring accountability. Enforcement and accountability 
were not just seen to be online issues: offline examples of misinformation 
can also carry few penalties so there was a need to think further about 
enforcement, penalties and how to hold actors to account.
11. Budget was seen to be a limiting condition on regulatory behaviour, but 
there was a consensus that some action could be taken without additional 
resource–one possibility was thinking about reconfiguring the regulatory 
landscape to work more effectively. This potentially linked to increased 
collaboration.
12. It was argued that there was a need to determine the aims of regulation, and 
what it is that any regulation is seeking to protect.
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APPENDIx 6: THE SEVEN PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC LIFE (THE 
NOLAN PRINCIPLES)
The Seven Principles of Public Life (also known as the nolan Principles) apply to 
anyone who works as a public office holder. This includes all those who are elected 
or appointed to public office, nationally and locally, and all people appointed to 
work in the Civil Service, local government, the police, courts and probation 
services, non-departmental public bodies, and in the health, education, social and 
care services. All public office holders are both servants of the public and stewards 
of public resources.
The principles also apply to all those in other sectors delivering public services.
Selflessness
Holders of public office should act solely in terms of the public interest.
Integrity
Holders of public office must avoid placing themselves under any obligation to 
people or organisations that might try inappropriately to influence them in their 
work. They should not act or take decisions in order to gain financial or other 
material benefits for themselves, their family, or their friends. They must declare 
and resolve any interests and relationships.
Objectivity
Holders of public office must act and take decisions impartially, fairly and on 
merit, using the best evidence and without discrimination or bias.
Accountability
Holders of public office are accountable to the public for their decisions and actions 
and must submit themselves to the scrutiny necessary to ensure this.
Openness
Holders of public office should act and take decisions in an open and transparent 
manner. Information should not be withheld from the public unless there are clear 
and lawful reasons for so doing.
Honesty
Holders of public office should be truthful.
Leadership
Holders of public office should exhibit these principles in their own behaviour. 
They should actively promote and robustly support the principles and be willing 
to challenge poor behaviour wherever it occurs.
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APPENDIx 7: LIST OF DEFINITIONS USED IN THIS REPORT
Definition of platforms (Box 1)
The defining feature of platforms, as used in this Report, in the context of 
democracy and digital technology is that they intermediate between their 
customers and content that they do not create (and that they do not usually pay 
for either). This is achieved through indexing content that exists elsewhere on the 
internet, such as Google, or through user submitted content, such as Facebook, 
Twitter or YouTube. As a result, they often offer harmful content that can have 
a detrimental effect on individuals and society. This can be compounded by the 
business models of these platforms. The largest platforms in this space are all 
funded by advertising and are incentivised to increase user attention. Many of 
these platforms harvest users’ personal data to effectively algorithmically rank and 
recommend content to maintain user attention. This can incentivise an increased 
spread of harmful content as we discuss throughout this Report. Algorithmic 
ranking and recommending of content mean these platforms are making de facto 
editorial decisions and we consider them as such in this Report.
neither advertising, nor algorithmic recommendation is a necessary condition 
for spreading harmful content. For example, WhatsApp features neither but still 
has been used to spread concerning content. Throughout this Report we refer 
to platforms, online platforms or technology platforms as ways to describe these 
intermediary services. These intermediaries are not necessarily bad. If platforms 
were to effectively abide by the norms of a democratic society through tackling 
harmful content rather than spreading it then they could play a powerful, 
constructive role in supporting democracy.
Definition of misinformation and disinformation (Box 2)
Baroness O’neill of Bengarve neatly explained the difference between 
misinformation and disinformation:
“… if I make a mistake and tell you that the moon is made of blue cheese, 
but I honestly believe it, that is misinformation. If I know perfectly well 
that it is not made of blue cheese but tell you so, that is disinformation.”
Whether or not information is purposefully false does not change whether it is 
harmful. In our report we use ‘misinformation’ where it is unclear if there was 
purposeful intent to misinform and only label something ‘disinformation’ if that 
intent is clear.
Definition of campaigner (Box 6)
There is no single definition of campaigning in law that can be readily used to 
define what a campaigner is. The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums 
Act 2000 (PPERA) has separate definitions of campaign spending for registered 
parties, third parties and referendum campaigners. The Representation of the 
People Act 1983 has another definition for election spending by candidates.
Advancements in digital technologies also bring the question of what a campaigner 
is into focus. The PPERA, drafted 20 years ago, does not account for the present 
situation.
In their 2018 ‘Democracy Disrupted’ report, the Electoral Commission used the 
term ‘campaigner’ loosely as an umbrella term for political parties, third parties, 
permitted participants, unregistered referendum campaigners and candidates.
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We define a ‘campaign’ as coordinated activity that promotes electoral success or 
promoting a referendum outcome. This applies to political parties, registered and 
unregistered third parties and candidates in local and national elections.
Definition of digital media literacy (Box 9)
We use the term ‘digital media literacy’ because our purposes go beyond, but do 
include, the functional skills required to use technology.
We define digital media literacy as being able to distinguish fact from fiction, 
including misinformation, understand how digital platforms work, as well as how 
to exercise one’s voice and influence decision makers in a digital context.
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APPENDIx 8: GLOSSARY
AI Artificial Intelligence
ASA Advertising Standards Authority
CAP Committee of Advertising Practice
CDEI Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation
CMA Competition and Markets Authority
CPD Continuous Professional Development
DPA Data Protection Act 2018
DCMS Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation
ICO Information Commissioner’s Office
ICT Information and Communications Technology
IFCn International Fact Checking network
LGBT+ Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, plus other gender and 
sexual minorities
LSE London School of Economics
nISRA northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency
OnS Office for national Statistics
OSR Office for Statistics Regulation
PPERA Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000
PSHE Personal, Social, Health and Economic Education
SME Small and Medium Enterprise
UCL University College London
UCLA University of California, Los Angeles
UnESCO United nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation
